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December 27, 1996
In this dissertation, the effects o f  financial liberalization in Turkey are investigated on three 
aspects. Firstly, the effects o f  liberalization on the macroeconomic variables o f aggregate 
saving, investment, growth, bank deposits, bank credits and securities issues and portfolios 
are discussed. It was found that after the liberalization the difference between private saving 
and investment increased. On the other hand the same difference for the public sector became 
highly negative. In other words the public sector increasingly resorted to the private sector to 
cover its deficit. The share o f  non-service sector investments (manufacturing, agriculture and 
mining) in total private investments decreased considerably after liberalization. The growth 
performance o f  the economy after liberalization compares negatively with that before the 
liberalization. Financial deepening increased after liberalization. Bank deposits increased 
rapidly but the increase in credits were limited. The main reason was a rapid increase in bank 
and non-bank holdings o f government securities.
We focus next on the probable efficiency effects o f  liberalization. Employing a fixed- 
effect model we compared the efficiency o f manufacturing firms in eight industries before 
and after the liberalization. We use these findings to see whether efficiency became a more 
important factor in the access to bank credit after the liberalization. The results indicate that 
there has been an increase in the mean efficiency and the importance o f  efficiency as a 
determinant o f  access to bank credit after liberalization. However, factors like size and 
location continued to play a major role in access to bank credit well after the liberalization. 
Finally, we present evidence through a second fixed effect model and a sample selection  
model that after the liberalization efficiency led to increased access to bank credit but the 
opposite link was much less strong.
Finally, we investigate the financial behavior o f  manufacturing firms quoted at the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange during “normal” times and during crisis. We present evidence that 
firms are financially constrained. Using interactive variables in ordinary least square 
estimations we argue that financial constraints on firms that are informationally closer to 
banks are less stringent. On the other hand, we found that during 1994 financial crisis the 
constraints became more stringent. However, again, this phenomenon was not homogenous 
across different firm categories. Finally, the findings point out to a substantial restructuring 
during the crisis. The terms o f restructuring varied across firm categories. We present 
evidence that firms with closer informational ties to banks had better conditions o f  
restructuring.
K eywords: Financial Liberalization, Financial Repression, Asymmetric Information, 
Financial Accelerator, Financial Constraints, Fixed-Effect Model, Random Effect Model, 
Sample Selection Model.
ÖZET
MALİ SERBESTİ VE REEL EKONOMİ: TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ
Murat Âli Yülek 
İktisat Doktora Tezi
Tez Yöneticisi: Yardımcı Doçent Doktor îzak Atiyas
27 Aralık 1996
Bu tezde Türkiye’de uygulanan mali serbestinin etkileri üç açıdan incelenmiştir. Öncelikle, 
liberasyonun etkileri makroekonomik açıdan, toplam tasarruflar, yatırımlar, büyüme, banka 
mevduatları, kredileri, değerli kağıt ihraçları ve finansal varlık portföyleri dikkate alınarak 
değerlendirilmiştir. Eldeki veriler liberasyon sonrasında özel kesim tasarrufları ile yatırımları 
arasındaki farkın büyüdüğünü, buna karşılık kamu kesimi açısından durumun tam tersi 
olduğunu ve farkın negatif yönde büyüdüğünü göstermektedir. Dolayısıyla liberasyon 
sonrasında kamu kesimi kendi açığını özel (ve dış) kesim tasarruflarından giderek artan bir 
trendle karşılamıştır. Üretken sektörlerdeki yatırımların toplam içindeki payı giderek 
düşmüştür. Ekonominin büyüme performansında da liberasyon öncesi döneme oranla bir 
gerileme olmuştur. Mali derinlik serbesti sonrasında artmıştır. Toplam banka mevduatları 
yükselmiş ancak krediler aynı oranda artmamıştır. Bunun temel sebebi bankaların ellerinde 
kanunen ve gönüllü olarak tuttukları devlet tahvil ve bonolarının artmasıdır.
Tezde ikinci olarak mali serbestinin verim üzerindeki etkileri incelenmiştir. Sabit 
etkiler modeli kullanılarak sekiz ayrı imalat alt-sanayi dalında faaliyet gösteren firmaların 
liberasyon öncesi ve sonrasındaki teknik verimlilikleri karşılaştırılmıştır. Bu bulgulardan 
hareketle firma verimliliğinin banka kredilerine ulaşımda liberasyon sonrasında etkisinin artıp 
artmadığı da korelasyon analiziyle incelenmiştir. Sonuçlar, liberasyon sonrasında ortalama 
teknik verimliliğin ve bunun banka kredilerine ulaşıma olan etkisinin arttığını göstermektedir. 
Ancak, ölçek ve yer gibi özelliklerin liberasyon sonrasında da banka kredilerine ulaşımdaki 
önemlerinin devam ettiğini göstermektedir. Banka kredileri ile verimlilik arasındaki pozitif 
ilişkide her iki yöne doğru bir sebepsellik olabilir. Bu konuda, ikinci bir sabit etkiler modeli 
ve bir örnek seçme modeli kullanılarak yapılan analizde, verimliliğin banka kredilerine 
ulaşımda önemli bir etkisi olduğu, ancak banka kredilerine ulaşmış olmanın firma 
verimliliğini artırıcı etkisinin çok sınırlı olduğu görülmüştür.
Son olarak, İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsasında listelenen imalat sanayi 
şirketlerinin normal zamanlardaki ve kriz dönemindeki finansal davranışı incelenmiştir. 
Regresyon analizinden elde edilen sonuçlar firmaların normal zamanlarda finansal 
davranışlarının kısıtlandırılmış olduğunu göstermektedir. Ancak, mali sektöre (bankalara) 
bilgi açısından daha yakın olan şirketlerin kısıtlarının daha zayıf olduğu görülmüştür. 1994 
krizi sırasında kısıtlar güçlenmiş ancak bu değişiklik farklı kategorideki şirketler için yine 
farklı biçim ve derecelerde tezahür etmiştir. Son olarak, bulgular 1994 krizi sırasında 
borçların önemli oranda yeniden şekillendirildiğini göstermektedir. Bu yeniden şekillenme de 
farklı firma grupları için farklı elverişlikte olmuştur.
A nahtar K elim eler: Mali serbesti. Mali Baskı, Asimetrik Bilgi, Mali Hızlandırıcı, Mali 
Kısıtlar, Sabit Etkiler Modeli, Rassal Etkiler Modeli, Örneklem Seçim M odeli.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Financial liberalization has been a widely studied topic in the economic 
literature in the last two decades triggered by the two influential studies by 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). In fact the discussion on the link between 
finance and growth goes back at least until Joan Robinson (1952). In The Rate 
o f Interest and Other Essays Robinson argued that economic growth brings 
about developments in the financial system. Schumpeter (1969) argued the 
opposite causality; developed financial systems would promote innovations and 
thus positively effect economic growth. Cameron (1967), Goldsmith (1968, 
1969), Patrick (1966) have studied country cases and argued similarly that the 
organization of the financial system is crucial to economic development'.
We find it useful for the integrity of this dissertation to summarize the 
main arguments of the pro-liberalization view and its main critiques. Within a 
loanable funds framework, the story can be told using a simple graphical 
apparatus . Consider a closed economy (i.e., zero current account deficit) with 
zero public sector borrowing requirement for simplicity. In Figure 1 below, SS 
and II lines represent the private saving and investment schedules respectively. 
At the r^ressed rate of r^ ,^ investments are constrained by lower-than-
equilibrium savings^. The area under the curve II and above ro can be viewed 
as a surplus to ‘investors’ (of physical capital). Similarly, the area above the SS
Some useful surveys o f the topic are Fry (1988) and Gibson and Tsakalatos (1994) and Schiantarelli et 
al.(1994).
^Fry(1982).
Tor simplicity, we assume borrowing and lending rates are equal.
curve and under ro is the savers' surplus. Triangle ABC can be seen as a 
deadweight loss in the financial markets which constrains the growth 
performance of the economy as a result of low investment levels compared to 
equilibrium. The repressionist policy therefore entails a transfer from the savers 
to investors -which constitutes an incentive for investors- and at the same time a 
deadweight loss to the society"*.
Figure 1 Financial Repression and Liberalization
Increasing the ceiling would relax the saving constraint leading to higher 
investment levels. We refer to this as the ‘volume’ effect as in Gibson and 
Tsakalatos (1994). This causes the deadweight loss to diminish. Full financial 
liberalization theoretically would lead to the equilibrium interest rate, re, and the 
equilibrium amount of investments, T. Consequently, the deadweight loss will 
disappear. Increased investment will lead to higher output and income, and the 
saving schedule will shift to right during the process^.
‘'Under certain assumptions, it may be showed that repressionist policy may be welfare improving in the 
long-run. For this point see Yiilek (1995a).
Wll this process of course vitally hinges on the assumption of positive association between interest rates 
and saving. As well known, this assumption is theoretically questionable due to the competing income 
and substitution effects of changes in interest rates. Moreover, as Snowden (1987) emphasizes, the
There is another advantage from liberalization; credit rationing will 
decrease or disappear and average efficiency of investment will increase. Under 
repression, assuming that both borrowing and lending are made at ro, it is easy 
to see in Figure 1 that the investment projects to be financed will be those with 
relatively lower returns (which will be slightly above ro) and lower risk as the 
banks can not charge the interest rate necessary to cover the perceived risk 
when they are subject to ceilings. In other words, high risk- high return projects 
will be denied credit and the investors’ surplus mentioned earlier will be de 
facto reduced. After liberalization, those projects with returns between ro and 
will be no longer profitable and therefore will not be considered. The average 
efficiency of investments will therefore go up. This is referred to as the 
‘efficiency’ effect.
The criticisms of financial liberalization has been made based on both 
macroeconomic and microeconomic arguments. Macroeconomic criticisms 
which focus on output, inflation and growth are mainly made by post-Keynesian 
and new-structuralist critiques. Post-Keynesian school^ emphasizes potential 
financial fragility after liberalization, effect of increased real interest rates on 
government budget deficit and, most importantly, the role of effective demand. 
It is argued that as a result of financial liberalization, the marginal propensity to 
save will increase leading to a fall in aggregate demand. This will cause the 
profit rates, and hence investment, to fall. If this further causes investors to 
become pessimistic about future, it will constitute an additional negative effect 
on investment and demand. Accelerator effects may be another potential force 
reducing investments.
New-structuralist strand^ emphasizes the working capital needs of the 
firms and credit supply mechanism in the developing countries in addition to *
incidence issues are also important. Snowden (1987) shows that generally the incidence falls on the 
highly-geared firms and as a result, total saving may not increase after liberalization. See also Cho 
(1986).
*See for example Burkett and Dutt (1991), Dutt (1991), Grabel (1995) and Studart (1993). See Gibson 
and Tsakalatos (1994) for a summary.
’See Taylor (1979, 1983), van Wijnbergen (1982, 1983a, 1983b, 1985) and Buffie (1984).
Q
the potential fall in aggregate demand due to liberalization . New-structuralists 
emphasize that firms in developing countries often have to resort to unofficial 
curb markets for their financing needs.
Financial liberalization will attract (flow) saving from unofficial to the 
official financial system. If this shift of saving originates from “unproductive” 
assets (gold, foreign currency etc.) there is not much problem. But if the funds 
that would otherwise be allocated to the curb market are directed to the official 
banking system, then the total supply of (bank and curb market) credit may 
decline as the official banking system is subject to reserve requirements unlike 
the curb market. This result is exactly the opposite of what is expected of 
financial liberalization by McKinnon-Shaw type reasoning. Moreover, as van 
Wijnbergen (1983b) indicates, this may lead to a serious fall in output through 
the channel of working capital.
‘Microeconomic’ criticisms of financial liberalization emphasizes 
failures in financial markets mainly due to informational asymmetries^. Recent 
studies on the implications of informational asymmetries in credit markets have 
shown that financial constraints play an important role on the spending (on 
factor inputs) behavior of firms in the developed financial markets'* .^ The 
arguments in this literature can be traced back to Akerlof (1970), Townsend 
(1979), Myers and Majluf (1984) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Akerlof (1970) 
emphasized the general problem of asymmetry of information between the 
buyer and the lender. The other mentioned authors have shown that the 
implications of asymmetric information are richer in the context of financial 
markets. This literature shows that to overcome the risks associated with the 
asymmetric information lenders have to include an “external finance premium” 
in the interest rates.
In their seminal article, Fazzari, Petersen and Hubbard (1988) have 
shown that unlike the predictions of a perfect Modigliani-Miller setup, firms
*The latter argument of the new-structuralists are similar to those made by post-Keynesians. 
’See Stiglitz (1989) and Stiglitz (1993).
that are financially constrained have to rely heavily on the internally generated 
funds to undertake investment spending. In other words, for such firms, the 
internal and external funds are not perfect substitutes given the external finance 
premia. The external finance premia get higher the farther, informationally, the 
firm is to the lender.
Recent studies in this literature generally focused on the monetary 
transmission mechanism''. Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992) Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989), among others, for example, argue that informational 
asymmetries imply an additional monetary transmission mechanism to the 
classical IS-LM type stories. One motivation of the mechanism works through 
the debt capacity of a firm. Unlike in a Modigliani-Miller set-up, in the real 
world, firms have to borrow against collateral. Taking net worth as a measure of 
collateralization capacity of a firm, it can be argued that changes in net worth 
will affect the debt capacity of a firm. The more the firm’s spending is sensitive 
to external funds, the more the changes in net-worth will affect the spending 
decisions of the firm. Hence an additional channel through which financial 
conditions affect the real economy.
Country Experience and Empirical Evidence
The theoretical ambiguities on the real effects of financial liberalization takes 
the question to the empirical arena. But there also, the ambiguity is not 
resolved.
One avenue in empirical studies have been cross-country regressions of 
financial deepening and average economic growth. The results of such studies 
are mixed on the association between financial development and real variables 
like saving, investment and growth. For example, Lanyi and Saraçoğlu (1983), 
Fry (1978), King and Levine (1993) and Jung (1986), among others, find a
'®See Gertler (1988) and Bernanke (1993) for surveys of this literature. See Gertler and Rose (1994) on 
a discussion of the relevance of this literature to financial liberalization developing countries.
"See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for a survey.
positive association. Paradoxically, Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989) 
demonstrate in a large sample of developing countries that plot a proxy for 
financial development (M2/GNP ratio) against average growth rates yields a 
cluster and arbitrary choice of smaller sub-samples may give any correlation 
between the two variables. A similar criticism was made by Giovannini (1983) 
to Fry (1978) in that exclusion of two observations from Korea significantly 
alters conclusions of the latter study. Moreover, cross-country studies such as 
Khatkate (1988), Schmidt-Hebbel, Webb and Corsetti (1992) and Thornton 
(1996) also show that empirical evidence is inconclusive'^.
The results of individual country studies are also mixed. Among these 
studies are De Meló and Tybout (1986) on Uruguay, Warman and Thirwall
(1994) on Mexico, Oshikoya (1992) on Kenya, Hanna (1994) and Fukuchi
(1995) on Indonesia.
Interestingly, there are even debates on whether there is repression in a 
country or not. For example, McKinnon (1991) considers Japan in the high 
growth period between 1953-1973 and Korea in the post-1965 period as non- 
repressed economies. The growth performance of the two countries are then 
implicitly attributed to financial liberalization. Clearly, it is very difficult to 
consider Japan’s financial climate in the pre-1973 period as a liberal one given 
a number of distortions that the government instituted in the financial markets'^. 
Similarly, authors like Cho (1989) and Amsden (1989) argue that the 
government intervention in the financial and goods markets became even 
deeper after 1965 reforms. Amsden (1989) and Amsden and Euh (1993) argue 
that the government intervention in financial markets in Korea continued even 
after the 1980 financial reforms.
‘^ Among the studies which find positive associations between financial development and real growth 
King and Levine (1993) is careful in considering the direction of causality. They estimate a simple 
model to test if the starting financial development leads to a highej;^ubsequent real economic growth. 
They conclude that the causality runs rather from financial development to real development. However, 
the conclusions of Jung (1986) and Thornton (1996) that causality runs both ways question King and 
Levine results.
'^See Yulek (1996) for a detailed discussion on this.
The Turkish Experience
Prior to 1980, the Turkish financial markets were highly repressed. The interest 
rates were subject to nominal ceilings which made the real rates negative. 
Capital was immobile. Official exchange rates were fixed and this created 
parallel markets. There was an extensive system of directed credit. The central 
bank fulfilled the function of a “development agency” instead of a standard 
central bank and reserve requirements were high. Nevertheless, in spite of these 
classical symptoms of financial repression, there has been a continuous increase 
in financial deepening between 1950 and 1980 and the average growth rate of 
the economy was one of the highest among the OECD countries.
After the financial liberalization, real interest rates turned positive and by 
mid- 1980s, a number of standard financial instruments have already been 
introduced. However, the country have witnessed a major financial crises in 
1982 and another one in 1994.
This dissertation aims at evaluating the results of financial liberalization 
in Turkey. We consider the results of financial liberalization in Turkey on three 
different domains that we mentioned earlier; from a macroeconomic (aggregate) 
point of view (the ‘volume’ effect), from efficiency point of view (the 
‘efficiency’ effect) and from a firm financial behavior point of view (in relation 
to the asymmetric information literature).
We first make a macroeconomic assessment of financial liberalization in 
the second chapter. We consider both real (saving, investment and growth) and 
financial variables (bank deposits and credits, securities). The results indicate 
that growth performance of the economy declined after liberalization. This was 
mainly due to the pressure that liberalization put on the government budget 
deficit and the ensuing positive difference between private saving and private 
investment.
In the third chapter, we consider the effects of liberalization on firm 
productive efficiency and firm’s access to bank credit. We use the fixed effects
model to estimate efficiency. Based on a large sample of manufacturing firms, 
we provide evidence that productive efficiency has increased after 
liberalization. Moreover, the importance of efficiency on access to bank credit 
has also improved. However, size continues to be a major factor in access to 
bank credit; a large firm is still likely to have relatively more access to bank 
credit compared to a smaller firm.
In the last chapter we go into more detail of the financial behavior of 
firms during “normal” times and during a financial crises. We base this study on 
the manufacturing firms quoted in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). We find 
evidence that supports the assertions of the asymmetric information literature. 
There are varying degrees of financial constraints on firms. Finns that have 
closer (informational) links to banks have less stringent financial constraints. 
Comparatively favorable factors also governed during the 1994 crises for these 
firms.
CHAPTER II
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION A LA TURC: A 
MACROECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE TURKISH 
EXPERIENCE WITH FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION
1 INTRODUCTION
The stabilization program announced in January 24, 1980, was primarily a 
response to the foreign exchange crises of the late 1970s. However, it included 
measures that made it more of a structural adjustment program, aiming at 
bringing about a major structural change in the economy that emphasized 
market forces in the determination of prices and allocation of resources.
The military coup of September 1980 provided an excellent environment 
for the implementation of the program as the military government stood behind 
it. The leading figure behind the program, Turgut Ozal, was nominated as the 
Deputy Prime Minister and kept that position until July 1982 when he resigned 
during the last phase of the so-called bankers’ crises. Free elections in 
November 1983 and December 1987 were won by Ozal’s Motherland Party that 
maintained the same paradigm. The government changed in October 1991 
elections but the main lines of the paradigm continued. In short, the January 
1980 program brought about a major break from the economic paradigm that 
prevailed in the 1980s and has continued since then.
In addition to short term stabilization measures like tight monetary and 
fiscal policy (to curb inflation) and devaluation (to reduce the current account 
deficit), January 1980 package included the liberalization of imports, export 
incentives, a hike in interest rate ceilings, limits on public sector investments in
infrastructure, privatization and SEE reform and efforts to increase the 
institutional efficiency of the public sector.
Later, the package was expanded to incorporate a broader financial 
liberalization. The measures included liberalization of interest rates, of capital 
movements, and introduction of a number of new financial instruments and 
markets.
In line with McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), it was presumed that 
financial liberalization would (1) drive real interest rates up and thus increase 
the flow of saving (which is of course theoretically a very controversial issue)
(2) this flow would enter the financial system (financial deepening), (3) the 
financial system would channel this flow to fixed capital investments and (4) 
investment projects financed by the liberalized markets would be on average 
more productive compared to those in the previous regime of repression. As a 
result, the growth performance of the economy would improve.
This chapter will argue that the main McKinnon-Shaw prediction, 
namely the improvements in growth performance, did not materialize. In fact, 
average growth rates declined slightly after liberalization, the private saving 
rate recorded a slight increase but that benefited the public sector, since, 
attracted by the high real interest rates on government debt instruments, the 
surplus of private saving over private physical capital investment grew and was 
used to finance the public sector deficit. On the· other hand, financial 
liberalization had an effect on the growing public sector deficit. Another 
important development in the real economy was the relative fall in the private 
investments in productive sectors. Especially, the share of private 
manufacturing investments in total private investments fell considerably.
On the financial side, deepening increased in the form of both increased 
bank deposits and increased stock of securities issued relative to GNP. 
However, the ratio of bank credits to GNP did not increase. In addition, the 
medium and long-term credits extended by the banking system declined 
substantially.
10
The Turkish experience provides other valuable lessons as well, by 
demonstrating the possible dramatic consequences of a hasty and unprepared 
attempt of liberalization. The economy has experienced a number of serious 
crises in the financial markets the last one being in 1994 showing that a stable 
financial market is still lacking after 15 years. ‘Bankers crises’ in 1981-82 is a 
good example. The oligopolistic structure in the financial sector led the 
government use bankers and small banks in driving the interest rates up. The 
lack of supervision attracted many 'entrepreneurs' to the field and substantial 
amounts of financial saving was deposited at the bankers. The lack of adequate 
real placement areas of these funds soon forced the bankers and the small banks 
to enter into a Ponzi scheme''’ and increasingly bidding up interest rates to 
attract fresh funds into the system. The bankers operated in such a regulatory 
vacuum that even their number was not known by the authorities. The time the 
latter became aware of the severeness of the situation, it was too late and the 
measures taken only accelerated the crises.
In this chapter, an assessment of the real and financial consequences of 
the financial liberalization is made form a macroeconomic point of view'^. 
Details of the financial liberalization and liberalization of capital movements 
will be given in section 2. In section 3, the assessment of the results of the 
financial liberalization in real and financial terms is made. Section 4 conveys 
the main conclusions.
2 CHRONOLOGY OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZA TION
The story of financial liberalization is a good example of an improvisatory 
attempt in the existence of an oligopolistic banking sector dominating the
’‘*On the one hand, tight monetary and fiscal policy reduced effective demand for goods and thus for real 
demand for working capital and physical investments. On the other, increasing financial costs added to 
these effects by further freducing demand for funds by the corporate sector. Thus the demand for funds 
were double-squeezed.
II
financial market. After the first liberalization of the interest rates in July 1980, 
the oligopolistic banking sector first responded by fixing deposit rates at low 
levels. Later, increased competition from unhealthy financial units in the form 
of small banks and ‘bankers’ led to skyrocketing of rates. In the last fifteen 
years the government intervened (mostly after crises) several times, the last one 
being in 1994, primarily through the central bank, and re-instituted the ‘old 
ceiling system’. Meanwhile, the country faced major financial crises and 
unstable and excessive interest rate movements.
Table 1 provides a chronology of the major decisions related to financial 
liberalization which can be classified as the decisions related to interest rates, 
introduction of new financial markets and liberalization of foreign exchange 
and capital movement regime.
studies by Akyiiz (1990), Atiyas (1990) and Inselbag and Giiltekin (1988), which covered the period 
until mid 1980s, are some of the earlier attemtps to assess the results o f liberalization. Atiyas and Ersel 
(1992) and Atiyas (1990) also consider the micro level effects of the of the post 1980 financial policies.
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Table 1: Chronology of Liberalization
FINANCIAL MARKETS INTEREST RATES FOREX AND CAPITAL 
ACCOUNT POLICY
1980 Private sector bond issue requirements 
rearranged (Aug.)
Ceilings on interest rates 
increased (Jan.)
Devaluation of TL against 
major currencies (Jan.)
1981 Capital Market Law (July) Ceilings on Interest rates 
abolished
Daily adjustments in forex 
rates started (May)
1982 Capital Market Board established 
(Sep.)
1983 Secondary Markets Regulation (Oct.) 
Prototype Banking Law (July)
Large banks were 
authorized to set deposit 
rates (Jan.)
Central Bank was 
authorized to set the 
deposit rates (Dec.)
1984 Special Finance Institutions started 
operations
Treasury Bills started to be issued on a 
continuous basis
Income Sharing certificates started to 
be issued.
Major liberalization of 
foreign currency holdings 
(decrees 28 &30) (Jan. & 
July)
1985 Banking Law (May)
Auction system started for Government 
securities (May)
1986 ISE reopened (Jan.)
Interbank money market started (April) 
Open Market Operations started (June)
1987 Firms were allowed to issue CP Interest rates on one-year 
deposits liberalized
1988 Ceilings on deposit 
interest rates were raised 
and ceiling was set on 
one-year deposits (Feb.) 
Ceilings on deposit rates 
were liberalized (Oct.) 
Ceilings were reinstituted 
(Nov.)
1989 Central bank Medium Term Rediscount 
Facility abolished
Variable interest rate deposits started 
(May)
First step to convertibility. 
Liberalization of capital 
movements (decree 32) 
(Aug.)
1990 Second step to convertibility. 
Liberalization of capital 
movements (amendment to 
decree 32) (March)
1991 Bond market started in the auspices of 
ISE (May)
Deposit interest rates 
liberalized (Feb.)
1992 Regulation on Repo, reverse Repo and 
Asset Backed Security issues (June)
1993 Repo and reverse Repo operations 
started at ISE (Feb.)
1994 Interest rates set by the 
central bank after the 
crises
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2.1 Liberalization of Interest Rates
The stabilization package announced in January 24th included only a hike of 
interest rates. The interest rates were liberalized to a large extent as of July 1980 
which can be considered as the ‘first liberalization’' .^ The interest rate ceilings 
on non-preferential credit were totally abolished. However, a certain percentage 
of credit interest payments had to be still deposited in the Interest Rate 
Differential Fund which was used to compensate for the low interest rates in the 
preferential credits mainly extended by the development banks. For the 
deposits, the ceiling for household saving deposits were abolished and interest 
on the commercial and public deposits (except those of social security 
institutions) were set at zero.
An important novelty of the decree by law was the introduction of 
certificate of deposits (CDs) which carried freely determined interest rates like 
the saving deposits for the first time in Turkey. This decision later proved to be 
a very important factor in the development of the ‘bankers’ whose main 
preoccupation became trading the CDs issued by banks. CDs were issued to the 
bearer by the banks. Tax structure in the financial market made it more 
profitable for the investor to buy the CDs from the bankers instead of buying 
them directly from the banks'^. In such an environment, both the size of 
operations and the number of the bankers grew exponentially. Most of the 
‘new’ bankers were in general entrepreneurs who did not really have a strong 
institutional background and were more or less engaged in a Ponzi type 
financing scheme basically uncontrolled and unaudited. All this caused a big 
financial crises at the end of 1981 as will be explained later.
Another novelty of the decree by law 8/909 was the modification of 
reserve requirement structure to encourage extension of credits to preferred 
areas like credits to backward regions, export credits, medium and long term
^Decree by Law no. 8/909.
*^Bank deposit holders had to pay 25% income tax and an additional 15% insurance transaction tax 
over the interest income. In addition, the bankers did not have the reserve requirements. TCMB (1985).
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credits etc. which of course was contradicting with the idea of financial 
liberalization.
After the first liberalization attempt of July 1980, banks got engaged in a 
‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’ keeping deposit rates low nominally and negative in 
real terms. This first started as a secret agreement but later became more or 
less public. The interest rates on 6 month deposits remained around 15% at a 
time when the annual inflation rate was around 100%. However, increasing 
competition from the bankers and smaller banks led to the breakdown of the 
agreement in mid-1981 when the real rates turned positive*^.
However, high and rising interest rates soon put the banks and bankers 
under liquidity problems and most of the small bankers collapsed towards the 
end of 1981. The crises culminated later, in mid-1982, in the collapse of the 
largest banker (Kastelli). The so-called banker crises caused the loss of 
confidence in the financial system.
In January 1983 nine large banks were assigned the authority to 
determine the deposit rates. In response they reduced deposit rates expecting the 
continuation of the slow-down in inflation. However, inflation rate accelerated 
instead of slowing down and the real deposit rates turned negative. The 
reluctance of large banks in keeping the interest rates positive led to a second 
intervention in December 1983, authorizing the central bank to set the interest 
rates and ending the first attempt to liberalize deposit interest rates^ *^ .
Interest rates were determined by the central bank until mid-1987. In 
July 1987, one year deposit rates were liberalized^'. Later, in February 1988, 
the central bank reinstituted the ceiling on one year deposits and raised the other 
ceilings across the board.
However, climbing inflation rate led to accelerated currency substitution 
especially in the second half of 1988. To reverse the currency substitution,
'^Çölaşan, Ibid., p. 262.
'^Some observers argue that, the government used some of the banks and bankers in breaking the 
agreement. See Artun (1985).
20tThe credit interest rates have remained liberalized after July 1980.
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interest rates were liberalized in October 1988. This third liberalization led to an 
immediate hike in the interest rates to 75%- 85% which led the central bank to 
establish once more a ceiling (85%) on the interest rate on one-year deposits in 
November 1988. The next liberalization came in February 1991 and continued 
till the 1994 crisis. To summarize, there did not exist a clear period during 
which the interest rates were ‘liberalized’. Instead, one can talk about ‘more 
liberal’ and ‘less liberal’ periods.
2.2 A Digression: “Bankers Crises”
The hasty attempt to liberalize the financial market led to its collapse in 1982. 
As this experience provides an interesting case, a digression on the process that 
led to the 1981-1982 crises is useful.
As mentioned earlier, liberalization of interest rates in July 1980, led to 
the rapid increase in the number of the so-called bankers. According to some 
sources, at the beginning of 1981, these bankers were not regulated and even 
there were more than 1000 bankers only in Istanbul . The Ministry of Finance 
did not have any estimate of their numbers. Until the crises became immediate, 
a permission from the local administrations, with a very short procedure and 
almost no special requirements was adequate to start operations as a banker. 
This attracted many ‘entrepreneurs’ with diverse backgrounds from even 
carpentership to waitership to start as a banker '^’.
There were also a number of more ‘serious’ bankers. To make a 
distinction, the former group was generally referred to as the ‘money market 
bankers’ (or ‘market bankers’ for short) and the latter as the ’stock exchange 
bankers’. The latter had been operating according to the provisions of the law 
no. 1447. Unlike their name, almost all of their operations were conducted 
outside the stock exchange^"* which virtually did not exist before 1985.
Decree by Law no. 87/11921 and the ensuing central bank communiqué no.l. 
Çôlaçan (1984).
Çôlaçan (1984).
Fertekligil (1993).
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Stock exchange bankers started to become important in the late 1970s. In 
particular, the tight monetary policy conducted after 1978 as a reaction to the 
accelerating inflation led to an increased demand for funds. Under the virtual 
non-existence of an organized market for corporate stocks and bonds, these 
bankers marketed bonds issued by companies which they purchased at big 
discounts and sold to the public with high profits .
The explosion in the number of bankers after July 1980, caused by the 
legal vacuum and the public’s rush for high returns, was at first ignored or even 
encouraged by the authorities. The reason was major banks’ reluctance to raise 
the real interest rates to the positive region and the authorities' desire to ‘raise’ 
the 'free' market interest rates. As a ‘funny’ side of the Turkish liberalization, 
the Governor of the central bank was attending the meetings of the banks where 
the interest rates (which were by now supposed to be determined by the free 
market forces) were determined^^. The interest rates turned positive only 
towards mid-1981. But this was also the early start of the crises.
The banks which actually were competing with bankers in attracting 
deposits thus entered in a symbiotic relationship with them to use their services 
in marketing the CDs they issued. There were even major state owned banks 
who marketed their CDs through the bankers. Smaller banks, in the absence of 
adequate control, issued excessive amounts of CDs and again marketed them 
through the bankers.
In the absence of adequate productive fields to place their funds the 
bankers had no other choice then resorting to a Ponzi-like scheme. The 
continuation of their operations depended on the inflow of new funds. To attract 
new funds, on the other hand, they had to continuously bid up the interest rates. 
More serious bankers had to follow the course. The situation of the small banks 
were no different than the bankers in entering the Ponzi scheme. They were 
paying the interests on the outstanding CDs by issuing new CDs to the bankers.
-Tertekligil(1993).
“ (j o^lajan (1984), Artun (1985).
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It was too late when the government noticed the seriousness of the 
situation. The Capital Market Law was enacted in July 1981 after the initial 
bankruptcies.
2.3 Introduction of New Financial Instruments and Markets
In addition to the liberalization of interest rates, a number of other decisions 
were made after 1980 introducing new financial markets/instruments, 
developing the existing ones and increasing the capital mobility.
First of all, Istanbul Stock Exchange was re-opened in January 1986. The 
background for that included the enactment of Capital Market Law (CML) in 
1981 dealing with the primary markets, the establishment of the Capital Market 
Board (CMB) in 1982, the Decree-by-Law 91 of October 1983 which extended 
the CML’s application to the secondary markets and finally a Council of 
Ministers Decree, issued in line with the Decree by Law 91, which set the main 
principles of the establishment and the working principals of the stock 
exchanges^’.
Conditions and procedures related to the issuance of corporate bonds 
were re-established in August 1980. The Decree by Law 8/909 (July 1980) had 
liberalized interest rates on deposits and credits. However that liberalization 
was not extended over the interest rates on corporate bonds^*. The amount of 
corporate bonds issued was very limited till mid 1980s . Issue of commercial
^^Essentially related to the primary markets, CML assigned the main duties of CMB as a regulatory and 
supervisory organization over the primary capital markets. The Decree by Law 91 extended the 
authority of the CMB explicitly over the stock exchanges. See Coşan and Ersel (1986) for the details. 
°^Only the ceilings were raised.
’^As Akyfiz (1990) points out, in 1980 and 1981, the bond market took a positive trend of development 
thanks the bankers and the existing spreads between the deposit and lending interest rates. But the 
collapse of the bankers in 1982, also led to the collapse of bond market.
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paper by the development banks and corporations^*  ^were allowed in 1986 and 
1987 respectively.
Government bonds and treasury bills have been used as the main tools to 
finance budget deficits after of 1980. Initially, government bonds had maturities 
from 1 year to 10 years. In 1984, the maturity of the bonds to be sold to the 
public was limited to 1 year. Also in 1984, the Treasury began to issue treasury 
bills on a continuous basis. Treasury bills were issued in bearer form, sold on a 
discount basis and with a maturity of 3, 6 or 9 months"’'.
The interest rates on bills and bonds were raised substantially in 1984 
and they started to be sold on weekly auctions in May 1985. The demand for 
Government securities grew rapidly because of the legal arrangements for 
banks and tax advantages they offered. The banks were asked to hold 65% of 
the public deposits held by them plus 12% of their liabilities in the form of 
Government securities. The banks also had to hold Government securities as 
collateral to their transactions in the interbank market. Finally, Government 
securities had tax advantages which made them a convenient instrument for 
investors"’^ .
In the end of 1984, Revenue Sharing Certificates^’ (RSC) and in 1987, 
Foreign Exchange Indexed Bonds (FEIB) were introduced as new types of 
public sector securities. RSC constituted about 10% of the total stock of 
Government securities in 1984-1987 but later lost its importance. In 1994 RSC 
constituted about 2.9% of the stock of Government securities. FEIB became 
relatively more important after 1991. In 1994, they constituted 8.0% of the total 
stock of public sector securities.
The interbank money market started operating in April 1986 under the 
auspices of the central bank. The central bank played the role of intermediary in
“^Xhe maturity of the corporate commercial paper ranged from 3 months to 1 year. They could be issued 
after obtaining permission from the CMB. (TCMB, 1986).
^‘Co§an and Ersel (1986).
“^TCMB(1986).
^^ In fact RSC were not true revenue sharing instruments in that a certain minimum yield was guaranteed 
to the holders.
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the interbank market. The transactions of a participator in the interbank market 
was limited by the collateral security (government securities) it held at the 
central bank. The intermediation of the central bank made the transactions 
anonymous to both sides of the transaction. Interest rates in the Interbank 
market were determined freely, with the exception of the period of February 
1988-March 1991 during when the central bank announced two way 
quotations^''.
In May 1989, Central Bank Communiqué no. 1 introduced variable 
interest rate deposits with a view to make possible the collection of longer term 
Hinds. This would be applicable to deposits of 2-5 years. In the same year, 
longer term government bonds carrying variable interest rates were 
introduced^^.
An important decision in 1989, made the central bank “more of a central 
bank”. Medium Term Rediscount Credit (MTRC) which effectively converted 
the central bank work to a major development agency was abolished in October 
1989. Through MTRC central bank extended medium and long term rediscount 
facilities to bank credits extended to agricultural and industrial sectors. MTRC 
mechanism was established with the central banking law of 1970 as a 
response to the inadequate supply of medium and long term credit to the 
priority sectors.
'^^Akkurt et al. (1991).
^^The variable interest rate on the deposits would be adjusted to the current interest rate on one year 
deposits plus an initially agreed upon differential.
^^The Law no. 1211 (Central Banking Law) of January 26, 1970 increased the authority of the central 
bank on money and credit policies compared to the previous law, which gave some of its authority to 
the Committee for the Regulation o f Bank Credits. Article 46 allowed the central bank to accept 
medium term notes for discount which effectively started medium term rediscount credits. The law 
required the commercial banks to extent at least 10% of their total credits in the form of medium term 
credits. The law also introduced the open market operations which never functioned in the ti'ue meaning. 
After the devaluation in August 1970 payment of interest rate differentials for investments in priority 
areas of the development plans started. According to the scheme, both the banks and the borrowers were 
separately paid a certain portion of the nominal interest payments on credits used for priority 
investments. The aim was on the one hand reducing the cost of finance to companies making 
investments in desired sectors and on the other hand, to encourage banks to extend credits to desired 
sectors. Later in March 1972, the central bank required commercial banks to extend a minimum of 10% 
of their total credits to priority sectors (Akbank, 1980 pp. 513-515). The role that was given to the 
central bank in 1970s was thus much more complex and wider than a standard central bank. In other 
words, the central bank of 1970s, worked more like a development agency.
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Simultaneous with the abolishment of MTRC, a short term rediscount
'xn _window was instituted to provide banks with short term liquidity . Thus the 
historical ‘development bank’ aspect of the central bank ended in 1989.
Related decisions in 1985-86 aimed at reforming the reserve requirement 
system to turn it into a usual monetary policy tool from its status of a financial 
resource for the government. High reserve requirements (at the order of 25%) 
were seen as a hindrance against conformation by banks. They were reduced, 
gradually, in 1985-1986 to 15%. Interest payments on the reserves (which were 
instituted to encourage conformation) were abolished in 1985. Finally, the 
period of conformation was shortened to two weeks.
The central bank prepared a monetary program for 1990 -after an 
unannounced one in 1989- and started implementation. The program included 
targets exclusively from the central bank balance sheet. The implementation 
was however not successful mainly due to political interference and fiscal 
pressures, and the monetary programming was shelved the next year.
In July 1992, procedures related to operations of repo/reverse repo, and 
the issuance of asset backed securities were published in the Official Gazette.
2.4 Liberalization of the Exchange Rate Regime and Capital Movements
One of the elements of the January 1980 stabilization program was a major 
devaluation of the Turkish Lira against major currencies. The adjustments for 
the inflation differentials continued throughout 1980 until the first half of 1981. 
In May 1981, the policy of maintaining a target real effective exchange rate was 
institutionalized by starting the practice of central bank’s setting and 
announcing nominal rates daily. With the easing of the foreign exchange crisis 
and the elimination of payments arrears, most multiple currency practices 
introduced in 1970s were phased out in the first three years of the program'’^ .
TCMB(1989).
Kopits(1987).
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The next important change in foreign exchange regime and capital 
movements came in July 1984 with Decree no 30 Decree no. 30 together 
with communiqué no. 84-30/1 of the Deputy Prime Ministry allowed
(a) the residents of foreign countries to invest in Turkish private 
securities, make necessary transfer freely and repatriate profits
(b) similarly, the residents of foreign countries to transfer necessary 
capital to engage in commercial activities and repatriate profits
(b) the residents in Turkey to carry foreign currency freely and to open 
foreign currency deposits at the domestic banks,
(c) the domestic commercial banks to set their own exchange rates 
within a band of 6% (8% for currency) of the rates set by the central bank
(d) the banks were allowed to extend foreign currency denominated
credits
(e) the banks or other residents in Turkey to obtain credits from foreign 
sources.
(f) the export of capital subject to permission from the related ministry 
(for amounts larger than USD 3 million permission required from the Council 
of Ministers).
In 1984, Foreign Exchange Risk Insurance Scheme (FERIS) was instituted 
under the auspices of the Treasury and the World Bank to encourage private 
industrial companies to use foreign credit in financing fixed capital 
investments'’^ .
The second major liberalization move for capital movements and foreign 
exchange regime came in August 1989 (Decree no. 32 on the Law of Protection 
of the Value of the Turkish Money) and February 1990 (Decree amending
’^Xhe Decree no. 30 on the Law of Protection of the Value of the Turkish Money (July, 1984). 
developed and replaced its prototype, Decree no. 28 (December 1983), which remained in power for 
only about half a year.
‘'“See Ustiinkaya (1990).
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Decree no. 32) in the context of the introduction of the convertibility of the 
Turkish Lira.
Banks, Special Financial Institutions and authorized foreign currency 
brokers were allowed to determine the foreign currency rates independent of the 
central bank rates. Ceilings on the private purchase of foreign currency were 
abolished. Ceilings on the amount of foreign currency that could be taken by 
persons going abroad was raised to USD 5,000. Transfers of TL out of the 
country was liberalized. Obtaining credits from external sources were further 
liberalized. Banks were allowed to extend foreign currency credits. For our 
purposes however, the most important of these decisions were: (a) the residents 
of foreign countries were allowed to purchase and sell stocks listed in Istanbul 
Stock Exchange and to transfer profits and principals through banks or 
intermediaries functioning according to the CML, (b) likewise, Turkish citizens 
were allowed to buy and sell foreign stocks and make necessary transfers (c) 
residents of foreign countries were allowed to buy and sell Turkish Government 
securities and make necessary pecuniary transfers (d) Turkish citizens were 
likewise allowed to buy and sell foreign Government securities and make 
necessary transfers (e) residents of foreign countries were allowed to open TL 
accounts in Turkish banks and transfer the interest earnings and principals.
With the Decree no. 32, the liberalization of the foreign exchange regime 
and capital movements were to a large extent completed. Another related 
development was the announcement of the procedures regarding off-shore 
banking, also in February 1990. Later in the end of 1990 a Free Zone for Off- 
Shore Banking in Istanbul was established. In January 1990, off-shore banks 
were granted exemption from reserve and disponibility requirements'” .
'Tajdelen (1995).
23
3 RESULTS OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION: THE REAL
ECONOMY
3.1 Saving
One major component of the Me Kinnon-Shaw line of thought is the hypothesis 
that the flow of saving is positively effected by the real interest rate, a 
hypothesis which is maintained despite the theoretical ambiguity between the 
net effect of substitution and income effects arising from a change in the 
interest rates. A good summary of the current stock of findings is made in Fry 
(1988): “Those investigators looking for interest sensitivity find it, while those 
expecting no influence find none. What is agreed, however, is that if the effect 
exists at all it is relatively small”. (Fry, 1988, p. 132)
The results of most empirical studies on a number of different 
developing countries indicate that the effect of real interest rates on saving is 
insignificant'* '^* .^
Fry (1978) reports, for a pooled sample of seven Asian countries over the 
period 1962-1972, that expected real interest rate exerts a positive and 
significant effect on saving. However, Giovannini (1983 and 1985) questions 
that result showing that when two observations from Korea (corresponding to 
post liberalization years of 1967 and 1968) exert an unproportional effect on the 
coefficients and that when they are excluded from the sample, the coefficient of 
the real interest rates is no more significant. Giovanini (1985) also reports the 
results for a larger sample in terms of years for the same seven countries
‘’"There are a number of difficulties associated to the the empirical estimation of saving functions. These 
include different definitions of saving, data availability problems, different calculation methods of 
saving in different countries. See Fry (1988) pp. 131-137 and Uygur (1993) pp. 30-31 for a discussion. 
‘’^ Some recent examples to such studies include De Melo and Tybout (1986) on Uruguay, Warman and 
Thirlwall (1994) on Mexico, Oshikoya (1992) on Kenya, Hanna (1994) on Indonesia, Schmidt-Hebbel, 
Webb and Corsetti (1992) on a cross section of 10 countries and Khatkate (1988) on a cross-section of 
64 countries and Giovannini (1985) on a cross-section of 64 countries. Warman and Thrilwall (1994) 
finds that although real interest rates do not have a significant effect on national saving and private 
saving, they have a positive and significant effect on financial savings. This result of course give credit 
to the proposition that financial liberalization might lead to a stock change in saving from non-financial 
saving instruments to financial ones.
24
(including Korea’s 1967 and 1968). The coefficient is again found to be 
insignificant and this time also negative.
What has the Turkish experience been? Table 2 provides data on the 
course of saving in Turkey in the pre- and post-liberalization periods'*'*. At first 
sight, Table 2 shows that the stagnation in private saving (as a ratio to GNP) - 
which started to fall in late 1970’s with the economic crises- continued till 
1985. After 1985, it started to recover. There is a marked jump in the ratio in 
1987 from 11.3% to 15.6%'*^ . At the turn of the decade, private saving rate 
reached twice its levels in the first half of the decade and also was considerable 
higher than the average rate in 1975-1976. Private saving rate derived from the 
new GNP series increased from 17% in 1987 to 22% in 1992 and 24.8% in 
1994. Thus the same conclusions are valid'*^ .
The trend for public saving was opposite to that of private saving. Public 
sector saving rates remained at relatively high (positive) levels until 1988. The 
memo item on new GNP series in Table 2 for post 1990 period shows that after 
1988, public saving rate started to decline turning negative in 1992. 
Consequently, the surplus of saving over investment in the private sector started 
to finance public sector’s deficit'* .^ This is a critical issue and will be further 
discussed later.
Combining the private and public saving, domestic saving as a ratio to 
GNP started to rise after 1986, relative to the first half of 1980s. The saving rate 
reached in 1990 was about 2.5% higher than that the average rate in 1970-76. 
The saving rate corresponding to the new GNP series which can be followed
'‘“'in 1991 the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) started a new GNP series. Later the series was extended 
until 1987. In some cases, we need a longer GNP series for comparison. The old GNP series figures 
reported, in such cases, for post-1991 period, are calculated by extending 1990 old-series GNP figure 
by the growth rates of the new series. In fact the old series goes until 1993 but after 1990 instead of 
being computed independently, the GNP figure for 1990 of the old series was raised by the growth rates 
of the new series. However, the corresponding consumption and saving figures have not not been 
calculated by the SIS.
'^ I^n real terms, private saving grew by 45% in 1987. This growth seems to be too high to be explained 
by the economic situation in 1987 and probably there is a calculation error although in interviews with 
SPO authorities they insisted that the figure was correct.
"*^ The ‘true’ private saving rate (private saving as a ratio to disposable income) also yields the same 
conclusions.
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from the memo item of Table 2 indicates that the saving rates fell after 1990 
with the exception of 1994 which witnessed a major economic and financial 
crises. Thus, overall, there is a slight increase in the savings rate after 
liberalization.
Does the (slight) increase in saving rate after 1980 arise from financial 
liberalization? In other words, does the Turkish experience support Me Kinnon- 
Shaw hypothesis? As it is difficult to disentangle the effects of other economic 
variables on saving descriptively, it would of course be problematic to derive 
any ultimate conclusion form the ‘partial’ analysis made above. As will be seen 
later in this section, econometric evidence yield ambiguous conclusions on the 
effect of interest rates on the private savings rate in Turkey in the post­
liberalization period. But before an exposition of the current stock of empirical 
results, a few points need to be mentioned about the analysis of saving after 
liberalization:
(1) The liberalization have already raised real interest rates by the first 
half of the 1980s whereas the private saving rate actually fell till 1983 and 
could not surpass its 1979 level till 1987. In addition, 1980 and 1981 were the 
“banker years” where the real interest rates offered were much above the 
official bank rates. Thus, if it is the real interest rates which triggered the 
private saving, there should have been at least some sign of increased saving in 
pre-1985 period.
(2) The saving rate figures, be it expressed as a ratio to GNP or private 
disposable income are highly erratic. In 1987 for example, the official figure for 
private saving recorded a 45% increase in real terms. The real GNP growth rate 
that year was 7% and such a jump is hard to explain economically.
47-Note that the Turkish data for private sector include both households and the corporate sector.
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Table 2: Saving (^ )
1970-
76
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Domestic Saving Ratio 21,1 16 18,6 15,9 16,2 16,5 18,9 21,9 24,1 26,3 23,4 23,7
Private Saving Ratio 13.0 ( ') 10,6 9,5 7,6 8,4 9,6 9,1 11,3 15,6 17,5 17,1 19,1
Public Saving Ratio 7.8 ( ') 5,4 9,1 8,3 7,8 6,9 9,8 10,6 8,5 8,8 6,3 4,6
Memo
Domestic Saving Ratio (New GNP Series) 23,9 27,2 22,1 22 21,2 20,9 21,8 23.0
Private Saving Ratio (New GNP Series) 17,3 20,4 17,2 18,6 20,6 21,9 24,5 24,8
Public Saving Ratio (New GNP Series)
.1.^. . —_ _  . - - . -i. 6,6 6,8 4,9 3,4 0,6 -1.0 -2,7 -1,8
Source; State Planning Organization.
1980 1981 1982 1983
------- --  —
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Private Saving - Investment Difference (~) -0,1 0,4 -0,6 -1,4 -0,4 -0,3 0,3 1,9 2,7 2.4 2,0 4,8 5,6 4,9 6,9
Public Saving - Investment Difference (~) -5,7 -3,7 -1.1 -2.3 -2,4 -1,6 -2,8 -3,7 -1,6 -2,6 -5,2 -6,9 -7,6 -9,7 -5,5
Foreign Saving (0 5,8 3,2 1.7 3,7 2.8 1,9 2,5 1,8 -1,1 0,2 3,2 2,1 2 4,9 1,5
Memo:
Primary Deficit (-) on the Consolidated 
Budget/GNP
-3,0 -0,7 -0,8 -0,9 -2,9 -0,4 -0,2 -0,5 0,8 0,2 0,5 -1,5 -0,6 -0,9 4,1
Total Interest Payments in the Cons. 
Budget/GNP
0,7 1,2 1 1,8 2,4 2,5 3,4 3,9 5.0 4,8 3,5 3,8 3,7 6 7,5
Domestic Interest Payments in the Cons. 
Budget/GNP
0,5 0,6 0,4 1,0 0,8 0,9 1,7 2,2 1.9 2,1 2.4 2,7 2,8 4,8 5,8
Total Deficit (-) in the Cons. Budget / GNP
/ 1 \  n /  J  ^ X T T ^ _____.·_____
-3,7 -1,9 -1,8 -2,7 -5,3 -2,9 -3,6 3,5 3,1 3,3 3,0 5,3 4,3 6,9 3,5
investment. Positive indicates current account deficit. 
Source: State Planning Organization.
; surplus over
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(3) The increase in saving rates in post -1980 period may well be the 
continuation of the trend that started after 1950. Indeed, the national saving rate 
has increased from 9.2% in 1950 to 12.7% in 1960 and reached the average 
value of 21.1% in 1970-76 period.
The econometric evidence presented in studies on saving in Turkey is 
not conclusive. OniJ? and Riedel (1993) find a positive and statistically 
significant relation between saving and real after tax deposit rate for the period 
of 1965-1986. They use the ratio of real private saving to permanent real private 
disposable income as the dependent variable.
Fry (1979) found a positive relationship between real interest rate and 
national saving for 1957-1977. As an extension of Fry (1979), Rittenberg 
(1988) regresses the ratio of national saving to GDP on real deposit rate inter 
alia for 1961-1985. She finds that the effect of real interest rate on saving is 
statistically insignificant. Flowever, when dummy variables taking the value of 
1 for the post-liberalization period are included, the coefficient of real interest 
rate becomes significant. She finds a significant coefficient for real interest rate 
also for the ratio of private saving to disposable income as the dependent 
variable.
Uygur (1993) finds that the interest elasticity coefficient is insignificant. 
He uses national saving and real after tax deposit rate for the periods of 1965- 
1990, 1969-1990 and 1971-1990. Fie also finds that the ratio, lagged one period, 
of total time deposits to GNP has a negative coefficient. He interprets this as a 
negative wealth effect on saving.
The results of empirical studies on interest elasticity of saving in Turkey, 
thus, do not provide a consensus. One point that stands out in these studies 
however is that income is consistently found to be significant.
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3,2 Public Sector Saving Behavior and Interaction with Private Saving
An important development after liberalization was increased public sector 
borrowing requirement (PSBR). PSBR/GNP ratio increased from 2.8% in 1986 
to 9.7% in 1993'*^
What accounts for the increase in the PSBR? As PSBR is equivalent to 
the difference between public sector saving (defined as public revenues minus 
current expenditures minus transfers) and public sector investment, one could 
first suspect public investments. However, public sector investments have 
stayed within the band of 10-12% of the GNP throughout 1975-1993 except for 
a few outliers. Thus public investments did not play a role in increased PSBR 
except for 1986 and 1987.
Financial liberalization had been an important factor on the increase in 
the PSBR through increased borrowing costs after liberalization'’^  which raised 
current expenditures and thus reduced public sector saving^^ (see Table 3). In 
other words, a direct effect of financial liberalization on the public sector 
balance was to increase its borrowing costs. Inability to increase the revenues 
commensurably kept PSBR growing and soon turned the situation into a vicious 
circle.
The process was accelerated by the monetary program of the central 
bank that was first unofficially applied in 1989 and than officially announced in 
1990 after which it was shelved. As seen in Table 3, the deterioration in the 
public sector balance accelerated after 1990. The program limited the central 
bank’s financing of the deficit to keep the monetary expansion under control. 
This forced the Treasury to increase borrowing and pushed the interest rates up 
continuously after 1990. The initial impact of the monetary program on the total 
interest payments (and thus the public sector balance) was through increased
■'*The ratio fell in 1994 to 5.5% but that level seems to be unsustainable.
“’’The other major reason was increased personnel expenditures after 1989 and the elections and the 
Gulf crises in 1991.
^°See Snowden (1996) and Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989) on the possible effects of liberalization on 
budget balance.
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borrowing and not through borrowing costs as demonstrated by Tables 3 and 6. 
However increased public borrowing soon pushed the interest rates up as seen 
in Table 6^'.
The ratio of primary deficit (non-interest deficit) in the consolidated 
budget (which constitutes about three quarters of the public sector in both the 
revenues and expenditures) to GNP has been very small in the period of 1981- 
1987 and ran surpluses in 1988-1990 (Table 3).
The deterioration in the public sector balance gives sign of continuation 
as the interest bill continues to grow. The ratio of total interest payments 
(domestic + external borrowing) to GNP rose from 1.2% in 1981 to 4.8% in 
1989. The ratio of the interest expenditures on domestic borrowing to GNP rose 
from 0.6% in 1981 to 2.1 % in 1989. The acceleration came actually after 1985, 
the starting year of the auction system for Government securities and the 
starting year of liberalization for practical purposes, for which the ratio was
0.9%. It rose to 1.7% in 1986 and continued its pace into 1990s with the 
increased personnel expenditures in 1989.
The above discussion centers around the effect of financial liberalization 
on the public sector’s balance in terms of increased PSBR. A related important 
question is how the growing PSBR was financed. Observation of Table 3 and 
the earlier discussion of private saving show that the private sector (households 
plus the corporate sector) ran a growing surplus of saving over investment after 
1985, the de facto start of the liberalization^'. Thus the private sector financed
r
the government’s growing deficit .
^*Note that the elections and the Gulf war also played a further role in the deterioration of the public 
sector balance in 1991.
“^In 1988, private sector also financed a foreign dissaving.
^^Snowden (1996) shows, in the context of a simple crowding out model, that increases in primary (non­
interest) budget deficit and nominal interest have a direct reduction effect on the growth rate of the bank 
lending to the private sector. On the other hand, if the government opts to increase monetization, than 
this likely will lead to a rise in nominal interest rates and thus, again the growth of bank lending to 
private agents will decrease. Though the model assumes, for simplicity, that government borrows only 
from the banks, the main conclusions of the exercise is generalizable to security issues as well. See also 
Morisset (1993) for a different model with similar conclusions.
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The mechanism behind this crowding out was (a) the favorable interest 
rates on government securities compared to other financial and real assets, in 
addition to the tax advantages on the returns from Government securities (b) a 
number of regulations regarding the reserve ratios and liquidity requirements on 
banks that induced banks to hold an increased amount Government securities '^*.
Thus, on the whole, increasing surplus of the private sector financed 
public sector deficits.
3.3 Private Investment
From the aggregate private investment figures, it can be concluded that the 
liberalization did not cause the increase in the private investments as suggested 
by the Me Kinnon-Shaw hypothesis. The ratio of private investments to GNP 
had stayed in the range of 11-13% in the period of 1968-79. In 1980-90 period, 
the investment ratio took the average value of 10.9% whereas it was 11.7% 
1970-76 period (see Table 4). The new GNP series shows that, on the average, 
private investments/GNP ratio relatively increased in the period of 1990-94 
over the late 1980s. The average private investment/GNP ratio was 15.7% in 
1987-1990 and 17.4% in 1990-1994^^
The major reason in the stagnation of the private investment after 1980, 
in spite of relatively increased private saving is high real yields on financial 
assets which reduces the attractiveness of physical investments in the short run. 
Theoretically, the yield on financial assets and physical assets should be 
equalized after controlling for risk. But in the Turkish case, growing borrowing 
needs of the public sector introduced a wedge between the returns of the 
financial and physical assets.
‘^'The reserve ratios were lowered after 1980 while the liquidity ratios were gradually raised. Liquidity 
requirements forced banks to hold Government securities. However, generally, banks held Government 
securities in excess of the requirements due to the mentioned high yields on Government securities. One 
source estimated that banks' voluntary holdings of government securities amounted to 13.7% in the end 
of 1990 and went up to as much as 18.5% in February 1991 (Akkurt et al, 1991, p. 35). All this shifted 
the interest expenditure burden from the central bank which used to pay interest on bank reserves to the 
Treasury, of course with an amplification factor.
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Table 4: Investments C)
1970-76 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 (")
Total Investment/GNP 2K1 19,7 19,0 18,0 18,8 17,9 20,0 23,1 24,0 24,0 22,3 22,4
Public Sector Investments/GNP 9,0 9,3 7,9 8,0 8,3 8,2 8,4 9,8 11,2 12,6 12,2 12,7
Private Sector Investments/GNP 11,7 10,4 11,0 9,9 10,5 9,7 11,6 13,3 12,8 11,4 10,1 9,7
Composition of Private Investment (%)
Manufacturing 42,4 31,4 35,2 34,6 33,8 33.8 33,0 33,0 26,3 23,5 21,1 27,5 27,7 27,7 27,7 24,4
Agriculture 10,5 8,8 12,7 13,1 13,3 11,8 9,0 6,7 6,7 5,4 4,0 4,9 4,3 4,0 4,0 n
Mining 0,8 0,6 0,6 0,7 1,3 12 1,4 1,3 1,5 1,4 1,4 1,2 1,3 1,2 1,2 1,2
Housing 30,7 42,9 28,5 27,9 27,5 28,3 30,6 35,2 43,6 48,4 50,1 41,3 41,7 41,9 41,9 47,7
Tourism 0,4 0,7 0,8 0,8 0,8 1,3 2,2 3,0 3,7 4,8 6,5 6,2 6,1 5,0 4,9 2,5
Others 15,6 22,2 22,9 23,3 23,6 23,8 20,8 18,2 16,5 16,9 18,9 18,9 20,2 20,3 20,9
Memo
Total Investment/GNP (New Series) 24,6 26,1 22,5 22,6 23,5 22,8 25,3 24,2
Private Investment/GNP (New Series) 14,7 17,3 15,0 15,7 16,1 15,5 18,4 19,4
Notes: ( ) Old GNP series used unless otherwise specified. (“) 1994 Private investment composition ratios rely on provisional data. Also, they belong to the new series and are therefore not directly comparable to prior 
years.
Source: State Planning Organization.
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In addition to relatively higher yields in the financial sector, a growing literature 
investigates the effect of policy uncertainty and politics on investment^^. In 
particular, Conway (1991) shows in an empirical study on Turkey that 
uncertainty in relative prices has a negative impact on private investment 
decisions.
3.4 The Composition of Private Investments
The post 1980 period witnessed sharp changes in the composition of private 
investments. The major trend was a decrease in two of the three non-service 
sectors (manufacturing, agriculture and mining- the former two fell). The 
combined share of non-service sector investments in total private investments 
fell from 48.5% in 1981 to 33.6% in 1990^  ^(see Table 4). The same combined 
share had stayed above 50% in the entire post 1963 period except for 1966.
The share of private manufacturing investments which remained around 
40-44% in the 1970-76 period fell to 33-35% in 1981-1986. In the 1986-1989 
period it further fell to as low as 21.1% in 1989. In 1990 the share reached 
27.5%. The trend for agricultural investments was similar: from a range of 10- 
12% in 1970-76 and 12-13% in 1981-85, it started to fall after 1985 declining to 
4.9% in 1990. Share of mining investments recorded a slight rise from 0.7% in 
1981 to 1.2% in 1990.
The decline in the non-service sector investments corresponded to a rise 
in the housing construction and tourism investments. Housing investment had 
been around 27-36% of the total private investment in 1970-76 and started to 
rise during the crisis years of 1978 and 1979 (35.9% and 43.8% respectively). 
In the 1981-1984 period the share fell and stayed around %28. After 1984, it 
started to rise, reaching 50% in 1989. In the 1990s, it remained above 40%. The 
share of tourism investments went drastically up from 0.8% in 1981 to 6.2% in 
1990.
See Rodrik (1991) and Özler and Rodrik (1992) for formal models. 
This share was 54.6% in 1975.
The rise in the housing investment can be attributed to two factors. 
Firstly, the encouraging policies in terms of sales of government land with low 
prices to cooperative housing projects and provision of funds to them had an 
important effect. Secondly, it can be argued that high demand for housing in the 
post liberalization period demonstrates that housing continued to be perceived 
by households as a saving instrument in spite of the widened menu of financial 
assets.
For the tourism sector investments, one should first note that the decision 
makers are this time the corporate sector (whereas for housing it is the 
households). The main factor for the surge in tourism investments was the 
incentive policies directed towards tourism in the second half of 1980s. The 
main motive behind these incentive policies was to remedy current account 
deficits.
In short, financial liberalization did not significantly increase overall 
private investment relative to GNP. However, there have been important 
changes in the composition of the private investments, mainly in the form of a 
reduction of the share of non-service sectors in favor of housing construction 
and tourism.
3.5 Growth Performance of the Economy
Growth performance of the economy in the post liberalization period also does 
not quite lend support to the Me Kinnon-Shaw hypothesis. It can be seen in 
Table 5 that, excluding the crises years of 1977-1980 and 1994, the average 
annual growth rate in 1963-1976 period has been 6.9%; markedly higher than 
the average rate for the period 1981-1993. Relatively lower growth rates in the 
post- 1980 period compared to pre-liberalization years are also evident when 
sub-periods are observed. If we disregard the 1981-1985 period and take 1986^  ^
as the fully-fledged starting year of liberalization, the average real growth rate
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in the 1986-1993 period (again excluding the crises year of 1994) compares low 
with that of both 1963-1969 and even lower with that of 1970-1976 (6.2%, 
6.4% and 7.4% respectively).
Table 5: Growth Performance of the Economy
Period % Real Growth Rate (')
Pre-Liberalization
1963-76 6,9
1963-69 6,4
1970-76 7,4
1977-80 1,3
Post-Liberalization
1981-93 5,1
1981-85 4,7
1986-93 6,2
1994 - 6,0
Notes: (') 1963-80 figures are from the old GNP series. 
1981-1993 figures are from the new GNP series..
Old series continues till 1990 and the growth figures 
derived from both series for 1980-1990 period are very 
close to each other.
4 RESULTS OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION: THE FINANCIAL 
MARKET
4.1 Interest Rates
The course of deposit interest rates after liberalization has been explained 
before. Table 6 presents the nominal and ex-post real interest rates for deposits 
and Government securities together with the returns in the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange Index. One aspect that immediately attracts attention is high 
borrowing costs of the public sector. Nominal interest rates on Government 
securities have been at times close and at times higher than the bank deposit 
interest rates. Note that interest income from Government securities is exempt
^*1981-1983 period was financially unstable. Though the unstability was for the most part recovered in 
1984-1985, it is more plausible to take 1986 as the start of the financial liberalization as it is 1986 that 
most of the financial markets and instruments became available.
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from taxes. Given the relatively higher risk that the deposits carry, one would 
have expected the deposit rates to be higher than the interest rates on
59government securities .
Table 6: Interest Rates and Financial Yields C)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
DEPOSITS
3 MONTH-NOMINAL 45.5 38.7 35.0 49.1 53.5 47.8 62.8 68.6 64.6 87.8
3 MONTH-REAL 6.7 10.7 -9.8 -9.3 0.6 -2.1 4.5 13.4 6.4 -1.9
6 MONTH NOMINAL 49.3 51.2 44.8 38.1 55.6 56.3 49.8 63.9 69.4 69.3 88.8
6 MONTH REAL 3.8 9.4 14.6 - 8.6 - 6.8 - 0.1 - 2.8 1.6 9.3 6.0 -7.5
12 MONTH NOMINAL 45.0 50. 50.6 43.3 70.2 65.8 57.5 66.2 73.8 74.8 102.6
12 MONTH REAL -3.1 4.1 15.2 -7.6 -2.9 0.9 - 1.8 -3.1 4.7 2.2 - 10.2
GOVERNMENT
SECURITIES
3 MONTH-NOMINAL 43.6 42.8 55.6 49.6 47.6 68.4 74.4 70.7 102.4
3 MONTH-REAL 15.7 -3.2 -3.9 -2.9 -2.3 9.7 19.2 12. 10.4
6 MONTH NOMINAL 49.6 45.2 57.8 53.0 49.0 69.0 74.0 73.0 113.0
6 MONTH REAL 19.2 -3.1 -5.2 - 2.6 -3.4 5.5 13.1 8.9 8.6
12 MONTH NOMINAL 43.0 50.6 51.0 47.0 62.4 58.3 51.9 72. 75.4 86.4 118.7
12 MONTH REAL -4.5 4.4 15.5 -5.2 -7.3 -3.7 -5.3 0.4 5.7 8.9 -3.0
CORPORATE BONDS
12-MONTH-NOMINAL N/A N/A 55.3 53.7 74.6 72.0 62.0 76.8 80.7 84.9 117.3
12 MONTH-REAL N/A N/A 18.8 -0.9 -0.3 4.7 1.0 3.1 8.8 8.1 -3.6
ISE ANNUAL RETURNS
NOMINAL 70.9 294.0 -44.0 493.0 46.0 34.0 -9.0 416.0 32.0
REAL 30.8 154.0 - 68.0 260.9 -9.0 -21.8 -45.2 201.6 -41.5
Notes: (') Nominal Rates: Annual Averages, gross, not compounded. Real rates: Ex-post. The maturities shorter than 1 year are 
compounded.
Source: Capital Market Board, the Central Bank and the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade.
The wedge between average interest on corporate bonds and Government 
securities give a better measure of risk-return characteristics. It is seen in Table 
6 that this wedge gets smaller after 1990 and turns to negative in 1993 and 
1994. Again pointing out to an ‘irrational’ risk-return structure.
Credit interest rates increased rapidly after the liberalization in 1980. 
Unlike the case of deposit interest rates, the government did not intervene in the 
credit rates in the post liberalization period. Effective nominal costs for 
borrowers from banks have been above 80% in the post liberalization period^ *^ .
There is deposit insurance but it does not cover all the deposits.
‘^^ See Chhibber and Wijnbergen (1992) for their calculation of effective cost of borrowing considering 
the effect of the compensating balances and also Main Economic Indicators of Undersecretariat of 
Treasuiy for 'Maximum Limits of Interest on Credit '. Ada (1992) calculates relatively lower rates
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4.2 Bank Deposits
The share of Foreign Exchange Deposits (FED) in total deposits became 
increasingly important after 1983 '^. The ratio of total deposits to GNP increased 
from 22.2% in 1982 to the peak of 29.3% in 1987 (Table 7). Between 1988 and 
1993 it remained above 24.9% except for 1990 and 1993. The ratio averaged 
25.3% in the 1982-94 period indicating a 7% rise compared to 1968-77 period 
when the average was 18.5%.
A more careful observation distinguishes the surge of FED. The ratio of 
FED to GNP went up from 2.3% in 1984 to 7.4 % in 1990 making FED one of 
the largest component of deposits and indicating growing currency substitution. 
On the other and, the ratio of household saving deposits plus CDs plus FEDs to 
GNP went up from 10.4% in 1981 to 16.3% in 1993.
Another important development was increased share of time deposits in 
total deposits triggered by increased difference between sight and time deposit 
interest rates. The share of time deposits in household saving deposits went up 
from 43% in 1980 and 69% in 1981 to over 80% after 1984. Similarly, the share 
of time deposits in total TL deposits increased from 27% in 1980 and 47.6% in 
1981 to over 60% after 1984.
considering only the fees and comissions charged on credits. Nevertheless, the rates she calculates for 
short-term commercial credits exceeds 60% after 1983 and approaches 100% in 1989.
^^Zaim (1995) found, considering deposits and credits as output, that financial liberalization have 
increased technical and allocative efficiency in commercial banking.
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1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Total Deposits/GNP 14,1 18,8 22,2 22,1 24,8 25,9 27,8 29,3 27,1 25,2 22,1 24,9 25,0 22,5 29,8
Total TL Deposits/GNP 14,1 18,8 22,2 22,1 22,5 22,6 22,5 21,9 19,8 19,1 16,6 16,7 15,6 12,6 14,4
Saving Deposits/GNP 6,0 8,5 10,3 11,8 12,4 11,8 11,2 9,2 9,8 9,9 8,2 9,0 8,2 6,2 8,4
Commercial Deposits/GNP 5,5 5,9 6,3 6,1 5,6 5,7 6,5 7,1 5,0 4,2 3,7 3,4 3,3 2,8 2,8
Public Sector Deposits/GNP 0,8 1,1 0,9 1,2 1,2 1,4 1,3 1,4 1,1 0,7 0,9 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,5
CD/GNP 0,4 1,9 2,4 0,8 1,2 1,9 1,5 1,8 1,0 0,9 0,6 0,5 0,3 0,2 0,1
Others/GNP 1,3 1,5 2,2 2,1 2,0 1,8 1,9 2,5 2,9 3,4 3,2 3,2 2,8 2,7
Forex Deposits /GNP 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,3 3,3 5,3 7,4 7,3 6,1 5,5 8,2 9,4 9,9 15,3
Memo
Time Deposits/Saving 
Deposits (%)
43,0 69,2 76,7 67,9 85,2 87,7 84,7 78,4 85,5 85,2 83,8 87,3 86,6 84,2 89,2
Time Deposits/Total 
TL Deposits (%)
27,4 47,6 55,1 46,2 62,2 66,3 65,5 60,8 67,7 65,8 65,0 68,4 67,0 63,4 72,7
Notes: ( ‘ ) Ratios to new GNP series.
Source: State Planning Organization and the Central Bank.
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The overall conclusion is that the total deposits in relation to GNP has increased 
by about 7% on average after liberalization compared to 1970-1976. Though 
this increase can not be neglected, the ratio is still relatively low. The term 
structure of the deposits has extended toward the longer end. Thus, 
liberalization was instrumental in attracting funds to the banking sector and 
extending the term structure of deposits.
4.3 Credits*^ ^
The ratio of credits of the banking sector (which here includes commercial 
banks and the Development Finance Institutions -DFIs) to GNP averaged 
20.1% during the 1982-1994 period constituting about a 2% rise to that of 
1968-1976 for which period the average was 18.3%. Thus after liberalization, 
credit supply increased relative to the size of the GNP. However this increase 
was quite small compared to that in deposits.
The ratio of medium and long term credits to GNP shows a drastic fall 
from above 5% in 1981-1984 to 2.5% in 1993. On the other hand, about half of 
the total medium and long term credits were extended by the Development 
Finance Institutions (DFIs) which provided shorter term working capital credits 
as well. In other words, total medium and long term credits extended by the 
commercial banks correspond to slightly over 1% of the GNP.
“ Bank credit figures were obtained from the annual publications of Turkish Banks Association. These 
publications for years 1981-1985 did not include the credits of State Invesment Bank, Industrial 
Development Bank and Industrial Invetsment and Development Bank in total credits. For the 
subsequent years, they include the credits of the same DFIs. That mistake was coreected in this study 
and the credit series became homogenous for pre- and post-1985.
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Table 8: Credits
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Total Bank Credits/GNP 18,7 20,1 20,8 21,8 17,7 18,4 22,5 24,9 21,5 20,0 20,2 20.5 21,0 21,7 20,2
Medium and Long Term Credits/GNP N/A 5,2 5,6 6,5 5,0 4,0 4,6 4,8 4,2 3,3 2,6 2,4 2,2 2,5 2,8
DFI Credits/GNP 3,8 2,7 3,0 3,1 2,8 2,0 2,4 3,1 3,1 2,7 2,4 2,4 2,3 2,3 2,5
Participations/GNP 0,5 0,6 0,9 1,1 U LI 1,3 1,5 1,4 1,5 1,4 1,3 1,2 0,9 0,9
Memo
Central Bank Direct Credits/GNP 3,8 3,5 2.7 1,5 1,1 2,9 3,9 4,2 3,8
Credits to SEEs/GNP 0,2 0,3 0,6 0,2 0,2 0,8 1,1 0,6 0,7
Credits to Central Government/GNP 3,6 3,1 2,1 1,3 0,9 2,1 2.8 3,5 3,1
Credits to Financial Institutions /GNP 1,2 2,4 2,1 1,6 1,0 0,7 0,8 0,9 0,3
Bank Credits + CB Credits to SEEs/GNP 22,7 25,3 22,1 20,2 20,4 21,3 22,0 22,3 20,9
Bank Credits+Central Bank Direct Credits/GNP 26,3 28.5 24,2 21,5 21,3 23,4 24,8 25,9 24,0
Med and Long Term Cred./Total Bank Credits N/A 26,1 27,0 30,0 28,3 22,0 20,3 19,4 19,7 16,7 12,7 11,5 10,3 11.4 13,7
Notes; ( ‘) Ratios to new GNP series. ( ‘^) Due to the change in the definition and calculations, central bank credits prior to 1986 are not reported here to avoid misleading conclusions. 
Source: The central bank and the Association of the Banks
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1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Securities/GNP 7,9 10,0 9,3 10,2 10,0 12,4 16,0 17,7 16,3
Private Sector Securities/GNP 1,8 2,8 3,0 3,5 4,1 5,4 5,5 5,6 3.4
Composition:
Stocks 84,9 76,4 81,3 83,8 89.7 93,5 80,9 63,6 83,5
Bonds 14,0 20,6 14,0 1,0 8,6 4,8 2,8 1,5 1,1
Commercial Paper - 2,3 4,4 6,1 1,3 1,5 1,2 1,1 0,2
Asset Backed Securities 1.1 0.6 0.3 9.1 0.4 \ 0 . 2 14.9 32.6 15.2
Others 1,1 0,6 0,3 9,1 0,4 0,2 0.1 1.2 0.1
Government Securities in the Market/GNP 6,1 7,1 6,4 6,7 6,0 7,0 10,5 12,1 12,9
Deposits/GNP C) 24,6 25,5 23,1 21,0 17,9 21,2 21,5 19,0 26,6
Total/GNP 32,5 35,5 32,4 31,2 27,9 33,6 37,5 36,8 42,9
Memo
Share of Public Sector Securities in Total Assets 18,7 20,2 20,1 21,5 22,9 21,0 29,4 35.9 34,2
Share of Private Sector Securities in Total Assets 5,6 7,9 9,2 11,2 14,5 16,2 14,7 15,3 7,8
Share of Deposits in Total Assets 75.7 71,9 71,2 67,3 64,1 63,0 57,3 51,8 62,0
Government Securities/GNP 6,1 7,1 6.5 6,7 6,4 7,0 11,0 13.2 14,6
Share of Bonds 48,7 44,9 58,0 70,2 74,1 55,2 60,1 72,0 39,1
Share of Treasury Bills 26,5 35,9 30,2 22,8 21,6 40,8 34,7 24,5 47,6
Source: Capital Market Board, the central bank and The Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade.
1 deposits.
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Bank participations in corporations which is another kind of extension of 
term finance by banks and DFIs became relatively more important as a source 
of term finance. The ratio of participations to GNP rose form 0.9% in 1982 and 
1.1% in 1983 to 1.5% in 1987. The trend however was partially reversed after 
1990 and the ratio fell to 0.9% in 1993 and 1994.
Overall, the credit supply by banks in relation to GNP slightly increased 
but supply of term finance from banks followed a declining trend throughout 
the decade. It can thus be concluded that financial liberalization, so far as the 
bank lending is concerned, did not impose a direct advantage in terms of the 
financing of private investments. Consistent with this conclusion, Atiyas and 
Ersel (1992) argue that firms’ reliance on internal funds did not change after 
liberalization.
4.4 Financial Asset Composition of Non-Governmental Sector
The composition of the portfolio of financial assets is informative since it 
shows the share of the stock of funds that are allocated to public and private 
sectors. With the data availability, two different approaches can be employed. 
The first is to consider the summation of the total financial assets owned by the 
private sector^ "* excluding bank credits, i.e., total deposits, less public sector 
deposits, plus public sector securities held by the private sector plus private 
sector (direct) securities. Such a measure, thus, would include a combination of 
“inside” and “outside” assets owned by the households, firms and the banks, 
excluding the credits^ .^
^^Participation figures include the bond holdings of DFIs.
‘^'Private sector includes households, firms and banks which include public banks. The holdings, of 
foreign residents are neglected.
®^ Note that some (small) portion of the government securities are held by the SEEs. Data is available on 
the amount of such securities that the SEEs buy in the primary market. However, data is not available on 
what portion of these securities remain in the portfolio of SEEs. That amount is thus neglected and it is 
assumed that the entire stock is held by the private sector. Secondly, we considered the banks as a whole 
without distinguishing between private and public banks. Thirdly, an important practice after 1989 was 
increased issues of ‘non-cash’ bonds in the form of ‘Special Order Government Bonds’. These were 
issued mainly against the SEEs’ debts to the central bank and central bank’s losses for currency 
revaluations both of which were guaranteed by the Treasury (See Yükseler, 1995). The Treasury thus
42
A second approach would be to concentrate more on the non-bank 
private sector with the help of some assumptions. Such a measure would 
include the household saving deposits, CDs and the FEDs (assuming CDs and 
FEDs are owned exclusively by the households) plus the public and private 
sector securities not in the portfolio of banks (assuming the firms do not hold 
these securities which actually is not of course true).
The details and results of both approaches are given below.
4.4.1 Portfolio of Private Sector (Households, firms and banks)
The first approach can be followed through Table 9. The total financial assets 
portfolio of the private sector consists of the private sector deposits at the banks 
(household saving deposits, commercial deposits, FEDs and CDs), private 
sector securities and public sector securities. As an estimate of the amount of 
the public sector securities held by the private sector, the amount of public 
sector securities held at the securities portfolio of the central bank was 
subtracted from the total stock. As mentioned earlier, this is found to be the best 
approximation given the increased issues o f ‘non-cash’ securities after 1989*’^ .
Table 9 shows that total financial assets as a ratio to GNP have risen 
considerably from 32.5% in 1986 to 37% in 1993. That indicates increased 
financial deepening. On the other hand. Table 9 also shows that the financial 
savings have increasingly turned to primary (or direct) financial assets. The 
share of deposits in the financial asset portfolio declined from above three 
quarters in 1986 to about one half in 1993.
It is readily noticeable that the share of assets issued by the public sector 
has almost doubled between 1986 and 1993. The share of public sector 
securities in the total has increased from 18.7% in 1986 to 29.4% in 1992 and 
35.9% in 1993. As a ratio to GNP public sector securities went up by 6
issued bonds against these liabilities and handed them to the central bank. The central bank, in turn, 
used them in open market operations.
**Note again that it is possible to find exact data on the primary market. However, after the initial 
purchases, we do not have data on the destinations of trading of securities in the secondary market.
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percentage points during the same period. Private sector securities as a ratio 
to GNP, on the other hand, went up from 1.8% in 1986 to 5.6% in 1993.
Note that the acceleration in the total stock of Government securities 
came after 1990. This finding is in line with the earlier discussion on the course 
public sector saving-investment balance. The three factors cited there in a 
liberalized environment played an important role in the acceleration of the 
deterioration after 1990.
The finding about the sharp increase in public sector securities confirm 
our earlier finding that the private sector’s surplus saving increasingly financed 
the public sector’s deficit.
4.4.2 Portfolios of Non-bank Private Sector
Earlier in this study, it was shown that the increase in bank credits after 1980 is 
much smaller than the increase in deposits. Instead, banks’ holdings of Treasury 
Bills and Government Bonds grew rapidly. This trend initially started with 
government’s policy of reducing reserve requirements, while also reducing the 
interest rate paid by the central bank on bank reserves^^ and simultaneously 
increasing the liquidity requirements. This had distinct effects on the public 
sector and banks. On the public sector side, the interest burden was effectively 
shifted from the central bank to the Treasury. Furthermore, as the interest rates 
on Government securities were much higher than the rates that the central bank 
paid to the bank reserves, the net interest burden on the public sector increased. 
On the banks’ side, the composition of the assets was effected. On the bank 
balance sheets, the share, in total assets, of Government securities held against 
mandatory liquidity requirement doubled from 0.23% in 1986 to 0.44% in 1989 
(see Table 10). In 1993 the share fell to 0.36% mainly due to increased issuance
^^The main component of the private sector securities up to 1992 was stocks. In 1992 and 1993 the 
banks started to issue asset backed securities as a less expensive way of collecting funds compared to 
deposits due to certain tax advantages. Asset Backed Securities issued by banks are not subject to 
reserve and liquidity requirements lowering their cost compared to deposits.
®*Namely, increased personnel expenditures in 1989, the monetary programs of 1989 and 1990 and 
finally the elections and the Gulf war in 1991.
’^interest paid by the central bank against required reserves held by the banks was totally abolished in 
1986.
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of asset backed securities by banks, which were not subject to reserve and 
liquidity requirements.
The voluntary holdings of public sector securities were however much 
bigger in quantity compared to mandatory holdings. High interest rates on 
Government securities with literally zero risk, made them an attractive 
alternative to credits on a risk-adjusted return basis. This phenomenon led to a 
rapid growth in the securities portfolio held by banks, the main component of 
which was Government securities . Altogether, the share of voluntary holdings 
of Government securities in total assets boomed from less than 4% in 1981^’ to 
above 10% after 1989.
The second approach outlined at the beginning of this section aims at 
estimating the holdings of financial assets by the non-bank private sector by 
eliminating holdings of banks from the holdings of private sector. The financial 
asset portfolio in this case consists of the household saving deposits, CDs, 
FEDs (assuming that CDs and FEDs are held exclusively by the households) - 
thus the commercial deposits are excluded- and public and private direct 
securities. To reach the holdings of non-bank private sector, holdings of public 
sector securities by banks were excluded from the stock of public securities 
held by the private sector, calculated earlier. Private securities held at the 
securities portfolio of banks are negligible and it is thus assumed that they are 
held exclusively by the households'^.
the 1986-1993 period, the share of Government securities in the securities portfolios has been in the 
range of 85-94%.
^'Though data is not available on the share of Government securities in securities portfolio for the years 
prior to 1986, the entire securities portfolio amounted to 3.8% of total assets in 1981. Thus, even with 
the assumption that Government securities made up the entire securities portfolio, it did amount to less 
than 4 % of the total assets.
^^To be precise, the private sector securities are also held by firms of course. But it is very difficult if 
not impossible to determine the share of private sector securities that are really held by households.
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TABLE 10: Non-bank Private Sector’s Portfolio of Financial Assets
1981 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Bank Holdings/GNP 1,3 4,3 5,4 5,3 4,8 4,3 5,1 5.1 5,1 5,0
Government Paper Holdings/Total Bank Assets(%) 4,0 8,8 9,7 9,9 10,6 10,3 11,2 10,5 9,8 10,0
Against Liquidity Requirement (%) 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4
In Securities Portfolio (%) 3,8 8,6 9,4 9,5 10,2 9,8 10,8 10,1 9,5 9,7
Non-bank Private Sector's Fin.Asset Holdings/GNP (') - 21,7 23,2 22,2 22,4 20,2 25,3 29,2 29,0 35,3
Composition (%)
Saving Deposits+ CDs+FEDs - 83,0 79,5 81,1 75,2 70,7 70,3 62,2 55,8 67,4
Public Securities - 8,6 8,3 5,5 9,3 9,2 8,1 19,0 24,8 23,1
Private Securities - 8,4 12,2 13,4 15,5 20,1 21,6 18,8 19,3 9,5
Memo
Total Bank Holdings/Total Stock of Gov. Paper 44,0 71,2 75,5 82,0 75,9 66,7 71,4 46,9 39.1 30,9
Notes: All in percentages. (*) Assuming that the securities portfolio consists entirely of Government securities in 1981 and that Government securities stock consists of 
bonds and Treasury bills.
The total of the holdings has some small discrepancy in some years with those in Table 9 because of data inconsistencies.
Source: The central bank, Association of Banks and Yıldırım (1994) and own calculations.
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The results, presented in Table 10 show that total financial assets of non­
bank private sector as a ratio to GNP increased from 21.7% in 1986 to 29.0% 
in 1993 providing another evidence for financial deepening. In the crises year of 
1994 the ratio jumped to 35% due to increased purchases of public sector 
securities and increased FEDs.
The share of government securities in non-bank private sector’s financial 
portfolio increased from 8.6% in 1986 to 24.8% in 1993. But the main increase 
in public sector securities came after 1991 before which the share of private 
sector securities was larger than that of public sector securities. Overall, when 
the entire period of 1981-1993 (or 1994) is considered for the direct financial 
assets held by non-bank private sector, the main beneficiary is again the public 
sector.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The Turkish experience with financial liberalization brought about positive 
results in the financial sphere but the McKinnon-Shaw predictions in the real 
sector did not materialize. The results of the analysis in this paper can be 
summarized as follows:
(1) The foremost measures to assess the results of liberalization are 
obviously those related to the real side of the economy. After all, the departing 
point for McKinnon-Shaw prescription was the presumption that 'financial 
repression' constituted an obstacle against higher growth rates in developing 
countries.
Real performance criteria like growth rate of the economy, private 
investments and investments in manufacturing sector either do not show a 
significant favorable developments or show negative developments. Especially 
growth performance of the economy declined after liberalization.
The behavior of private investments which is the primary determinant of 
the productive capacity of the economy shows similarity with what happened in
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Latin American countries after the financial liberalization attempts in previous 
decades indicating that the Turkish experience is not idiosyncratic. Diaz notes 
the following on the experience of Latin American countries:
“Aggregate investment performance showed no clear sign of either 
improving or becoming more efficient, in the South American countries 
undergoing financial liberation. In Chile gross fixed investment during the 
1960s averaged 20.2 percent of gross domestic product; during 1974-82 it 
reached only 15.5% of GDP. Argentina and Uruguayan performance was better 
on the investment front, partly because public sector capital formation did not 
shrink as the Chilean case.” (Diaz, 1985, p. 376 )
(2) Saving shows some increase but subject to the reservations 
mentioned in the text. However, it has been the public sector, not the private, 
who benefited from this increase. The private sector has started to run surplus 
saving over investment with which it financed the public sector's growing 
deficit. On the other hand this growing deficit has been primarily a result of 
higher cost of borrowing of the government due to financial liberalization. Thus 
the financial liberalization had a direct effect on the worsening of the situation 
in this respect.
(3) In accordance with point (2) above, the public sector consistently 
increased its share in the stock of financial assets held by the private sector.
(4) Hasty financial liberalization attempt caused major financial crisis. 
The major economic crises at the beginning 1994 which started in the foreign 
exchange market spreading to the banking sector and finally to the real sector 
showed that the economy is still on a delicate balance. 15 years after the 
January 1980 program the real credit interest rates are still at unsustainably high 
levels. Nominally the rates are above 100%. During the 1994 crises the rates 
reached 1,000% in the interbank market and 400% on the government bonds. 
This experience also seems to be shared by the Latin American liberalization. 
Diaz notes;
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“Short term real interest rates, plausibly defined, on the whole remained 
very high in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, even during periods of massive 
capital inflow. ... It is clear from the Southern Cone experience that the type of 
deregulation experience by those countries gives no assurance of stable real 
interest rates hovering around reasonable estimates of the socially optimal 
shadow interest rate.” (Diaz, 1985, p. 377)
(5) Though the real performance of the economy did not present a jump 
compared to 'financial repression' period, financial deepening increased and 
new financial instruments and markets were introduced. Total financial assets 
held by the household and private sectors grew. Bank originated financial assets 
increased their dominance in the financial portfolios but that dominance eroded 
to some extent as new instruments and markets were introduced.
The increase in financial deepening should be considered with care. In 
particular, not all of the credit for increased financial deepening should be 
attributed to financial liberalization. An investigation of the development of 
financial and real indicators after 1950 show that there has been a trend not only 
of increasing financial deepening but also of increasing saving rates.
(6) It was seen that increased financial deepening does not directly lead 
to increased funds for the private investment from the banking system. In 
particular, though total bank deposits increased considerably compared to 
1970s, bank credits did so only slightly. Moreover, the medium and long term 
credits extended by the banks diminished considerably after liberalization. On 
the other hand, in the capital market, the public sector crowded out a substantial 
chunk of funds originating from the private sector. As explained, these funds 
were used to finance growing public sector deficit which was due to increased 
borrowing costs after liberalization.
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CHAPTER III
EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION
1 INTRODUCTION
The literature on financial liberalization stresses two channels through which 
liberalization of finaneial markets influences (positively) the real side of the 
economy. Firstly, by virtue of the assumption of positive assoeiation between 
interest rates and saving rates, increased (or abolished) deposit rate eeilings will 
lead to increased (flow) savings which constitute the resources available for 
physieal investments. This ean be referred to as the volume effect. Seeondly, 
low (relative to ‘equilibrium’) interest rate ceilings will lead to less-productive 
investments due to moral hazard and adverse selection problems emerging 
between lenders and borrowers. This can be referred to as the efficiency effect. 
Financial liberalization literature emphasizes that both factors will lead to a 
contraction in the growth performance of the eeonomy^\
The volume effect implicitly presumes that the financial institutions are 
“neutral” eonduits between those who save and those who invest so that more 
financial saving will lead to more credits extended to those who will undertake 
the investment projeets. In the first chapter, however, the aggregate time series 
data on saving, investment, bank deposits and bank credits showed that at least 
in the Turkish ease this presumption did not hold.
Below we reproduced the data on bank credits to facilitate discussion 
(Table 11). The ratio of total bank credits to GNP remained within the band of 
20-22% except for the two peak years, 1986 and 1987. Thus relative to the GNP
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the liberalization did not bring about a major rise in the credit supply^ "*. A 
second observation is the reduced amount of medium and long term credits 
relative to the GNP which fell from about 6% in 1982 to 2.5% in 1993.
Table 11 Course of Bank Credits
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Total Credits/GNP 20.: 20.8
Real Total Credits
21.8 17.7 18.4 22.5 24.9 21.5 20.0 20.2 20.5 21.0 21.7
5,767 6,213 6,529 5,603 6,506 8,859 10,903 9,569 9,682 11,071 11,599 12,755 15,122
Medium and Long 
Term Credits/GNl^___
5.2 5.6 6.5 5.0 4.0 4.6 4.8 4.2 3.3 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.5
Notes: ( ‘) Total credits deflated by WPl. 1985 prices. 
Source: The Central Bank.
After financial liberalization, private saving increased together with bank 
deposits. However, bank credits did not increase commensurably with deposits 
which is a measure of financial saving. Private investments also did not increase 
at the trend of the saving. Our conclusion on the reasons of this for the Turkish 
case was the behavior of the public sector which was influenced by the 
liberalization; a story of bi-directional causality.
We will deal with the second channel, i.e., the efficiency effect of 
liberalization, in this chapter. In fact, recent studies on financial liberalization 
have supported the idea that the positive effects of financial liberalization come 
through increased efficiency of investments instead of increased amount of 
investment^^. The theoretical ambiguities make the issue an empirical one. In 
this vain, we might consider two related avenues. “Did liberalization cause an 
increase in the productive efficiency of firms?” And “did the allocation 
mechanism in the financial markets become more sensitive to the productive 
efficiency of firms?” Of course the two channels may work simultaneously as 
well.
The first question above is basically a question on whether or not bank 
monitoring increased after liberalization. Banks will presumably be more
’^See McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973) and Fry (1982) for discussions.
^Ws discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, the main reason of this was increased borrowing 
of the government.
” See for example. King and Levine (1993) and Jayaratne and Strahen (1996).
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concerned about the performance of the firms to which they extend credits in a 
liberalized environment. Bank monitoring is thus expected to increase after 
liberalization forcing firms to manage their resources more efficiently.
A positive answer to the second question puts the banks in an active ex- 
ante^%ut a rather passive ex-post role. As explained earlier abolishment of 
interest rate ceilings will lead the average returns on investments to increase; 
the banks are simply selecting the projects^^ with higher ex-ante returns (and 
thus also with higher risks) and charging them commensurate interest rates. Of 
course both questions may have positive answers implying that banks select 
projects with higher ex-ante returns and also they monitor the companies 
closely afterwards.
We use panel data obtained from State Institute of Statistics (SIS) on 
manufacturing sector for the years 1985-1993. Due to the course of financial 
liberalization we consider the post-1989 period as financially (if not absolutely) 
more liberal period compared to pre-1989 (inclusive) period. Unfortunately, we 
do not have the extension of the panel data set to 1980-1985 period.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. The next section discusses 
the data and the econometric method. Section 3 presents the results on the 
technical efficiency during the pre- and post-liberalization period and the 
association between credit and efficiency during these periods. The differences 
among larger and smaller firms and firms located in main cities and in 
provinces are discussed also in this section. Sections 4 and 5 take two other 
approaches on determination of the association between credit allocation and 
technical efficiency. In these sections we present evidence on the direction of 
causality between efficiency and credit allocation.
use the word here in reference to the timing of the decision of the extension of credit.
’^As discussed in Chapter 2, at least in the Turkish experience the bulk of the bank credit is extended in 
the form of short-term credits. In that circumstance, the argument in this paragraph should be centered 
around firms instead of projects; “do more efficient firms get more (short-term) credits compared to less 
efficient ones?”
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2 DATA AND METHOD
2.1 Data
The data set was obtained from the Industry Department of the State Institute of 
Statistics (SIS). It consists of a large sample of manufacturing firms employing 
with than 10 workers between the years 1985 and 1993. The SIS made two 
surveys in 1985 and 1992. Each year between the surveys, the list of the newly 
established manufacturing firms was obtained from Chambers of Commerce 
and they were added to the list. Our data set is a subset of this SIS data set in 
that it includes the firms that had reported positive values for fixed capital in the 
1985 survey. Either because of exits or lack of response to the survey the 
number of firms in our sample decreases for the years subsequent to 1985. The 
number of firms in the data set per year is presented in Table 12 below:
Table 12 Number of Firms in the Panel Data Set
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
1985 4083 3679 3501 3296 2864 2929 2684 2515 2731
1986 3425 3210 2787 2860 2619 2444 2597
1987 3225 2792 2860 2619 2444 2597
1988 2806 2862 2624 2452 2578
1989 2637 2406 2241 2327
1990 2644 2450 2489
1991 2446 2369
1992 2379
Notes: The table is arranged in the following way. The years in the first column represent the starting year and the years in the 
first row are the target year. For example, the number of observations (firms) that existed in 1988 and also in 1991 is 2624. Note 
that the first year of the data set contains 4083 observations and all the firms that is contained in any subsequent year is also 
contained in 1985.
The original SIS data set used five-digit SIC codes for the surveys between 
1985-87, six-digit codes between 1988-1991 and eight-digit codes in 1992- 
1993. In this study we aggregated the original SIC codes into three digit sectors. 
We then took the sectors with more than 150 firms as the basis of our study. 
Out of ten such sectors, in 369 (non-metallic minerals) and 371 (iron and Steel) 
the data were too noisy as displayed by implausible production function
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coefficients and efficiency indices and these two industries were also discarded. 
The remaining eight industries are as follows: 311 (food products), 321 
(textiles), 322 (wearing apparel), 352 (other chemicals), 381 (metal products), 
382 (non-electrical machinery), 383 (electrical machinery), 384 (transport 
equipment). The number of firms per year and industry is presented in Table 13. 
During the econometric analysis, the firms with less than two observations 
during any of the periods 1985-89 and 1990-1993 were excluded as separate 
panel data regressions were run for each of these two periods. Also, 
observations that were clearly noisy were excluded by outlier analysis. 
Therefore the actual number of firms that entered the analysis were less than 
those appearing in Table 13.
Table 13 Number of Observations Per Year and Industry
311 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
1985 476 611 244 153 326 286 202 189
1986 421 534 212 132 295 252 190 178
1987 388 505 206 133 279 257 172 166
1988 374 473 213 127 245 229 171 154
1989 365 448 202 121 228 213 107
1990 331 430 190 123 223 203 146 136
1991 301 403 168 113 203 177 13: 136
1992 280 388 146 107 182 167 122 128
1993 327 415 162 114 201 185 132 136
The surveys included data on wage payments, number of employees, work 
hours, expenditure items such as material, energy, insurance, advertisement, 
transportation, maintenance etc., revenues, inventories, electricity consumption 
in kilowatt hours and Turkish Liras, physical investments, depreciation, and 
financial data (equity plus retained earnings plus revaluation account, bank 
credits, sum of current assets and sum of all long term financial and physical 
assets).
In the regressions, which were basically, production function estimations 
with fixed effects, value added was used as the dependent variable. As labor 
inputs to the production process, total number of work hours was employed.
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Capital input was problematic as the survey did not include physical capital 
(book value). The financial data included the sum of long term financial and 
physical assets which included physical capital stock as well as equity 
participations in other companies, severance payments and guarantees. As that 
composite variable is not an appropriate measure of the capital stock we first 
attempted to employ a two step procedure by running this composite variable on 
electricity consumption in kwh to obtain a fitted value for capital stock as 
suggested by Tybout (1992) We compared the results of this estimation 
procedure with another one that simply used electricity consumption as a proxy 
for capital inputs, an approach employed by Pitt and Lee (1981) also, and found 
the second alternative to be the more promising one. More on this issue in the 
section on the econometric analysis and the appendix.
The descriptive statistics of the data set are given Table 14 below.
Table 14 Descriptive Statistics
311 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
Real Sales C) 54,782 67,349 31,743 105,530 33,759 51,242 92,910 141,360
Standard Deviation 124,250 148,680 40,631 213,580 65,829 252,530 275,610 683,230
Skewness 6.68 4.48 4,48 4,07 6.76 10,76 6,81 10,68
Number of Workers (“) 120 281 133 98 98 125 156 267
Standard Deviation 214 469 194 135 127 298 278 756
Skewness 3.77 3.43 4.36 3.84 3.90 6.96 4.53 5.53
Size Distribution (%) ^ )
Very Large 6,3 16,2 4,6 2,9 1,9 4,4 6,8 11,0
Large 19,3 31,5 30,3 26,6 24,8 18,5 28,3 31,7
Medium 16,6 20,1 28,5 17,6 24,1 23,0 18,6 19,6
Small 57,8 32,1 36,6 52,9 49,2 54,1 46,3 37,6
(1) Averages. 1985 prices in 1,000 TL.
(2) Average number of workers employed in production.
(3) Size distribution in terms of number of workers employed in production. Small: 0-49; Medium: 50-99 
Very Large: 500+.
Large; 100-499 ;
^®One other alternative would be to use perpertual inventory method to construct a physical capital stock 
series. This had two problems. Firstly, we still need a starting capital stock figure which in this case has 
to be taken as again the long term financial and physical assets. Secondly, investment data were missing 
in too many observations.
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2.2 Econometric Method
In this study, panel data techniques is used to determine firm specific 
efficiency^^. We will utilize the single equation model developed by Schmidt 
and Sickles (1984) in this study:
yu = l-l +P/ Xl it +p2 ’^t'2 /7 + .....+ it + yt -Ui 1, ... ,N
(1)
where y  is the logarithm of real output, x\, .. xk represent the factors of 
production. Vi, denotes random disturbances, u, > 0 represents finn specific 
technical inefficiency. It is reasonable to assume that the firm specific 
efficiency measure is invariant with respect to time when T is small so that Ui is 
taken as a constant for each firm.**^ .
Defining a, = p - U/ (1) becomes
y  it ^  CLi + p /  X l  i,  + p 2  X2 ;7 + ....  + Pa X k  it + Vit (2)
which is the familiar fixed-effect model^' that can be estimated 
straightforwardly using least-square dummy variable technique (LSDV). As 
shown by Maddala (1971), analysis of covariance has the disadvantage of 
utilizing only the within-group information. However, this approach has two 
main strengths. Firstly, if the firm efficiency is correlated with labor and capital 
inputs, LSDV approach is suitable as it does not require the efficiency term to 
be uncorrelated with the regressors^^. Secondly, LSDV does not require any
distributional assumptions for the inefficiency terms u,83
’’See Schmidt (1986) and Forsund, Lovell and Schmidt (1980) for surveys of measurement of efficiency 
using frontier producton functions.
^^Battese and Coelli (1988).
‘^AIso known as the analysis of covariance model. For the details of the model see for example Hsiao 
(1990) or Maddala (1971),
®“See Pitt and Lee (1981) and Schmidt (1986) for the discussion of this point which is especially 
important when one has to chose between fixed-effect and random- effect models. This point is to be 
discussed shortly.
^^See Schmidt (1986).
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The fixed effect model or the analysis of covariance treats the individual 
differences '^* as fixed constants that are invariant over time. On the contrary 
random effects models (alternatively the error components model) take the 
differences as random. Where the studied random sample is a relatively small 
subset of the entire population under question, it can be thought that the 
individual differences that we observe are a result of the random sampling 
process and thus they themselves are random. If we write the production 
function to be estimated as**^
y u  =  II + P l ^1 it +p2 ^2 /7 +  ....... +  P k ^K it +
the “error components” could be written as 
V/,= a /  + /\., + u,v
with the assumptions of
E{a,}=E{X,}=E(u„}=0 
E(a,/\,, }= E{A.,u,/} = E{u,va/} = 0 
E{a,ay}=a^a for /-y  and E{a,ay }= 0 for Z?!:/
E{X./A-i} = a \  for Z = 5 and E 0 for / 5^ i·
E{ u it uyi} = for t = s, i = j  and E(u ,·,uy^ } = 0 otherwise.
Here a , represents the individual specific time invariant effects, X, represents 
time effects that are invariant over individuals and u ,/ represents the remaining 
effects that are peculiar to both the individuals and time periods. After these 
assumptions, random effects models can be estimated by Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS)®^
*‘‘ln our case, we interpret the fixed effects as individual (in-)efficiencies. In the general panel data 
literature, the fixed effects are taken to represent the effects of omitted variables.
*^The exposition here about the random effects mdoels follows Hsiao (1990).
**'For details see Hsiao (1990).
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There are trade-offs between using random effect and fixed effect 
approaches. The primary advantage of fixed effect models over random effects 
for our case (production function estimations with individual differences) is 
that it does not require that efficiency be uncorrelated with the independent 
variables . When it is thought that the management can “learn” from the past 
factor combinations, the production efficiency will be correlated with the 
regressors . The main disadvantage on the other hand is that the covariance 
estimators are less efficient that the GLS estimators.
Hausman (1978) has suggested a misspecification test to facilitate the 
decision between fixed and random effects models that is widely used in the 
literature. His test is based on comparison of the coefficients obtained by fixed 
and random effects models. In the estimations we made, we checked and 
reported the Hausman test results.
We tried three functional specifications (unrestricted Cobb-Douglas, 
Cobb-Douglas with the restriction of constant returns to scale and translog) to 
estimate the fixed effects. The correlations among the estimated fixed effects 
from these models were high and in the study we used the fixed effects obtained 
from the unrestricted Cobb-Douglas function. The results of the estimations and 
the correlations among the fixed effects are presented in the appendix to this 
chapter.
A further complication was on the variables to be used as the proxy of 
capital input as mentioned earlier. The data set did not include either the 
replacement cost (or market value) of the capital equipment which is used in the 
standard studies on the estimation of production functions. Instead, the study 
included “Long Term Financial and Fixed Assets” (LFFA) which is defined as 
the sum of fixed assets, participations in other companies, severance payments 
and guarantees. However, luckily the data set also included the electricity 
consumption in the production facilities, in kilowatt hours (kwh).
*’See Schmidt (1986).
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To our view, electricity consumption, a flow measure, is a reliable proxy 
for capital inputs, possibly a much more reliable proxy than the standard proxy 
in the literature of book-value of fixed assets* .^ In the literature, one example 
where electricity is used for the same purpose is Pitt and Lee (1981). 
Nevertheless, an attempt was made to utilize also the information provided by 
the LFFA variable by using a two stage least squares approach whereby, the 
fitted values obtained by regressing LFFA on labor and electricity were plugged 
as the capital input in the production function^®. The details of this approach, 
the results and correlations between the fixed effects of this approach and the 
one with the electricity used is provided in the appendix.
3 EFFICIENCY AND ACCESS TO CREDIT IN  PRE-AND POST 1990
Before investigating how the correlations between efficiency and access to bank 
credit changed in the pre- and post-1989 periods it is useful to examine how 
efficiency and access to bank credit changed in the same two periods. In Table
15, arithmetic averages and standard deviations of the efficiency indices 
obtained from the panel data estimations are displayed for each of the eight 3- 
digit SIC sectors. These estimations were made using electricity as a proxy for 
the capital inputs of the production processes (see Appendix). Next, in Table
16, arithmetic averages of “ratio of total bank credit to total resources (BCTR)” 
and the standard deviations are displayed. Because of data unavailability, we 
can not construct the ratio of bank credit to total liabilities. The “total
*®See Pitt and Lee (1981) and White (1978) for a case supporting the possible existence of correlation 
between the production efficiency and factor input combinations. See also Mundlak (1978) for a more 
technical formulation of the same issue.
^^Taymaz and Saatçi (1996) found, in a study on three four-digit SIC industries from the same data set, 
that using number of installed machines (a stock measure of capital input) or depreciation allowances (a 
flow measure) give generally similar results on the coefficients and mean efficiency levels (except for 
one industry, 3692, where the mean efficiency differs largely).
^^We also ran regressions for one of the sectors to see if, using, as a proxy for capital stock, total 
horsepower of electrical motors in the factory which was available in the data set, changed the
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resources” used here is a subset of total liabilities and it consists of paid-in 
capital, accumulated retained earnings, revaluation account, bank credits (short 
and long term) and “other debt”.
Table 15 Average Efficiency in Pre- and Post-1989 Periods
311 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
Pre-1989 6.07
(1.14)
4.37
(0 .86)
2.76
(0.73)
6.17
(0 .86)
5.89
( 1.00)
4.48
(0.75)
6.03
( 1.12)
7.06
(1.09)
Post-1989 6.52
(1.31)
7.16
(1.16)
5.82
(0.89)
5.89
(1.12)
5.97
(1.07)
5.26
(2.44)
5.68
( 1.01)
4.72
(0.82)
1985-93 5.97
(1.14)
3.13
(1.81)
4.10
(0.69)
4.84
(0.87)
4.40
(0.96)
5.29
(0.92)
5.32
(0.96)
1.63
(0.69)
Notes: Efficiency indices are obtained as the firm specific fixed effects from covariance model. Numbers in 
parenthesis are standard errors.
Table 15 shows that, in general, technical efficiency has improved after 
1989; average efficiency either increased or remained virtually unchanged after 
1989^'. In five of the eight sectors, efficiency has increased after 1989. In 
sectors like 321 and 322 the increase is substantial. On the other hand in sector 
381, increase is only slight. In sectors 352 and 383 the efficiency decreased 
slightly but for both sectors the average efficiency levels have been among the 
highest in both pre- and post-1989 periods. Possibly, the efficiency increases 
due to liberalization have been obtained before 1985 in both sectors. In only one 
sector (384) there is a decline in efficiency in the post-1989 period.
Table 16 reports the BCTR ratios for three different sub-samples. These 
three sub-samples were formed to control for the effect of possible misreporting 
of the bank credit information. In the original data set, there were zeros reported 
under the bank credit variable. We do not have information as to which of these 
are really zero bank credits and which are actually unreported data. Three 
refinements were made to take into account this fact, resulting in the three sub­
samples. The first sub-sample consists of the observations with the (reported)
conclusions. We found that the estimated efficiencies were again highly correlated with those obtained 
using electricity consumption like the other approaches reported in the appendix.
^‘As samples are large, relatively large increases between the two periods are statistically significant 
and statistical significance are not seperately reported in tables. In Table 15 for example, for all of the 
five sectors where the mean efficiency increased, except for 381, the increases are statistically 
significant.
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interest expenses and bank credits consistent with each other. It was obtained by 
excluding from the entire sample, the observations with zero reported bank 
credit but positive reported interest expense.
The second sub-sample consists of a further refinement by resort to the 
interest expense data. It was obtained by excluding from the first sub-sample, 
the observations with zero reported bank credits but also with the ratio of total 
reported non-bank liabilities (-  total resources - bank credits) to total assets^  ^
larger than 0.80. The aim was to refine the first sub-sample further by excluding 
observations with zero reported bank credits which in fact are likely to have 
access to bank credit but misreported it. Finally a third sub-sample was also 
obtained by excluding all the observations with zero reported bank credits. 
While this last sub-sample is likely to eliminate useful information as it 
excludes firms with no access to bank credits, it might be useful to see the 
results for firms with only non-zero reported bank credits.
Table 16 BCTR Ratios *er Sector
Sub-
sample
Period 311 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
1 Pre-1990 0.22
(0.21)
0.21
(0.19)
0.23
(0.20)
0.25
(0.18)
0.19
(0.18)
0.18
(0.19)
0.21
(0.16)
0.24
(0.18)
Post-1989 0.26
(0.22)
0.24
(0.21)
0.35
(0.24)
0.32
(0.20)
0.25
(0.21)
0.21
(0.19)
0.25
(0.18)
0.24
(0.22)
1985-93 0.23
(0.20)
0.21
(0.17)
0.27
(0.19)
0.26
(0.18)
0.17
(0.15)
0.19
(0.16)
0.23
(0.15)
0.24
(0.18)
2 Pre-1990 0.18
(0.20)
0.18
(0.18)
0.19
(0.19)
0.23
(0.18)
0.17
(0.15)
0.15
(0.17)
0.20
(0.16)
0.21
(0.19)
Post-1989 0.21
(0.22)
0.22
(0.21)
0.28
(0.23)
0.29
(0.20)
0.23
(0.21)
0.18
(0.19)
0.24
(0.18)
0.22
(0.20)
1985-93 0.20
(0.19)
0.20
(0.17)
0.23
(0.18)
0.24
(0.17)
0.17
(0.15)
0.16
(0.15)
0.22
(0.15)
0.21
(0.16)
3 Pre-1990 0.28
(0.21)
0.27
(0.18)
0.30
(0.21)
0.28
(0.19)
0.23
(0.17)
0.21
(0.19)
0.23
(0.15)
0.25
(0.18)
Post-1989 0.32
(0.21)
0.31
(0.19)
0.44
(0.20)
0.36
(0.19)
0.31
(0.19)
0.26
(0.19)
0.29
(0.18)
0.29
(0.22)
1985-93 0.29
(0.19)
0.28
(0.17)
0.36
(0.17)
0.31
(0.18)
0.23
(0.16)
0.23
(0.16)
0.26
(0.15)
0.27
(0.18)
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.
“^The following asset items were included in the survey: the sum of Cash and deposits, securities, 
receivables, inventories, and the sum of participations, severance pay, fixed assets. The sum did not in 
general equal the sum of the reported liability items which included bank credits.
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It is seen from Table 16 that independent of the sub-sample chosen, the average 
ratio of bank credit to total resources has increased after 1989. In other words, 
on the average access to bank credit increased. The rise is especially 
pronounced in industries 322, 352 and 381. For example, average BCTR 
increased from 19% to 28% in sector 322 (second sub-sample). The only sector 
where the ratio did basically remain unchanged is sector 384 (considering 
evidence from the first and second sub-samples) which experienced a fall in 
productivity after 1989 compared to pre-1989 period.
Our next question in this section is whether the correlation between 
efficiency and access to credit, in general, have improved after 1989. In other 
words, were the movements in efficiency and BCTR correlated. Table 17 
reports the inquired correlations.
Table 17 Correlations Between Efficiency and Access to Bank Credit
Sub-
sample
Period 311 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
1 Pre-1990 0.22 0.38 0.13 0.05 0.28 -0.06 0.33 0.09
Post-1989 0.19 0.51 0.48 0.15 0.35 0.25 0.32 0.17
1985-93 0.23 0.49 0.39 0.16 0.35 0.09 0.36 0.05
Pre-1990 0.23 0.43 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.02 0.38 0.17
Post-1989 0.30 0.51 0.59 0.19 0.36 0.26 0.36 0.22
1985-93 0.27 0.50 0.45 0.23 0.36 0.16 0.42 0.16
Pre-1990 0.12 0.25 -0.13 0.00 0.14 -0.19 0.27 0.01
Post-1989 0.09 0.34 0.21 0.07 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.08
1985-93 0.14 0.35 0.07 0.04 0.10" -0.04 0.21 -0.04
Notes: ‘ represents significance at 1% level, at 5% level and · at 10% level.
First note that in all sectors except for 311, the direction of change in the 
correlations between efficiency and access to credit are the same for all three 
sub-samples.
Secondly, in all the sectors except for 383, the correlations between 
efficiency and access to credit have increased. In sectors 322 - where both 
efficiency and access to credit independently increased considerably- and 382, 
the increase in the correlations are especially striking. In sector 352 where the 
average efficiency slightly fell and BCTR increased considerably, the 
correlation increased. In 383, efficiency ' fell, BCTR increased and the
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correlation remained intact. Finally, in sector 384, efficiency fell considerably 
the access to credit remained level but the correlation between efficiency and 
credit increased. Indeed, in the pre-1980 period, the average BCTR in sector 
384 was among the highest compared to the other sectors whereas in the post- 
1980 period, it was among the lowest. The increase in correlation shows that 
efficiency has been a major factor in access to bank credit in this sector.
3.1 Were Different Categories of Firms Treated Differently?
Our next question is whether or not different categories of firms were treated 
differently by banks in the process of credit extension and whether this has 
changed in the post-1989 period? Size and location were taken as two such 
criteria. The asymmetric information literature and credit view suggest that a 
bias in favor of large firms exists in financial markets^'’.
Firms located in main cities may have an advantage in access to credit 
compared to those located in provinces. Information may be poorer in provinces 
or there may be fewer banks available. The other side of the coin is that higher 
aggeragate demand for funds in main cities may cause non-efficiency factor to 
come in the play and the correlations between efficiency and credit may well be 
lower in the main cities. Hence the benefits generated by liberalization may not 
be shared equally by large and small firms or by firms located in main cities and 
in provinces.
In this section for both criteria, first we will present the average 
efficiency and access to bank credits and than show the results on the evolution 
of the correlation between efficiency and access to bank credit in pre- and post- 
1989 periods.
” See Gentler (1988) and Bernanke (1993) for surveys.
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3.1.1 Size
Tables 18 and 19 show the average efficiency and BCTR ratio for small and 
large firms. Size variable is determined on the basis of the number of direct 
labor in production averaged over the year. The cutoff point for large firms is 
taken as 100 workers.
Larger firms are more efficient on the average and the difference in all 
cases are pronounced. On the other hand, BCTR ratio is also comparatively 
very high for large firms indicating easier access to bank credit.
Table 18 Average Efficiency: Large vs. Small Firms (Full-sample-1985-93)
Sub­
sample
Size 311 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
1 Small 5.47
(0.81)
3.57
(0.77)
3.98
(0.73)
4.54
(0.77)
4.11
(0.83)
5.11
(0.71)
4.84
(0.75)
1.40
(0.65)
Large 7.23
(0.83)
4.36
(0.74)
4.35
(0.56)
5.45
(0.76)
5.32
(0.61)
6.27
(0.81)
6.00
(0.79)
1.90
(0.66)
2 Small 5.46
(0.81)
3.57
(0.78)
3.94
(0.72)
4.51
(0.76)
4.06
(0.84)
5.09
(0.74)
4.84
(0.75)
1.40
(0.66)
Large 7.22
(0.84)
4.38
(0.72)
4.38
(0.53)
5.43
(0.75)
5.32
(0.60)
6.29
(0.78)
6.00
(0.79)
1.89
(0.65)
3 Small 5.51
(0.82)
3.64
(0.75)
4.12
(0.73)
4.57
(0.77)
4.14
(0.80)
5.18
(0.71)
5.00
(0.72)
1.50
(0.58)
Large 7.25
(0.83)
4.39
(0.73)
4.34
(0.55)
5.44
(0.75)
5.35
(0.60)
6.32
(0.78)
6.00
(0.80)
1.92
(0.66)
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.
Table 19 BCTR Ratios: Large vs. Small Firms
Sub­
sample
Size 311 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
1 Small 0.20
(0.17)
0.13
(0.14)
0.22
(0.18)
0.23
(0.19)
0.16
(0.14)
0.17
(0.16)
0.19
(0.14)
0.22
(0.18)
Large 0.32
(0.22)
0.28
(0.17)
0.35
(0.17)
0.32
(0.14)
0.24
(0.15)
0.25
(0.13)
0.29
(0.15)
0.27
(0.18)
2 Small 0.17
(0.16)
0.11
(0.13)
0.18
(0.17)
0.22
(0.18)
0.14
(0.14)
0.14
(0.14)
0.17
(0.13)
0.19
(0.15)
Large 0.27
(0.22)
0.27
(0.17)
0.31
(0.16)
0.29
(0.12)
0.23
(0.15)
0.24
(0.14)
0.28
(0.15)
0.15
(0.17)
3 Small 0.26
(0.17)
0.22
(0.14)
0.34
(0.17)
0.28
(0.18)
0.22
(0.18)
0.21
(0.16)
0.23
(0.16)
0.25
(0.17)
Large 0.37
(0.22)
0.31
(0.17)
0.38
(0.17)
0.34
(0.16)
0.25
(0.14)
0.28
(0.12)
0.30
(0.14)
0.29
(0.18)
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.
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To complete the picture we need information on the correlations between access 
to credit and efficiency during the pre- and post 1990 periods. These are 
displayed in Table 20.
In general, the correlations between access to credit and efficiency 
improved after 1990 for both small and large firms (The exception is sector 383 
in which the correlations declined for both small and large firms). In sectors 
321 (textiles) and 322 (wearing apparel) the correlations for small firms 
increased considerably after 1990 and surpassed those for large firms. In sector 
381 correlations improved for small firms and became significant. The 
correlations for large firms which were very high at the order of 0.50, remained 
intact after 1990 but were still very high compared to small firms. In sector 382 
the correlations were negative and significant for large companies and 
insignificant for small firms in the pre-1990 period. There has been 
improvement in both categories after 1990. For small firms the correlation 
became significant and for large firms it became insignificant (from negative 
and significant before 1990). Finally in sector 384, the correlation became 
significant after 1990 for small firms. For large firms, after 1990 the 
correlations turned positive but still insignificant.
In the post-1989 period, the correlations for smaller firms were higher 
than those for large firms in six of the eight sectors studied.
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Table 20 Correlations Between Efficiency and Access to Credit in Pre- and Post-1989 Periods: Large vs. Small Firms
311 321 322 352
Sub-
sample
Size Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
1985-
1993
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
1985-
1993
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
1985-
1993
P re- 
1989
Post-
1989
1985-
1993
1 Small 0.19*** 0.13** 0.15·· 0.22··· 0.52··· 0.38··· 0.12 0.45··· 0.33··· 0.14 0.24·· 0.14
Large -0.26*·· -0.07 -0.15· 0.32··· 0.33··· 0.37*** 0.14 0.42-* 0.50··· -0.07 0.10 0.02
2 Small 0.24··· 0.28··· 0.25·*· 0.27··· 0.49··· 0.39··· 0.14 0.55··· 0.36*** 0.18· 0.21·· 0.21··
Large -0.11 -0.05 -0.06 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.22·· 0A6*** 0A6*** 0.15 0.20 0.02
3 Small 0.09· 0.06 0.04 0.10· 0.47··· 0.32*** -0.21*· 0.08 0.14· -0.06 0.05 0.08
Large -0.26··· -0.22·· -0.22·· 0.24··· 0.24··· 0.24··· 0.03 -0.30·*· -0.03 0.00 0.16 -0.27·
381 382 383 384
Sub­
sample
Size Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
1985-
1993
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
1985-
1993
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
1985-
1993
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
1985-
1993
1 Small -0.02 0.15·· 0.05 -0.10 0.11 -0.03 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.02 027** 0.17
Large 0.56-* 0.51 — 0.55*** -0.31** O.Il -0.09 0.32·· 0.19·· 0.31** -0.16 0.09 -0.19·
2 Small 0.07 0.15·· 0.05 -0.04 0.15·· 0.04 0.24** 0.16** 0.20·· 0.12 0.28·· 0.31***
Large 0.53··· 0.50··· 0.52*** -0.21 0.05 -0.09 0.32·· 0.19** 0.33** -0.07 0.10 -0.10
3 Small -0.14- -0.13* -0.22*** -0.23*** 0.09 -0.15** 0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.08 0.07 -0.06
Large 0.56— 0.43*** 0.52*** -0.35·· -0.02 -0.27** 0.28** 0.15 0.29** -0.16 0.03 -0.16
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The above findings indicate that in general, the correlations between efficiency 
and access to credit have improved after 1990. This improvement was more 
pronounced for smaller firms. In other words, the degree of association between 
efficiency and access to bank credit increased more for the smaller firms. In all 
of the sectors except for 383, the correlations increased for smaller firms. For 
larger firms, in two sectors, the correlations declined and in one sector the 
correlation did not change. As a result, after 1989, in all sectors, the correlations 
between efficiency and credit were higher among smaller firms than among 
large firms.
Did this relatively higher improvement of correlations in small 
companies lead to a higher average access to bank credit? At this point we need 
extra information on the course of BCTR ratio in the pre- and post-1989 
periods. These are provided in Table 21 together with the average efficiency per 
period in Table 22.
It is seen from Table 21 that there was clearly a bias against the smaller 
firms in terms of access to bank credit in the pre-1989 period. The average 
BCTR ratio of small firms is much smaller than that of large firms in all 
sectors. More importantly however. Table 21 also shows that this bias grew in 
the post-1989 period as demonstrated by the increased differential between the 
BCTR ratios of small and large firms; in four industries (311,322, 381, 383) the 
differential increased, in two industries (382, 384) it decreased, and in one 
industry (it remained unchanged, and in one sector (321) it decreased slightly.
Consideration of this last finding with the earlier finding - correlation 
between efficiency and access to credit was higher for smaller firms in the pre- 
1980 period and improved even more in relative terms after 1989 - also 
supports that the bias increased after 1989. For smaller firms, efficiency is an 
important factor in determining the access to bank credit. For larger firms, it is 
less of a factor in relative terms, and this became more pronounced after 1989.
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A final important point to consider is the difference in efficiency 
between the small and large firms. Table 22 shows that the improvement in 
efficiency is higher for large companies except for sector 383 where the average 
efficiency declined for both small and large firms.
Interestingly, (1) larger firms are more efficient than smaller firms in 
both periods, (2) large firms have higher access to bank credits than smaller 
firms and this increased after 1990, and (3) the correlation between access to 
credit and efficiency is higher for small firms compared to large firms and this 
situation became even sharper after 1989.
We can conclude this section in the following way. Although in general 
the large firms operate more efficiently '^*, the correlation between efficiency 
and access to credit is lower than that for small firms. Thus the benefits of 
liberalization has not been equally shared by large and small firms. Although 
the correlation between firm productive efficiency and access to credit 
increased relatively more for small firms compared to large firms after 
liberalization, the wedge between the average BCTR ratios of large and small 
firms increased.
A large firm has higher access to bank credit than a smaller firm. 
However, among the set of small firms, efficiency seems to be a relatively 
more important factor in access to credit compared to large firms, i.e., a small 
firm that is more efficient than another small firm is likely to have higher access 
to credit. As we do not deal with causality here, we should note that it could 
also be that obtaining bank credit brings with it bank monitoring which might 
be forcing the management to run the firm more efficiently.
For a large firm competing with another large firm, efficiency seems to 
be a less important factor compared to the competition between the small firms. 
Similar to the foregoing argument, it should be noted that the causality might 
also be running from the opposite direction. In large firms, higher access to
’“'Possibly scale effects have a role in this but we cannot directly tell at this point. The other possibility 
is the higher access to credit forces these firms to be managed more efficiently due to higher bank 
monitoring.
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bank credit and the ensuing increased bank monitoring is a less powerful factor 
driving the firm’s management to increase efficiency in the production 
compared to smaller firms.
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Table 21 BCTR Ratios in Pre- and
5.u 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
P re- 
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Small 0.16
(0.14)
0.18
(0.20)
0.11
(0.14)
0.14
(0.18)
0.15
(0.19)
0.22
(0.22)
0.21
(0.20)
0.28
(0.22)
0.15
(0.13)
0.19
(0.20)
0.13
(0.17)
0.20
(0.20)
0.16
(0.14)
0.19
(0.17)
0.17
(0.18)
0.19
(0.19)
Large 0.25
(0.24)
0.30
(0.25)
0.26
(0.18)
0.28
(0.21)
0.26
(0.18)
0.39
(0.22)
0.25
(0.13)
0.32
(0.21)
0.24
(0.16)
0.32
(0.21)
0.21
(0.17)
0.24
(0.17)
0.25
(0.16)
0.32
(0.18)
0.26
(0.19)
0.24
(0.20)
311 321 322 352 381
OUL
382 383 384
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Small 5.56
(0.81)
5.97
(0.95)
3.95
(0.82)
6.37
(0.88)
2.73
(0.81)
5.48
(0.81)
5.89
(0.73)
5.37
(0.84)
5.50
(0.84)
5.58
(0.87)
4.37
(0.66)
4.46
(0.64)
5.40
(0.82)
5.22
(0.79)
6.26
(0.68)
4.80
(0.84)
Large 7.27
(0.81)
7.96
(1.03)
4.73
(0.73)
7.81
(0.97)
2.81
(0.54)
6.40
(0.75)
6.79
(0.79)
6.92
(0.82)
6.83
(0.66)
7.01
(0.71)
5.16
(0.69)
5.21
(0.70)
6.83
(0.89)
6.45
(0.90)
7.76
(0.64)
4.58
(0.77)
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3.1.2 Location: Main Cities vs. Provinces
We take the firms in the cities where the bulk of the Turkish industry is located 
as the main city firms: Adana, Ankara, Istanbul, İzmir, Kocaeli and Bursa. We 
start by presenting the average productive efficiency and credits for the firms in 
the main cities and provinces.
Table 23 Average Efficiency: Main Cities vs. Provinces
Sub-
sample
Location 311 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
1 Main City 6.26
(1.12)
4.08
(0.85)
4.14
(0.69)
4.91
(0.85)
4.53
(0.92)
5.61
(0.86)
5.32
(0.96)
1.71
(0.70)
Province 5.78
(1.11)
3.86
(0.81)
3.77
(0.68)
3.90
(0.78)
4.18
(1.09)
4.98
(0.81)
5.43
(0.97)
1.44
(0.62)
2 Main City 6.24
(1.13)
4.06
(0.86)
4.12
(0.69)
4.89
(0.85)
4.48
(0.92)
5.58
(0.88)
5.32
(0.96)
1.68
(0.71)
Province 5.79
(1.13)
3.88
(0.82)
3.77
(0.68)
3.90
(0.78)
4.10
(1.15)
4.98
(0.81)
^ .4 3
(0.97)
1.44
(0.62)
3 Main City 6.35
(1.10)
4.19
(0.84)
4.25
(0.65)
4.97
(0.84)
4.60
(0.88)
5.65
(0.88)
5.37
(0.94)
1.74
(0.69)
Province 5.81
(1.13)
3.97
(0.77)
3.77
(0.68)
3.90
(0.72)
4.25
(1.12)
5.09
(0.77)
5.43
(0.97)
1.56
(0.46)
Notes:Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations. Main cities: Adana, Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Kocaeli and Bursa.
Table 24 Average BCTR Ratios: Main Cities vs. Provinces
Sub-
sample
Location 311 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
1 Main City 0.25·
(0.22)
0.21
(0.17)
0.27
(0.19)
0.26
(0.18)
0.18
(0.15)
0.18
(0.15)
0.23
(0.15)
0.24
(0.18)
Province 0.22
(0.18)
0.23
(0.18)
0.34
(0.20)
0.32
(0.11)
0.23
(0.14)
0.20
(0.18)
0.22
(0.14)
0.27
(0.20)
2 Main City 0.22
(0.22)
0.19
(0.17)
0.23
(0.18)
0.24
(0.17)
0.16
(0.15)
0.16
(0.15)
0.22
(0.16)
0.21
(0.15)
Province 0.18
(0.16)
0.22
(0.18)
0.32
(0.21)
0.28
(0.14)
0.21
(0.14)
0.18
(0.15)
0.19
(0.12)
0.25
(0.17)
3 Main City 0.31
(0.21)
0.27
(0.16)
0.35
(0.17)
0.30
(0.17)
0.22
(0.17)
0.21
(0.14)
0.26
(0.16)
0.27
(0.18)
Province 0.29
(0.18)
0.28
(0.16)
0.42
(0.22)
0.44
(0.17)
0.26
(0.12)
0.26
(0.18)
0.23
(0.14)
0.29
(0.18)
Notes:Figures in parenthesis are standard deviations. Main cities: Adana, Ankara, Istanbul, İzmir, Kocaeli and 
Bursa.
Tables 23 and 24 indicate that except for industry 383, mean productive 
efficiencies of firms in the main cities are higher than those of the firms located
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in provinces irrespective of the sub-sample used. On the other hand, for BCTR 
ratios the opposite is true except for industries 311 and 383.
The correlations between efficiency and bank credit, as displayed in 
Table 25, have in general, improved in both the main cities and the provinces in 
the post-1989 period. The exceptions are sector 383 (for main cities) and 384 
and 352 (for provinces). On a comparative basis, the improvements in provinces 
were higher than in main cities. Sectors 382 and 383 are striking examples. For 
example, in 382, the correlation increased from -0.04 to 0.50 for 51 and 53 
firms respectively.
As a result of this relatively higher improvement in provinces, in the 
post-1989 period, in all sectors except for one (322) the correlations were 
higher in provinces than in main cities whereas in the pre-1990 period, that was 
true in only 3 sectors out of 8.
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Table 25
311 327 322 3S2
Sub­
sample
Location P re- 
1989
Post-
1989
1985-
1993
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
1985-
1993
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
1985-
1993
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
1985-
1993
1 Main City 0.23-* 0.21*** 0.25·« 0.36*** 0.49-* 0.47*** 0.15« 0.47*** 0.41··· 0.08 0.16· 0.19**
Province 0.17« 0.16** 0.21*- 0.45··· 0.53··· 0.58··· 0.00 0.54· 0.27 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04
2 Main City 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.42··· 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.20··· 0.60*** 0.48··· 0.18·· 0.21** 0.21**
Province 0.19«* 0.27··· 0.48··· 0.54··· 0.56*** 0.04 0.54* 0.31 0.33 -0.05 0.22
3 Main City 0.11 0.05 0.14· 0.24^*^ 0.31*** 0.31*** -0.12· 0.22*** 0.14· 0.02 0.10 0.10
Province 0.08 0.12· 0.13·· 0.32··· 0.39··· 0.48··· -0.30··· -0.10 -0.25 0.66· 0.09 0.30
381 382 383 384
Sub­
sample
Location Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
1985-
1993
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
1985-
1993
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
1985-
1993
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
1985-
1993
1 Main City 0.28*** 0.33··· 0.35*** -0.06 0.17·· 0.11 0.44*** 0.32*** 0.41*** -0.03 0.13 0.03
Province 0.40·· 0.44*** 0.49··· -0.03 0.45··· 0.14 -0.46* 0.37 -0.21 0.60*** 0.37·· 0.19
2 Main City 0.32··· 0.34*** 0.35··· 0.16· 0.16** 0.18·· 0.44··· 0.35*** 0.44*** 0.11 0.20·· 0.16*
Province 0.49*** 0.46*** 0.52··· -0.04 0.50··· 0.21· -0.21 0.41 0.13 0.54··· 0.38··· 0.30**
3 Main City 0.13· 0.16** 0.08 -0.07 0.13· 0.04 0.38*** 0.18·· 0.25··· -0.04 0.05 -0.01
Xlr\t<ac· ♦♦♦ r£
Province 0.25 0.25
. ak Jk ^ n /
0.25 -0.29** 0.22· -0.05 -0.51* 0.41 -0.19 0.43·· 0.20 -0.18
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How did efficiencies and BCTR ratios evolve after 1989? In Tables 26 and 27, 
average BCTR ratios and efficiencies for main cities and provinces are 
displayed. Table 26 shows that access to bank credit increased in both 
categories. However, the increase in BCTR ratios were in general higher for the 
main city firms (all sectors except for 311 and 322) although average BCTR 
ratios were still higher in provinces in all sectors except 311, 352 and 383. As 
seen in Table 27, average efficiency was higher in main cities in pre-1989 
period and that was preserved after 1989 as well.
Our findings can be summarized as: (1) average efficiency is higher in 
main cities in both periods, (2) on the contrary, BCTR ratios are higher in 
provinces but this situation changed somewhat in favor of main cities in the 
post-1989 period, (3) correlations between bank access and efficiency are 
higher in provinces and this became more pronounced in the post-1989 period.
The finding that BCTR ratios for the main city firms are surprising.The 
number of firms may be playing a role in this; small sample sizes may lead to 
high figures if the members of the (small) sample has a high access to credit for 
some reason. The sample sizes and the size distributions are given in Table 28. 
It is seen that in four of the eight sectors, number of firms in provinces is less 
than 30. Especially, in sectors 322 and 352, these numbers are very small; 8 and 
6 respectively. These latter sectors are the ones with the highest BCTR ratios. 
On the contrary as the number of firms in a province go up, for example sectors 
311 and 322, the BCTR ratios converge to those in main cities^ .^
’^One other explanation that might reconcile the above findings is higher demand and therefore higher 
competition in main cities (given higher number of firms) for credits compared to provinces. If the 
banks provide some kind of credit quotas, the average credit potential for firms in provinces will be 
higher than the average potential in main cities.
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Table 26
3ju 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Main
Cities
0.21
(0.23)
0.23
(0.24)
0.18
(0.17)
0.21
(0.21)
0.18
(0.19)
0.28
(0.23)
0.22
(0.18)
0.29
(0.20)
0.17
(0.16)
0.225
(0.21)
0.13
(0.17)
0.14
(0.14)
0.20
(0.16)
0.24
(0.18)
0.20
(0.18)
0.22
(0.20)
Provinces 0.17
(0.17)
0.20
(0.20)
0.20
(0.19)
0.23
(0.21)
0.27
(0.21)
0.39
(0.29)
0.26
(0.17)
0.29
(0.19)
0.20
(0.13)
0.26
(0.22)
0.21
(0.17)
0.18
(0.22)
0.19
(0.13)
0.18
(0.16)
0.26
(0.21)
0.23
(0.21)
Table 27
3iU 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
P re- 
1989
Post-
1989
P re- 
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
P re- 
1989
Post-
1989
P re- 
1989
Post-
1989
Pre-
1989
Post-
1989
Main
Cities
6.34
(1.18)
6.85
(1.26)
4.42
(0.88)
7.18
(1.17)
2.79
(0.73)
5.82
(0.89)
6.23
(0.85)
5.97
(1.11)
5.97
(0.96)
6.04
(1.07)
4.37
(0.66)
4.73
(0.71)
6.00
(1.10)
5.66
(1.03)
6.96
(1.04)
4.74
(0.85)
Provinces 5.90
(1.10)
6.28
(1.29)
4.28
(0.84)
7.17
(1.19)
2.17
(0.40)
5.93
(1.13)
5.48
(0.71)
5.08
(0.98)
5.59
(1.09)
5.74
(1.09)
5.16
(0.70)
4.15
(0.66)
6.11
(1.22)
5.88
(0.93)
6.77
(0.79)
4.60
(0.66)
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Relatively higher correlations between efficiency and access to credit in 
provinces point out to the fact that the allocation of credit in provinces are 
determined more on the basis of efficiency than in main cities. In other words, 
factors other than efficiency (possibly based on relations with higher 
administrative levels of banks) become relatively more important in large cities 
in access to credit. The increase in correlations and BCTR ratios in the post- 
1989 period suggest that this problem ameliorated to some degree after 1989.
Table 28 Composition of Firms in the Sample (Second Sub-sample, 1985-93)
Location 311 321 3 2 2 3 5 2 381 3 8 2 3 8 3 3 8 4
Main City: Total 120 277 143 101 138 107 105 91
Large 43 137 49 36 39 23 42 44
Small 77 140 94 65 99 84 63 47
Province: Total 190 118 26 55 10 23
Large 47 79 15
Small 143 39 17 40 14
4 DOES ACCESS TO BANK CREDIT EFEECT EEEICIENCY?
So far we have presented evidence that in general, there has been a rise (a) in 
the productive efficiency and (b) the association between productive efficiency 
of a firm and its borrowing from the banking system. We also presented 
evidence that both findings depended on the firm categories. Now we turn to a 
related but a different question: does access to bank credit influence productive 
efficiency? There are two possible reasons as to why bank debt will influence 
the productive efficiency positively. Firstly, of course, bank lending brings with 
it close bank monitoring which forces the firm to function more efficiently.
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Secondly, access to bank credit will provide firms with funds enabling the firm 
to access more efficient technologies^^.
There can be a bi-directional causality or a one-way causality between 
access to credit and technical efficiency. The counterpart to the above question 
is therefore whether or not efficiency influences access to credit positively. That 
will be taken in the next section. It should be emphasized that the approaches 
we are taking in this and the next section are technically not precise causality 
determination methods. But nevertheless their results provide some interesting 
evidence.
There have been three approaches in the literature to investigate the 
“efficiency effects” to our knowledge. Pitt and Lee (1981) and Kalirajan (1981) 
have devised a two-step procedure. In the first step the firm productive 
efficiencies are estimated as fixed-effects in a panel data regression of a 
stochastic frontier production function. In the second step, the fixed-effects 
obtained earlier as the predicted technical efficiencies are run on the suspected 
factors in an OLS regression. Battese and Coelli (1995) have proposed a one- 
step maximum-likelihood estimation procedure for panel data. Finally 
Schiarantelli and Jaramillo (1996) have used GMM estimation on the first 
differences of variables. Their approach comprises of estimation of a 
production function enriched by leverage and maturity variables to capture the 
effects of the latter on efficiency.
In this section we use a one-step estimation procedure based on a fixed 
effect model. Basically, the model is similar to the one employed in 
Schiarantarelli and Jaramillo (1996) except for the fact that we used a fixed- 
effect model instead of GMM estimation. Take the standard fixed effect model 
explained earlier
y  ¡1 = a,· +(3/ X/ a +^2 X2 ¡1 + .....+ pA' ^ A ii + yu (2)
’®See Schiarantarelli and Jaramillo (1996) for a discussion on. the effects of maturity structure of bank 
credit.
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We contemplate that the efficiency effect is a function a suspected 
factors Zj are as
=/(^y) j  = 1,... , s
Then the function to be estimated becomes 
y it = +5/ z/ + ... + 5,. z^  +p/ X/ ¡, +p2 it + -  + Px it + Vii (3)
We have estimated (3) using fixed effects model with a single factor, the lagged 
leverage (BCTR) defined by total bank borrowing divided by total resources 
lagged one year. We have included the beginning of period leverage to avoid 
endogeneity problems. As in the previous section we used electricity 
consumption as the measure of capital inputs. The results are presented in Table 
29. Compared to the previous estimations, however, we lost a large number of 
observations as we had to run the regressions on the second sub-sample.
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Table 29 Estimation Results for the Effect
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The results indicate that in two industries (381 and 382) the coefficient of 
lagged leverage turned significant after liberalization. In one industry (384) the 
opposite took place. In the rest of the sectors the coefficient of leverage is 
insignificant both during the pre- and post liberalization period.
The evidence from the results indicate that except for two industries, the 
liberalization did not bring about an efficiency gain due to borrowing from the 
banking system.
5 EFFICIENCY AND ACCESS TO CREDIT IN  THE PRE-AND POST 
1989: EVIDENCE FROM SELECTIVITY MODELS
In the previous section we presented evidence that bank borrowing did not force 
firms to increase their technical efficiency except for two industries out of eight. 
In this section we investigate the question of whether or not the technical 
efficiency has become a determinant of access to bank credit after 
liberalization.
We use a simple Heckit sample selection model due to Heckman (1976) 
to explain access to bank credit as out bank credit variable is a truncated 
variable (at zero); some firms in the market simply have zero bank credits. We 
have however, the small problem with our credit variable BCTR that we 
encountered earlier. The BCTR variable (ratio of bank credits to total resources) 
takes either a positive value or is zero. As explained earlier, there is doubt as to 
whether all the zero values really correspond to no bank credit or they are 
simply misreported. Therefore, in the regressions in this section, we use the first
and second sub-samples defined earlier.97
97.The third sub-sample can not be used here as it excludes all the observations with zero BCTR.
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5.1 Sample Selection (Incidental Truncation) Problem and Heckman’s Two- 
Step Procedure
Sample selection models has recently been used extensively in the applied 
literature. These models have been surveyed by studies such as Maddala (1983) 
and (1984). The theoretical exposition here follows Green (1990).
We depart from a random variable, y, whose existence in the sample 
depends on another variable the selection variable. An example in the 
applied literature is the female labor supply problem of Heckman (1976). In 
Heckman (1976) the aim is to estimate the number of hours of work female 
workers supply in terms of variables like wage, marital status and number of 
children. The problem is one of truncation as, the number of work hours is 
observed only if the person is working which in Heckman (1976) is 
hypothesized to be conditioned on whether or not the prevailing wage rate is 
above the reservation wage rate.
We can therefore write the “selection” equation as
z* = y ' w  + u (4)
and the equation that we want to estimate as
y  = P 'a: + 8 (5)
where characters in bold represent vectors. In the second equation y  is observed 
only when z* is greater than zero. Assuming s and u have a bivariate normal 
distributions with zero means and correlation p, we can write:
E{y|/>0} =E{y\u>-Y'w)
= p 'ji + E{sl u>-y' »i'} 
= p' a: + p Og X (ttu)
=  p '  + P ^  X  ( a u )
(6)
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where p;t = p ag
a „ = - y '  w la ^
A,(a) = (})( y' M '/a„ )/© ( i  w ! a„)
(|) (·) is the standard normal probability density function, and 
© (·) is the standard normal cumulative density function.
Then,
|^/«-'<«>0 = p';c +p;^X (au) + v (*).
If an ordinary least square regression is run on the entire sample, disregarding 
the selection process, then it is seen from equation (6) above that the 
coefficients obtained will be inconsistent estimates of the parameters p.
The correct parameter estimations can be made by the two step 
procedure due to Heckman (1979)^ .^ In the first step of Heckman’s procedure, a 
probit model is run on the first (selection) equation to estimate y. To do this,
0(y' )
the (estimated) inverse Mill’s ratio, is calculated for each observation in the 
selected sample. In the second stage, p and P;\_ = p ag are estimated by 
regressing y o n x  and estimated X.
5.2 Data, Estimation and Results
The data in this model consist of averages, during 1985-89 and 1990-1993 
periods of the original panel data set. The variables used here is a subset of the 
variables suggested in Titman and Vessels (1988) and discussed in Atiyas 
(1991). The BCTR variable is converted into a 0-1 variable for the first step
’“Maximum likelihood estimator can also be used, but it is. more cumbersome as noted by Greene 
(1990).
84
estimation^^. Efficiency variable used here (EFF) are the fixed effects obtained 
in the earlier panel data regressions. Size variable (LARGE) is used as a dummy 
taking the value of one for firms with average number of employees greater or 
equal to 100. PROFIT is the average real profits during each period. ADV is 
the ratio of advertisement expenditures to total sales. As in Atiyas (1991) 
advertisement is employed as a measure of intangible investment. A dummy 
indicating the location of the firm (MAINCIT) is also employed in the 
regressions, taking the value of one for large cities (Ankara, Istanbul, İzmir, 
Adana, Kocaeli and Bursa).
The regressions were run on an industry wise combined data set. To 
account for the systematic differences between the industries, seven industiy 
dummies were included in the regressions.
The estimation results are presented in Tables 30 and 31 for the two sub­
samples. For both sub-samples, the coefficient of PROFIT is negative in both 
periods (in the second stage regressions). However, in both sub-samples, the 
coefficient is insignificant in the pre-liberalization period whereas significant in 
the post-liberalization period. The coefficients of ADV and MAINCIT are 
insignificant in all cases. Finally, the coefficient of size variable, which is 
positive in all cases, turns slightly significant in the post liberalization period in 
the first sub-sample regression, but remains insignificant in the second sub­
sample.
The important variable for our purposes is the efficiency variable. In 
both the first and the second sub-samples, the coefficient of the efficiency 
variable (EFF) is positive but insignificant in the pre-liberalization period. In 
the post-liberalization period the coefficient becomes significant. Thus these 
regressions provide evidence that in access to credit, efficiency became an 
important determinant after the liberalization.
This result indicates that efficiency has become a significant determinant 
of bank credit a firm obtains after liberalization; firms with higher efficiency
’’The new variable takes the value of zero for BCTR=0 and one for BCTR>0.
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has higher debt ratios indicating higher access to bank credit in the post 
liberalization period.
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Table 30 Sample Selection Model for Access to Credit (First Sub-sample)
PRE-LIBERALIZATION POST-LIBERALIZATION
FIRST STAGE SECOND FIRST STAGE SECOND
(selection) STAGE (selection) STAGE
CONSTANT 0.303*’ 0.053 -0.78" -0.1641
(1.89) (0.40) (-2.89) (-0.91)
EFF 0.1433" 0.018 0.269" 0.052’ ·
(4.28) (1.30) (6.15) (2.11)
LARGE 0.306" 0.087" 0.29*’ 0.04
(3.09) (2.99) (2.37) (1.83)
ADV 0.828 0.0499 0.3581 0.063
(0.53) (0.25) (0.56) (1.25)
PROFIT 0.00001 -0.050 1.20 -0.31"
(1.82) (-0.019) (0.66) (-2.58)
MAINCIT 0.00063 0.00002 -0.071 -0.00023
(1.30) (-0.18) (-0.75) (-0.015)
DUM311 0.0985 0.56"
(0.32) (2.34)
DUM32I -0.007 0.0097
(-0.296) (0.42)
DUM322 0.038 0.179"
(1.27) (6.53)
DUM352 0.0129 0.121"
(0.40) (4.25)
DUM381 -0.024 0.061"
(-0.84) (2.41)
DUM382 -0.027 -0.017
(-0.99) (-0.64)
DUM383 -0.028 0.06"
(-0.91) (2.14)
LAMBDA 0.29 0.197
(1.14) (0.98)
F-VALUE Chi-Sq.: 42.3 4.13 Chi-sq.: 94.3 9.85
(p-value) (p=0.00) (0.00) (p=0.00) (0.00)
No. o f 1388 1211 1377 1151
Observations
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are t-values. represents significance at 5% level.
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Table 31 Sample Selection Model for Access to Credit (Second sub-sample)
PRE-LIBERALIZATION POST-LIBERALIZATION
FIRST STAGE SECOND FIRST STAGE SECOND
(selection) STAGE (selection) STAGE
CONSTANT -0.01 0.14” -1.03" -0.13
(-0.62) (1.87) (-4.3) (-0.64)
EFF 0.15” 0.014 0.262" 0.0484”
(5.16) (1.64) (6.88) (2.41)
LARGE 0.32” 0.064*’ 0.32" 0.036
(3.61) (3.7) (3.28) (1.34)
ADV 19.97” 0.031 0.48 0.064
(2.78) (0.2) (0.61) (1.36)
PROFIT 0.99” -0.15 1.10 -0.31"
(2.00) (-0.84) (0.69) (-2.95)
MAINCIT 0.044 -0.014 -0.038 -0.0019
(0.52) (-1.13) (-0.45) (0.14)
DUM311 -0.022 0.0019”
(-0.91) (2.50)
DUM321 -0.016 0.0185
(-0.79) (0.85)
DUM322 0.035 0.17"
(1.29) (6.36)
DUM352 -0.074 0.135”
(-0.27) (4.84)
DUM381 -0.04 0.0747"
(-1.66) (3.04)
DUM382 -0.038 -0.0074
(-1.60) (-0.29)
DUM383 -0.038 0.079*’
(-1.46) (2.87)
LAMBDA -0.037 0.78
(-0.36) (0.43)
F-VALUE Chi-sq.: 30.3 4.8 Chi-sq.: 128.15 10.85
(p=0.00) (0.00) (p=0.00) (0.00)
No, o f Observations 1498 ¡212 1491 1151
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are t-values. represents significance at 5% level.
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6 CONCLUSION
This study have produced a number of results. Firstly, there has been an 
increase in the mean productive efficiency and gearing ratio after financial 
liberalization. In addition, the correlations between efficiency and access to 
credit also improved after liberalization. Thus, ceteris paribus, a more efficient 
firm has received a higher reward in terms of access to bank credit after 
financial liberalization.
Secondly, however, these benefits have not been shared equally by 
different categories of firms. In this study we considered two such categories, 
size and location.
Thirdly, we basically found no evidence that efficiency of a firm is 
affected by its access to credit in both the pre-and post-liberalization periods. 
We interpreted this as, bank monitoring did not improve after liberalization.
Fourthly, we investigated the opposite question and found that in access 
to credit efficiency played an insignificant role in the pre-liberalization period 
but this role became significant in the post-liberalization period. This, we 
interpreted as, banks playing an ex-ante active role; after liberalization, banks 
were careful in extended credits with high (ex-ante) return projects/firms. The 
previous result however shows that, ex-post, the banks do not monitor the 
projects keenly. Increased productive efficiency thus basically follows from 
banks’ ex-ante roles.
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A number of specifications were estimated in the study. The need for this was, 
firstly, the unavailability of physical capital stock data. Instead the data set 
included annual electricity consumption and the LFFA variable mentioned 
earlier. The results of estimations reported here belong to (1) (unrestricted) 
Cobb-Douglas with electricity as a proxy for capital input, (2) (unrestricted) 
Cobb-Douglas with fitted value for capital input, (3) Cobb-Douglas with the 
restriction of constant returns to scale, and (4) translog production flinction.
The estimation of specification (2) deserves some explanation. 
Specification (2) was estimated using a two-step procedure similar to the 
ordinary TSLS estimation of cross-section or time series data. In the first step, 
the LFFA variable was regressed on a constant and the ELEC variable 
(electricity consumption in kwh) using ordinary least squares approach. The 
fitted variables obtained from this regression were used as the proxy for capital 
input in the second step estimation. This second step estimation was fixed- 
effect panel data estimation as described in the text. All the other estimations 
were identical to the second step (panel) data estimation. The result of 
estimations are presented in Tables A-1 - A-4.
In this study we are interested in obtaining the fixed effects to be used as 
firm-specific efficiency indices and not in the coefficients of the production 
function. Thus the aim of trying different specifications is to see if specification 
makes a difference in the relative efficiencies to be attributed to each firm. If 
the relative efficiencies are not invariant with respect to the specification used, 
the conclusions based on the efficiencies get weakened. To test the this 
invariance the correlations between the efficiency indices obtained from the 
different specifications are presented in Table A-5. High correlations obtained 
show that the relative efficiencies are invariant with respect to the specification 
used.
The results of the first specification, which is the one used in the study, 
are presented for all the three periods of pre-1989, post-1989 and 1985-93. For
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
90
the other three specifications only the “full sample” results are presented (1985- 
1993 i.e., the entire panel). The correlations in Table A-5 are all based on the 
entire panel.
We also ran regressions for one of the sectors to see if, using, as a proxy 
for capital stock, total horsepower of electrical motors in the factory which was 
available in the data set, changed the conclusions. We found that the estimated 
efficiencies were again highly correlated with those obtained using electricity 
consumption like the other approaches reported in this appendix.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
A. CO BB-DO UG LAS W ITH ELECTRICITY
T able A -la  Cobb-Douglas with Electricity (1985-1989)
311 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
ELEC 0.12
(3.10)
0.20
(6.97)
0.29
(5.57)
0.19
(3.75)
0.15
(4.29)
0.23
(4.96)
0.19
(3.40)
0.03
(0.5)
LABOR 0.30
(4.10)
0.53
(9.96)
0.80
(8.90)
0.57
(6.20)
0.31
(4.40)
0.49
(6.10)
0.24
(2.7)
0.50
(4.60)
0.85 0.91 0.82 0.90 0.86 0.87 0.93 0.94
Haiisman 84.7
(0.00)
27.8
(0.00)
0.50
(0.78)
36.6
(0.00)
90.4
(0.00)
16.2
(0.00)
61.2
(0.00)
38.2
(0.00)
No. of Observations 1530 1937 721 511 907 115 494 431
Notes: All variables in natural logarithms. Regressors; numbers in parenthesis are t-values. Hausman test; numbers in parenthesis 
are p-values.
T able A -lb  Cobb-Doiiglas with Electricity ( 19 9 0 -1 9 9 3 )
311 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
ELEC 0.12
(2.80)
0.07
(2.60)
0.09
(1.71)
0.41
(4.90)
0.22
(5.10)
0.06
(1.22)
0.25
(4.10)
0.24
(5.00)
LABOR 0.24
(3.01)
0.39
(9.11)
0.55
(7.12)
0.06
(0.60)
0.13
(2.51)
0.48
(6.90)
0.28
(3.38)
0.59
(7.20)
R- 0.88 0.94 0.85 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.97
Hausman 109.9
(0.00)
136.9
(0.00)
27.5
(0.00)
36.6
(0.00)
91.1
(0.00)
51.0
(0.00)
39.5
(0.00)
18.2
(0.00)
No. of Observations 1145 1512 545 364 688 515 442' 438
Notes: All variables in natural logarithms. Regressors: numbers in parenthesis are t-values. Hausman test; numbers in parenthesis 
are p-values.
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Table A -lc  Cobb-Douglas with Electricity (1 9 8 5 -1 9 9 3 )
311 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
ELEC 0.14
(5.30)
0.27
(14.6)
0.20
(6.30)
0.30
(7.80)
0.31
(11.6)
0.20
(6.32)
0.24
(8.20)
0.47
(10.7)
LABOR 0.28
(6.30)
0.43
(13.8)
0.69
(13.8)
0.47
(6.84)
0.18
(4.40)
0.37
(6.72)
0.35
(6.30)
0.49
(7.7)
0.83 0.89 0.79 0.87 0.84 0.81 0.89 0.90
Hausman 206.8
(0.00)
68.6
(0.00)
19.1
(0.00)
19.0
(0.00)
113.7
(0.00)
26.2
(0.00)
66.5
(0.00)
18.3
(0.00)
No. of Observations 2675 3449 1266 919 1595 1407 965 881
Notes: All variables in natural logarithms. Regressors: numbers in parenthesis are t-values. Hausman test: numbers in parenthesis 
are p-values.
B. COBB-DOUGLAS WITH FITTED VALUES FOR CAPITAL
Table A-2 Cobb-Douglas with Fitted Values for Capital (1985-1993)
311 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
KFITTED 0.23
(5.30)
0.36
(13.6)
0.20
(5.10)
0.38
(7.20)
0.54
(11.7)
0.27
(5.70)
0.32
(7.18)
0.49
(8.68)
LABOR 0.30
(6.40)
0.40
(11.3)
0.73
(11.8)
0.45
(6.02)
0.14
(3.21)
0.33
(5.40)
0.32
(5.09)
0.58
(6.60)
R^ 0.83 0.89 0.80 0.86 0.84 0.80 0.89 0.90
Hausman 163.3
(0.00)
65.1
(0.00)
13.5
(0.00)
16.5
(0.00)
102.9
(0.00)
46.0
(0.00)
68.0
(0.00)
11.86
(0.00)
No. of Observations 2104 2879 986 776 1321 1165 813 720
Notes: All variables in natural logarithms. Regressors: numbers in parenthesis are t-values. Hausman test: numbers in parenthesis 
are p-values.
C) CRTS COBB-DOUGLAS 
Table A-3 CRTS Cobb-Douglas (1985-1993)
311 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
ELEC 0.26
(9.90)
0.31
(17.3)
0.22
(7.10)
0.34
(9.72)
0.43
(16.7)
0.29
(9.52)
0.30
(10.3)
0.35
(10.06)
R^ 0.56 0.65 0.53 0.68 0.65 0.58 0.68 0.63
Hausman 0.06
(0.81)
1.54
(0.21)
7.88
(0.00)
0.16
(0.69)
4.44
(0.035)
2.35
(0.125)
2.08
(0.15)
0.49
(0.49)
No. of Observations 2675 3449 1266 919 1595 1407 965 885
Notes: All variables in natural logarithms. Regressors: numbers in parenthesis are t-values. Hausman test: numbers in parenthesis 
are p-valiies.
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D) TRANSLOG PRODUCTION FUNCTION
Table A-4 Translog Production Function (1985-1993)
311 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
ELEC -0.81
(-4.10)
-0.99
(-6.72)
-0.60
(-1.73)
-0.87
(-3.09)
-1.03
(-4.40)
-0.35
(-1.83)
0.43
(3.50)
-0.66
(-3.64)
LABOR 1.77
(7.50)
2.01
(12.9)
1.65
(4.40
1.41
(3.23)
0.78
(2.54)
0.93
(3.32)
1.44
(4.72)
1.22
(3.64)
ELEC*LABOR -0.13
(-6.80)
-0.17
(-12.9)
-0.12
(-2.85)
-0.08
(-2.04)
-0.06
(-2.45)
-0.035
(-12.8)
-0.15
(-4.82)
-0.08
(-2.40)
ELEC^ 0.05
(6.30)
0.07
(11.0)
0.05
(2.80)
0.06
(4.40)
0.06
(6.15)
0.03
(3.39)
0.01
(1.70)
0.05
(6.09)
LABORÉ 0.08
(3.90)
0.12
(8.19)
0.09
(2.20)
0.017
(0.36)
0.033
(1.14)
-0.035
(-1.12)
0.14
(4.30)
0.047
(1.37)
R- 0.83 0.90 0.79 0.87 0.84 0.82 0.89 0.91
Hausman 106.6
(0.00)
40.3
(0.00)
15.7
(0.00)
15.0
(0.01)
82.0
(0.00)
38.7
(0.00)
62.1
(0.00)
33.2
(0.00)
No. of Observations | 2675 3449 1266 919 1595 1407 965 885
Notes: All variables in natural logarithms, 
are p-values.
Regressors: numbers in parenthesis are t-values. Hausman test: numbers in parenthesis
E) CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EFFICIENCY INDICES 
Table A-5 Correlations Between Efficiency Indices
> 311 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
A ANDB 1.00
(310)
1.00
(396)
1.00
(151)
1.00
(107)
1.00
(187)
1.00
(164)
1.00
(115)
1.00
(114)
A ANDC 0.86
(311)
0.88
(396)
0.99
(151)
0.96
(107)
0.90
(187)
0.88
(164)
0.90
(115)
0.99
(114)
A ANDD 0.96
(311)
0.94
(396)
0.99
(151)
0.99
(107)
0.99
(187)
1.00
(164)
0.99
(115)
0.98
(114)
Notes: A: COBB-DOUGLAS WITH ELECTRICITY. B: COBB-DOUGLAS WITH FITTED VALUE FOR CAPITAL. C: CRTS 
COBB-DOUGLAS D: TRANSLOG. All correlations are significant at 0.01 significance level.
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FINANCIAL BEHAVIOR OF FIRMS IN TURKEY DURING 
NORMAL TIMES AND CRISIS
CHAPTER IV
1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we will investigate the financial behavior of Turkish 
manufacturing firms during ‘normal’ times and during crises. We base the study 
on the assertions of the recent credit view literature. As diseussed in the next 
section, this literature emphasizes the role of credit markets, characterized by 
the asymmetry of information between borrowers and lenders, as an additional 
monetary transmission mechanism. Moreover, this literature argues that 
“adverse shoeks to the eeonomy may be amplified by worsening credit-market 
conditions”*®®, a phenomenon called the ‘financial accelerator’.
In this ehapter, first a brief aceount of the literature is discussed. In the 
second section, a Vector Autoregression approach will be employed to shed 
some light on the general credit channel of monetary transmission. In the third 
section the a general discussion on the 1994 economic crises in Turkey will be 
made. In the fourth section, the reasons of credit contraction during the crises 
and the non-monetary factors behind it will be discussed. In the fifth section, 
the effects of crises on the earnings behavior of sample firms will be discussed. 
Sixth section gives a general description of the sample before and during the 
crises in terms of liability structures. Seventh section discusses the same issue in
100Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996).
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a more detailed way using regression analysis. In the eighth section the debt 
restructuring behavior of the firms is investigated.
2 A BRIEF LITERA TURE SUR VEY
The standard accounts of the transmission mechanism can best be summarized 
through an IS-LM framework where the interest rates link the monetary and the 
real sides of the economy. Monetary disturbance (say a contraction), be it the 
result of a deliberate policy attempt or the result of another exogenous shock, 
first permeates the financial market lowering the (short term) interest rates. To 
the extent that the interest rates influence the aggregate spending components 
like consumption and investment (both physical capital and inventory 
investments) monetary policy influences the real side of the economy.
The credit channel view suggests an additional channel (or 
“enhancement” channel in the words of two major advocates of the credit 
view'* '^) by which the monetary disturbances are transmitted into the real sphere 
of the economy . The basic premise of the suggested channel is the existence 
of a wedge between the cost of external funds and the opportunity cost of the 
internal funds due to the informational asymmetry between borrowers and 
lenders. Two separate mechanisms that link monetary policy to external finance 
premia are considered in the literature: the borrower balance sheet (or net 
worth) channel and the bank balance sheet (or bank lending) channel.
Before turning to these channels, it should be stressed that stories of both 
channels can be told without mentioning the monetary policy. In the net worth 
channel, an exogenous shock other than monetary policy that would erode the 
net worth of the borrowers could yield responses similar to the responses to a
'°’See Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
'“^ Gertler (1988), Bernanke (1993) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995) provide a general overview of the 
literature.
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monetary shock. Similarly, in the bank lending channel, a non-monetary 
exogenous shock to the bank balance sheets could cause responses similar to 
those of a monetary shock.
2.1 The “Borrower Balance Sheet” or “Net Worth” Channel
In a world of informational asymmetries and costly state verification 
(Townsend, 1979) an external finance premium is likely to be included in the 
lending rate’*^·’. The borrower balance sheet channel (or the “net worth” 
channel) is based on the assumption that the external finance premium is a 
function of the financial position of the borrower; better the financial position 
of a company, higher is the collateralization capacity of a firm. Moreover, a 
good financial position implies a bigger amount of the firm’s own funds 
injected in the project for which bank credit is asked. In other words more of 
. the firm’s own resources are at stake.
Since borrowers’ financial positions are likely to be procyclical external 
finance premia will rise during recessions and fall during booms. To the extent 
that external finance premia and hence the overall cost of external finance 
influences the spending decisions of firms - such as their demand for fixed 
investments or inventories- shocks to borrower balance sheets will have real 
effects. Bernanke and Gertler (1989 and 1990) present two theoretical models 
in this vein'*^ "*. In these models, it is shown that agency costs that arise from 
asymmetry of information between borrowers and lenders may lead to a kind of 
accelerator mechanism (“the financial accelerator”). During booms borrower 
balance sheets will get strengthened reducing the external finance premia. This 
will expand spending for inputs and investment and therefore will amplify the
simple costly state verification story would entail the principals (the lenders) to impose the mark-up 
at least to cover the costs of monitoring. Alternatively, a the wedge could also be imposed as a “lemon” 
premium due to the private information over the quality of the investment project the firm has. For this 
second stoiy, see for example Myers and Majluf (1984) or Bernanke and Gertler (1990).
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upturn. During, recessions, the opposite mechanism will be at work. The 
models also show that exogenous shocks to borrower balance sheets as in a 
Fisherian debt deflation, may start real fluctuations. This last point adds to the 
models a “real business” cycle flavor.
No part of the story so far needs a monetary policy factor. To convert the 
story into a monetary transmission story, monetary policy can be added as an 
exogenous factor to the triangular mechanism between the borrower balance 
sheet, the external finance premia and spending decisions described above. 
Monetary policy can affect the financial positions of borrowers both directly 
and indirectly as elaborated in Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
A rise in the interest rates, say in response to a contractionary monetary 
policy, generally lowers the asset values in the economy thus lowering the 
collateral value of the firm. Moreover, a rise in interest rates increases the 
interest expense and thus reduces the cash flow. The extent of this effect 
depends on the size of the debt (especially short term) the firm carries.
There are also possible indirect effects of increases in interest rates on 
financial positions of firms. Assume a manufacturing firm producing for 
downstream customers. If the same contractionary monetary policy reduces the 
spending decisions of the customers by similar reasons cited above, the revenue 
of the Arm will decline while its various fixed and quasi-fixed costs will not 
adjust in the short-run. This reduces profitability and cash flow in the short run 
as well as eroding the net worth of the company. Moreover, possibly, such a 
situation will have longer lasting real effects as well'*^ .^
A final consideration is about the differential impact of a cash squeeze 
emerging from tight money (or another exogenous factor that raises general 
level of interest rate and external finance premium) on different classes of 
firms. In particular, firms with higher access to finance are presumably more 
likely to smooth declining cash flows. Those firms which are constrained in
'°‘'Other important references are Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Calomiris and Hubbard 
(1990) and Gertler (1992).
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borrowing will possibly have to cut their spending by much more than their 
counterparts which are not constrained. Thus the credit view actually works 
more through these firms
What is the theoretical link between financial constraints and real spending 
behavior such as physical investments and demand for production factors 
including the intermediate goods? Bernanke and Gilchrist (1996) includes a 
very simple example that has been borrowed from Kiyolaki and Moore (1995) 
showing how the demand for immediate goods can be affected by borrowing 
constraints. Here we will employ the same example with slight modifications in 
exposition to convey the main idea.
Take a simple firm that purchases the inputs to be used in production in 
the next time period. In the production, the firm employs this intermediate good 
(x) and fixed capital that it owns. For simplicity, we assume that the fixed 
capital does not depreciate and the firm does not intend to make new physical 
investment. The firm borrows from the financial market to finance the purchase 
of intermediate input and assume that it inherited a nominal debt of Bq from the 
previous period.
The firm’s problem is to maximize the cash flow from operations in the 
next period net of debt repayments:
n  -p F (x ,)-B ,(l+ r)
where F(xj) stands for the production to be made in the next period with the 
inputs purchased this period (xy). We assume F (j is concave and increasing. 
The price of input, x, is normalized to 1 and that of output to p. Both of these 
prices and the nominal interest rate, r, are assumed to be intact in the both 
periods. B] is the nominal amount of debt to be made this period to finance the 
purchases and the debt obligations inherited from previous time period.
‘“^ Example taken from Bernanke and Gertler (1995). The same scenario can also be used to predict that 
under such a circumstance, the amount of intra-company trade credits will increase.
106Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993 and 1994).
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Therefore the accounting identity that links the purchases and borrowing in the 
starting time period {t-0) is
xj + (1+r) Bo =pF(xo) +B, 0)
where pF(xo) represents the cash flow obtained at t-0  using the inputs, xq, 
purchased previous time period. The first order conditions lead to
p F ’(xi) =(l+r) (2)
What happens if the firm’s borrowing is constrained by, say, the value of the 
collateral the firm owns denoted by qi C, where qj is the (certain) price of 
collateral the next period and C is real capital? Then the borrowing is 
constrained by
B] < qi C/(l+r) (3)
where the right hand side is the present value of the collateral.
The situation can be depicted as in the figure below. If the present value 
of collateral dictates a borrowing, B ’l, that is smaller than the optimal
)|c )|c
borrowing, B I, that is if B i < qi C/(l+r), then the amount of input to be 
purchased and therefore the amount of output will be smaller than the optimal 
values, x / and F(x /).
In that case, the amount of input to be purchased will satisfy
X/ < pF(xo) -(1+r) Bo + q, C/(l+r) (3)
with strict inequality where the right hand side is simply the net worth of the 
firm. It is easy to see that the borrowing constraint leads to a higher shadow 
price as the amount of input used in production is less than the optimal amount 
had the constraint not been there. The difference p F ’(xi) - r > 0 is the agency 
cost of borrowing in this simple example; the marginal value of internal funds 
are higher than their opportunity cost. This agency cost increases as the net 
worth decreases; as seen from equation (3) as net worth decreases x/ gets
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smaller (and thus also the output in period 1) and thus its marginal product gets 
higher. In other words, an exogenous shock which reduces the value of the right 
hand side of equation (3) reduces the spending and thus the prospective output 
of the firm. It is seen that such shocks can exert their effect through a fall in the 
current cash flow (pF(xo)), a fall in the (certain) price of collateral (gj) or an 
increase in the amount of initial debt Note that although not considered in 
this simple example, expectations may play an important role in this process 
through the price of collateral; which is easy to see if is replaced by its 
expectations.
Figure 2 Borrowing with and without constraints
2.2 Empirical Findings on Balance Sheet Channel
One of the major studies in financial constrains literature is the one conducted 
by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). F^zzari et al. attempted at classifying
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the sample firms in terms of the retention practices'*^’ prior to estimation. Such 
an a priori classification of firms provides a valuable means of testing the 
financial constraints hypothesis. Observed retention practices are taken to 
“provide a useful a priori criterion for identifying firms that are likely to face 
relatively high costs of external finance”.
If the external finance premia are not different across the classes, 
retention practices should not have an explanatory power on the investment 
behavior. Firms across all classes will simply shift to external funds to smooth 
their investment whenever the internally generated funds fluctuate. Thus under 
such circumstances, the coefficient of cash flow should not differ substantially 
across classes of firms and the retention practices should reveal no information 
about investment behavior. Flowever, if the external finance premia differ 
significantly across categories of firms, then high retention ratios should be 
pointing out to difficulties -high costs- in obtaining external funds. 
Consequently, if the financial constraints hypothesis is correct, for high 
retention firms, the influence of cash flow on investment should be more 
pronounced in the low retention firms.
The a-priori classification of the firms also helps overcome an important 
“identification” problem. Contrary to the stoiy of differences in the behavior of 
firms that are likely to be financially constrained and those that are not, a 
positive correlation between cash flow and investments may simply reflect 
profitability rather than financial constraints'*'^. However, in that case, the 
observed sensitivity of investment to cash flow should be equal across 
categories of firms. On the other hand, if the sensitivity to cash flow is 
significantly different across categories of firms, this would be an evidence for 
the financial constraints hypothesis.
'°’Xhe firms are classified into three categories. Class I firms have retention ratios less than 10% for at 
least 10 years and Class 11 firms include those with retention ratios between 10% and 20% for at least 
10 years. Class II firms include the rest.
‘“ The firms that are not financially constrained may sirnply be those that are more profitable in their 
operations and hence have more prospects.
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Three models of investment behavior (q-theory itself, neoclassical 
investment theory, accelerator theory) are estimated for each of the categories 
of firms to check if the coefficient of the cash-flow is larger for the high 
retention class. Care is taken in the study to consider the possibility that 
investment might be related to cash flow not because of financial constraints 
that the firm faces but simply because cash-flow might proxy the firm’s future 
earnings potential. To take into consideration this rather important issue, the 
authors include Tobin’s q, which is a proxy of the market’s perceptions of the 
firm’s future profitability (and which can be taken as a major factor determining 
the firm’s demand for physical investment), in the neoclassical as well as the 
accelerator models (q already exists of course in the q-model estimations). In 
each case, financially constrained (high retention) firms are found to be more 
sensitive to cash flows than less constrained firms.
Hence “the link between financing constraints and investment varies by 
type of firm”. In fact financial effects were found to be important for 
investment in all firms. But the effect was substantially more pronounced for 
firms that retained nearly all of their income. Moreover, the effects get more 
pronounced for sample periods in which the high retention firms were the 
youngest -thus for sample periods when their disadvantages from asymmetric 
information were high.
After Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), a number of more recent 
studies were made using other criteria of firm categorization. Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1993 and 1994) uses size as the classification criteria. Larger firms 
are presumed to have an informational advantage over smaller firms in financial 
markets. Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) provide evidence that at the onset of 
recessions caused by tight money, bank lending to smaller firms declines 
relative to large firms. The evidence is stronger for shorter maturities. Short 
term borrowing by larger firms rise substantially under tight money. Bank 
lending to smaller firms, on the other hand, does not increase, although they 
typically suffer a proportionately larger drop in sales. In short, Gertler and
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Gilchrist find that during recessions after tight money, the bank lending is 
directed towards larger firms at the expense of smaller firms. Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1993) also report that the trade credit received after tight money 
decreases for smaller firms and remain unchanged for large firms.
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) classify a sample of manufacturing firms 
again according to size, taking the latter again as a proxy for the degree of 
capital market access. The results, which are in line with ‘endogenous’ 
classification approaches like the one opted by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(1988) -namely the retention rate criterion- indicate that as size gets smaller, 
reliance on ‘information based’ finance (bank-finance vs. paper market) 
increases. After the onset of a recession, larger firms appear to borrow heavily 
to carry inventories whereas the smaller firms do not. For small firms, short­
term debt drops rapidly along with inventories. To determine the effect of 
balance sheet condition on the inventory investment, the latter is estimated 
including as a regressor, interest coverage ratio (taken as the ratio of cashflow 
to interest expenditure). The latter carries a significant coefficient for small 
firms whereas an insignificant (and wrongly signed) one for larger firms 
providing evidence that the effect of balance sheet conditions on inventory 
investment are more important for small firms.
Results of a study by Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) support the 
conclusions of Gertler and Gilchrist (1994). They use the existence of Standard 
and Pool’s bond ratings for firms as a proxy for the latters’ access to public debt 
markets. Their results of inventory investment estimations provide evidence that 
firms without bond ratings have a much higher reliance on internal funds than 
those with bond ratings. Further, such constraints are found to be significant 
during tight money regimes and are largely absent during looser monetary 
regimes. This last result supports the view that credit market provides a conduit 
(in addition to the traditional mechanism) through which monetary policy is 
transmitted in to the real side of the economy.
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Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) find more direct evidence on the 
importance of financial constraints on (physical capital) investment behavior of 
Japanese firms. Instead of using size as a proxy for capital market access, these 
authors use, as criteria, the official ties of firms to large Japanese 
conglomerates which constitute the main source of external finance. The results 
indicate that the coefficient of cash flow is small and insignificant for ‘group’ 
firms (firms belonging to a keiretsii) whereas it is highly significant for non­
group firms.
2.3 The Bank Lending Channel
As described earlier, the borrower balance sheet (net worth) channel is realized 
through the demand side for funds (borrowers). A second channel is the “bank 
lending channel” or the ‘Banks’ Balance Sheet’ channel where the response of 
bank credit supply to monetary policy is emphasized. Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988) present the main idea employing a simple model which extends the text 
book IS/LM model by dropping the latter’s implicit assumption that bank loans 
and bonds are perfect substitutes. As noted by Bernanke and Gertler (1995), “if 
the supply of bank loans is disrupted for some reason, bank-dependent 
borrowers (small and medium sized businesses for example) may not be literally 
shut off from credit, but they are virtually certain to incur costs associated with 
finding a new lender, establish a credit relationship and so on. Therefore, a 
reduction in the supply of bank credit, relative to other forms of credit, is likely 
to increase the external finance premium and to reduce the real activity.”
The bank lending channel relates to the supply side of the funds. The two 
basic premises are that (1) bank lending is “special” in that given the 
imperfections in the financial market, there are “bank-dependent” borrowers,
i.e., firms for which borrowing from non-bank sources is not a perfect substitute 
to the borrowing from banks (2) monetary policy influences bank lending; in
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particular, a contractionary monetary policy decreases the total amount of bank 
lending because of the reserve requirements on banks. Combining these two 
premises leads to the theoretical prediction that this will introduce an extra 
channel of transmission of monetary policy. If the net worth channel is 
considered to refer to a movement in the demand curve for credits, the bank 
balance sheet or bank lending channel refers to a shift in the supply curve of 
credits.
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model introduces credit supply equation as 
a fraction of total bank liabilities net of reserves and credit demand equation as 
a function of own interest rate, bond interest rate and transaction proxy 
(income). A ‘credit-commodity’ (CC) schedule is then derived by combining 
credit market equilibrium with the usual goods market equilibrium condition 
(IS). The equilibrium interest rate-income pairs are then determined in the 
model at the intersection of the CC and ordinary LM schedules.
The novelty arises at this point. In this model, monetary policy 
(measured by the bank reserves here) shifts not only the LM curve as in the 
traditional IS/LM story but also the CC curve through the changes in the bank 
reserves (in the same direction). Thus the possibility arises that (1) an 
expansionary monetary policy might raise the interest rates and also might lead 
to a larger expansion than is contemplated under the traditional model (2) 
conversely, a contractionary monetary policy, implemented by a reduction in 
bank reserves might have a larger impact than contemplated under the 
traditional model as it will contract the bank lending as well.
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) support the same idea by providing 
evidence that, following tight money, banks initially respond by selling off their 
liquid securities without a change in loans. Over time, however, they reduce 
their outstanding credits by “terminating old loans and refusing to make new 
loans”. Thus they argue that the primary effect of the monetary contraction falls 
on credits. Finally, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) also find that the timing of
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permanent negative effect on credit supply coincides with the rise in real 
contraction (measured by employment rates in the study).
That some firms are “bank dependent” does not mean that such firms 
really have no other lending source other than banks. As Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995) emphasize, the bank-borrower relation entails informationally a closer 
relationship between the borrower and any other direct or indirect source of 
lending in the financial market. When the supply of bank loans decline, such 
bank-dependent firms may start looking for alternatives, but that process of 
search and establishment of new relationship both introduce extra costs. 
Furthermore, non-bank alternative will be informationally “farther” than bank 
and thus the external finance premium further increases. Empirical studies by 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993 and 1994), Fazzari et al (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and 
Scharfstein (1991), Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1991), among others, support 
this point.
A more important issue to consider is the size of the influence of 
monetary policy on bank credit supply. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) argues that 
contractionary monetary policy reduces the bank reserves and deposits. 
Consequently, it would limit the supply of bank loans by reducing firms’ access 
to loanable funds. However, this story rests on the assumption that banks can 
not compensate for the reduced reserves and deposits by increasing other 
sources of funds such as new issues of CDs or equity which are not subject to 
reserve requirements. To the extent that this latter option is available and 
practiced, the possible effect of monetary policy on bank credit supply weakens. 
Römer and Römer (1990) have for example argued that after the removal of 
Regulation Q in 1980 in the US, banks became freer to manage their liabilities 
including large CDs without subject to reserve requirements.
Römer and Römer (1990) argue that the link that created a co-movement 
between the credits and reserves and thus monetary policy has been broken after 
1980 in the US. Nevertheless, they do not dismiss the real effects of credit. In
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their recent account of their work“^  ^ they argue that the “apparent 
disproportionate impact of monetary policy on bank loans in the postwar era” 
was caused by the Fed’s augmenting “the conventional monetary tightening 
with actions specifically aimed at curtailing bank loans” (e.g. Fed’s “credit 
actions” of 1979 and 1980).
Although Bernanke and Gertler (1995) accept that “the importance of the 
traditional bank lending channel has most likely diminished over time” they 
counter the arguments Römer and Römer (1990) arguing that bank lending 
channel of monetary policy still exists to some extent in the context of the US 
economy and it is empirically relevant. The discussion seems to be far from 
conclusion as of now and it can safely be said that the arguments put forward 
by Bernanke and Blinder (1988 and 1992) seem to be appropriate, at least, for 
an economy like Turkey where the issues of bank liabilities not subject to 
reserve requirements are limited.
Another important criticism of the lending view is that the detected 
coincidence of timings of the contraction of bank lending and the real output 
following tight money may well be due to causality running from tight money to 
output and from output to credit demand. In other words, the story may be that, 
the credit channel simply does not exist and the contraction of bank lending 
may just be caused by the reduced demand for bank credit due to contraction of 
real activity after tight money triggered by the traditional transmission 
mechanism.
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) provide evidence against this 
argument. They analyze the behavior of bank lending and commercial paper 
issue after tight money and find that commercial paper issues increase 
simultaneously with the contraction of bank lending. If it were really the case 
that contractionary monetary policy reduces output and this causes the fall in the 
demand for bank lending, one would expect that the demand for funds from 
other external sources (paper market) decrease as well. Therefore, their finding
109Römer and Römer (1995) pp. 8-11.
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support the existence of an independent channel of the transmission of 
monetary policy to the real side of the economy.
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3 THE LENDING CHANNEL: PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM VAR 
ESTIMATIONS
Before going into the details of the crises in 1994 and its effect on the 
contraction of credit, it will be useful to pinpoint the relation between the 
money supply decisions and their effect on total credit supply and output at the 
macro level. For this purpose, we follow the Vector Autoregression (VAR) 
approach employed in Bernanke and Blinder (1992).
Vector Autoregressions have been extensively used in the literature to 
investigate the money-income (causality) relationship after Sim’s 1980 article. 
In the seminal paper by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) VARs have been 
employed to investigate the role of credit in the transmission mechanism. 
Bernanke and Blinder ran VARs for bank balance sheet variables including 
credits, an output indicator and the US funds rate as the indicator of the stance 
of monetary policy. Their results have shown that an innovation on the funds 
rate -taken as an exogenous contractionary shock on the money supply- leads 
to an immediate contraction of banks’ security portfolios and a rather gradual 
build up of contraction in total credits. The timing of the peak of the credit 
contraction coincides with the contraction of output. The authors have 
interpreted this as the existence of at least an additional mechanism (the lending 
channel) of transmission of monetary impulses into the real economy.
A criticism to Bernanke-Blinder conclusion which they address in their 
article is based on the possible endogeneity of credit to output. In other words, 
the criticism is that the same evidence can be used to argue that first output has 
adjusted to money and then credit to output after a shock to money. In fact, 
technically, a direct causality conclusion (in the Granger sense) to either 
direction is difficult to make as the timing of the contraction of credit and of 
output coincides. Nevertheless, Bernanke and Blinder address the criticisms by 
using the evidence reported by Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993). As discussed
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in the previous section, Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) show that during 
tight money periods, while borrowing from banks decline, borrowing from 
other sources such as by issuing commercial paper increases. If the decline in 
bank credit was caused solely by the firms’ passive reduction of total borrowing 
as a response of the fall in credit demand due to monetary contraction, 
borrowing from others sources would be expected to fall as well.
In this section, we will run VAR configurations similar to those run by 
Bernanke and Blinder. The results are important both because they shed some 
light on the ongoing debate and also because they will help us set up the 
preliminary scene for our discussion of the credit contraction in 1994 in Turkey.
The Turkish set up is likely to provide an interesting case because (1) it 
has started liberalizing its financial markets after 1980; roughly after 1985, the 
financial market has included most of the conventional instruments like an 
active stock exchange, overnight market among the banks, an active 
government paper auction system, etc. (2) however, in spite of liberalization, 
banking system remained to be the main source (although not the only one) of 
external finance especially for short term maturities (basically the sole 
alternative to short term bank lending is trade credit; only very large firms issue 
CPs). This set up proves a convenient one to discuss the bank lending channel.
3.1 Data and Estimations
VARs included six variables: monetary policy indicator, the logarithms of 
output (LNIPI), wholesale price index (LNWPI), real total bank deposits 
(LNRTDEP), real total bank credits (LNRTC) and real aggregate securities 
portfolios of banks (LNRSEC). Six lags were used for each variable. Impulse 
response functions were calculated corresponding to four different orderings. 
The results of two other VAR configurations and one impulse response function 
for each configuration are also reported. In the first of these latter 
configurations, nominal bank balance sheet variables are used instead of real
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(bank credits, LNTC ; deposits, LNTDEP; and security holdings, LNSEC). In 
the second, real bank credits to private enterprises (LNCPE) is employed 
instead of total bank credits. The coefficient estimations are saved for appendix.
VARs were made on monthly data running from January 1986 to March 
1995. As suggested by Bernanke and Blinder (1992). overnight interbank 
interest rates (FR) were used as the monetary policy indicator. For output, the 
natural logarithm of the monthly Industrial Production Index (LNIPI) compiled 
by the State Institute of Statistics was employed. Wholesale Price Index (WPI) 
is also announced by the same source on a monthly basis. Finally, all three 
aggregate bank balance sheet variables are published in the Quarterly Bulletin 
of the Central Bank on a monthly basis. Deflation of real variables was made by 
the WPI.
3.2 Results
The generated impulse response functions are presented in Figures 3-6 for four 
different orderings of the first configuration which includes the variables: FR, 
LNRTC, LNIPI, LNRTDEP, LNRSEC and LNWPI.
In Figures 3-6, the center panel shows the course of the interbank interest 
rate after a one standard deviation shock at time zero. As positive values 
indicating increasing rates is interpreted as tight money, the figure shows that 
after about the fourth month, the rates start to decrease, or in other words 
monetary stance endogenously becomes expansionary.
Credits start declining rather slowly at the beginning but than accelerate 
as seen in the bottom center panel. They continue declining until the 15-19th 
months however. The difference in the movements of money and credit is 
apparent here. Whereas money starts to ease after a relatively sooner period of 
four months, credits continue contracting during a period of about one year and 
a half in response to the initial monetary contraction.
i n
Response of output to money is displayed in the first rows of Figures 3- 
6. Clearly the trends in the course of output is much more similar to those of 
credit rather than of money. Output contracts until about the 15-17th months 
except for a very slight recovery between 8th and 11th months. On the other 
hand, money starts easing after the fourth month but credit declines until about 
15-19th months. Thus the output contraction seems to follow credit rather than 
money itself and this in spite of easing money. This finding provides an 
important evidence in support of the existence of a strong bank lending channel 
of monetary policy in Turkey.
The impulse response functions of credit (bottom right panel) to credit 
show that an exogenous shock to credit (top right panel) is likely to maintain its 
affect about 8 months. As the impulse response function of output to credit 
indicates that a shock to credit influences the output in the same direction. The 
more powerful the shock to credit is, the more apparent is its effect on output 
(contrast Figure 3 to Figure 6).
Impulse response functions of credit to output (bottom left panel) show 
that shocks to output drive credit demand in the same direction as would be 
expected. Impulse response functions of output (top left panel) to output show 
that shocks to output maintain their effect for about 3-4 months. Credit demand 
starts to move in the same direction with a lag of 1-2 months as seen in the 
impulse responses of credit to output.
Credit is highly responsive to money as shown by the impulse responses 
of credit to interbank rates (center bottom panel). It is especially striking that 
the effect of a one standard deviation shock to interbank rate has a greater 
effect, in general, on credit than a one standard deviation initial shock to credit 
itself (bottom right panel). This is apparent in all of the Figures 3-6 except for 
Figure 6.
These observations support the conclusions that there is a bi-directional 
relation between output and credit and that a monetary shock has a relatively 
important effect on credit. These findings also support the existence of a
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‘lending’ channel of monetary policy. An exogenous contractionary shock to 
money leads to a direct effect on the output as well as an indirect effect through 
the bank lending.
The results of the VAR estimations of the next two configurations are 
also placed in the Appendix and the ensuing impulse response functions are 
presented in Figures 7-8.
In Figure 7, the nominal bank balance sheet variables were used. The 
conclusions are generally similar to those from Figures 3-6. Again, the 
contraction of money after the initial shock continues relatively for a shorter 
period compared to credit, and then it starts to expand. The contraction of 
output for a relatively longer period provides evidence on the role of credit in 
the contraction output. One deviation from earlier results is the finding that the 
output seems to be not responsive to a shock to nominal credits in contrast to 
the finding that it is responsive to a shock to real credits.
Figure 8 reports the impulse response functions when the VAR 
configuration includes real bank credits to private enterprises instead of total 
credits. Again the main conclusions from Figures 3-6 are valid. One difference 
in results is the lack of response of credits to output and money to credit 
(bottom left panel and middle right panel).
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Figure 3 impulse Response Functions: First Configuration
Order of Variables: FR, LNRTC, LNIPI, LNRTDEP, LNRSEC, LNWPI
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Figure 4 Impulse Response Functions: First Configuration
Order o f Variables; FR LNIPI LNWPI LNRTDEP LNRSEC LNRTC
Response of LNIPI to LNIPI
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Figure 5 Impulse Response Functions: First Configuration
Order o f Variables: LNIPI LNWPI FR LNRTDEP LNRTC LNRSEC
Response to One S .D , Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Figure 6 Impulse Response Functions: First Configuration
Order of Variables: LNRTC LNIPI FR LNRTDEP LNRSEC LNWPI
Response of LNIPI to LNIPI
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Figure 7 Impulse Response Functions: Second Configuration
Order o f Variables: FR, LNTC, LNIPI, LNTDEP, LNSEC, LNWPI
Response of LNIPI to LNIPI
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Figure 8 Impulse Response Functions: Third Configuration
Order o f Variables: FR, LNRCPE, LNIPI, LNRTDEP, LNRSEC, LNWPI
Response of LNIPI to LNIPI
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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4 MACROECONOMY IN  1994; FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE 
CONTRACTION OF CREDIT SUPPLY
In 1994, Turkey has experienced possibly the worst economic crises in her 
history. At the core of the crises were financial factors. Tables 32 displays the 
macroeconomic indicators of 1994 on comparative basis.
Table 32 Macroeconomic Indicators (1989-1994)
(%) 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
REAL GNP GROWTH (') 1.0 9.4 0.0 6.4 8.2 - 6.0
CHANGE IN REAL DOM. ABSORB. 1.5 14.6 0.9 4.8 13.5 12.3
WPI INFLATION 64 52 55 62 58 121
CHANGE IN REAL EXCH. RATE 10 19 -4 -1 -20
NOMINAL DEPRECIATION 49 23 60 65 60 170
EXPORTS/GNP 10 14
CHANGE IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 10
CHANGE IN MANUFACTURING 
PRODUCTION
10 -8
Notes: ( ) GNP at producers’ prices. 
Source; State Planning Organization
The result of the crises in terms of macroeconomic variables was a record 
contraction in GNP of 6.1% and a drop in the industrial production of 5%. The 
“contraction in domestic demand at the level of 12% together with and the US 
dollar’s appreciation of 170% against the TL caused the exports increase by 
30%. About 20 banks came close to bankruptcy ad 3 of them were liquidated. 
Finally, inflation rate rose to record levels due to two reasons. Firstly, the 
necessary price adjustments of SEEs were postponed until after the local 
elections in March 1994. Secondly, the stabilization package of April 1994 
included a ‘jump’ in the SEE prices to fix them for a while afterwards. SEE 
prices increased at the monthly rate of 55% in April 1994 which caused WPI
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inflation reach 32%. Consequently, average annual WPI inflation reached 120% 
in 1994 after 58% in 1993.
In Table 33, the timing of the crises is shown more clearly. The crises 
started and the recession peaked in the second quarter; GNP contracted by about 
10% and the industrial production by about 14% compared to the second 
quarter of 1993. The effects of the crises continued however well through the 
end of the year.
Table 33 Quarterly Developments in 1994
(%) 94/1 94/2 94/3 94/4 1994
GNP GROWTH (‘) 4.1 -9.6 -8.7 -6.9 - 6.1
GROWTH IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION C ) 1.7 -14.2 -8.5 -8.9 -7.7
CHANGES IN STOCKS Q -302 -1,343 289 -1,569 -2,925
Notes: ( ) Growth of GNP compared to the corresponding period ofl990. (“) SIS Monthly Index of Industrial 
Production (1986=100). (^ ) Billions ofTL, 1987 prices.
Source: State Institute of Statistics.
In 1994, especially in the second quarter, total credit supply of commercial 
banks fell drastically. Real credit stock decreased at about the same rate in the 
last quarter of 1993 and the first month of 1994. In February 1994, there was a 
fall of 10%. In March, there was another, but slight, fall of about 3%. In April 
and May, however, we see drastic falls of 18% and 15% respectively. The 
investigation of the reasons that led to the crises and the dynamics that caused 
the contraction of the credit supply will be the aim of the rest of this section.
But before starting to discuss the crises it is useful to discuss the conduct of 
monetary policy in Turkey.
4.1 Conduct of Monetary Policy in Turkey
Prior to 1980 liberalization program, the Turkish central bank could be defined 
as a powerful development agency'** .^ After the liberalization of the financial
"“within the context of planned development that started in 1960 but especially with the central 
banking law of 1970, the central bank was assigned the task of financing the development. The credits
121
markets in 1980, a number of measures were taken that eliminated the 
development financing characteristics of the central bank and more or less put 
it in the position of conventional central banks'".
As instruments to conduct monetary policy the central bank had the 
open market operations, the reserve requirements and interventions in the forex 
market using the foreign exchange reserves. It could also influence the financial 
markets by borrowing or lending in the interbank market. In 1990, the central 
bank announced a monetary program “as an integral part of a medium term 
strategy aimed to restructure its balance sheet by reducing its forex exposure”. 
The main target of the monetary program was to limit the changes in the central 
bank money to the changes in net foreign assets by keeping expansion of 
domestic credits under control . The other major component of the program 
was to increase the net foreign assets"''. To achieve these two targets 
simultaneously, the central bank announced that it preferred forex operations to 
expansion of domestic credit to increase liquidity when needed. Indeed, in 
1990, the growth of domestic credit was realized at a low 12% and size of the
it extended to both the public and private sector was financed by issuing currency and by the bank 
reserves. For a detailed treatment of the central bank prior to 1980, see Yulek (1995a, b). The reforms 
related to central bank after 1980 can be followed from the first chapter of this dissertation. See also 
Ersel (1990).
‘'^The main measures were, institution of the Open Market Operations (OMO) in 1987, the forex 
market in 1988, the gold market in 1989 and the abolishment of the Medium Term Rediscount Credit 
facilities in 1989 which was the main tool of the pre-1980 central bank in financing the development 
projects. Thus by 1990, the stage was ready for the central bank to reorganize its operations as a 
conventional central bank.
‘‘’c b m  was the measure of high powered money chosen by the central bank. It is the sum of (1) 
currency issued (2) bank reserves (required+free) (3) deposits made by extra-budgetary funds (4) 
deposits of non-bank sector (5) liabilities outstanding from OMOs (6) deposits of public sector. In 
practical terms, CBM represents the total TL denominated liabilities of the central bank against all the 
other units in the economy. Two other measures of high powered money in the Turkish context exist. 
“Reserve Money” (RM) is the sum of first 4 items above. “Monetary Base” (MB) is the sum of RM 
and liabilities from OMOs (item 5). Thus the CBM is the sum of MB and public sector deposits (item 
6).
“^The numerical target was 6-16% nominal growth. (Central Bank, 1991 and Ersel, 1990)
Total domestic liabilities equaled the sum of CBM and liabilities from residents’ forex deposits. The 
program also aimed at reducing the forex liabilities and to make total domestic assets more or less equal 
to the CBM. This was thought to facilitate the conduct of monetary policy. On the other the central bank 
administrators believed that there was a close link between the total domestic liabilities and total credit 
supply in the economy as revealed in the pamphlet “Merkez Bankası Parası” published by the central 
bank (1990, p. 9). Thus the reduction of forex liabilities was thought to increase central bank’s influence 
on the credit supply as well.
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OMOs was limited"^. To increase forex reserves necessary to be effective in 
the forex market, TL was kept overvalued"^.
The monetary program could not be announced in 1991 and the 
following year due to increased fiscal imbalance. In 1990, the Treasury was 
able to compensate the reduced reliance on central bank financing by increasing 
its borrowing from the debt markets. Increasing pressures after 1990 made it 
impossible for the central bank to announce and conduct annual monetary 
programs. Nevertheless, the central bank continued its policy of limiting the 
credit to the public sector as stringent as the politics permitted after this year as 
well. On the other hand, the TL rapidly appreciated in real terms between July 
1992 and March 1993 after a period of real depreciation between January 1991 
and July 1992'".
We now turn into the 1994 crises and the non-monetary factors in the 
contraction of credit.
4.2 The Financial Crises in Early 1994
After the liberalization and stabilization program of 1980, the ceilings on 
interest rates were abolished though the government continued its indirect 
influence in 1981. In 1985, the Treasury started weekly auctions for Treasury 
bonds and bills. After this year, reliance on the securities markets to finance the
I
consolidated budget deficits increased.
On the other hand, the fiscal imbalance deteriorated substantially after 
1985 and especially after 1989. Mainly because (a) the primary (non-interest) 
deficit could not be eliminated (b) some budgetary revenue items (the so-called 
extra budgetary funds) were separated under the coverage of the consolidated
"’Central Bank (1991) p. 31.
"’This policy was officially not confirmed. However observers close to the central bank support this 
deliberate policy. See Gökçe (1993). Also, Selçuk (1993) found that the export weighted real exchange 
rate index appreciated by 1.03% on the average between January 1989 and December 1990. On the 
other hand, Selçuk (1996) found that surprisingly impulse responses of the trade weighted real exchange 
rate to monetary disturbances are positive. He interpreted this as the existence of a target real exchange 
rate by the central bank; in case of deviations from the target, the central ban Ik intervened.
‘"Selçuk (1993).
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budget, to finance some special purpose projects, and finally (c) the interest 
rates in the government security market reached record high levels, the burden 
of interest expenses on the budget. Consequently the budget deficits rose 
rapidly. The ratio of consolidated budget deficits to GNP rose from 2.3% in 
1985 to 6.9% in 1993. Average interest rate on 1 year government bonds rose 
from 51% in 1986 to 86.4% in 1993. Total interest payments on government 
debt as a ratio to GNP rose from 1.9% in 1985 to 2.6% in 1986 and to 5.8% in 
1993.
Another important development in the financial markets necessary to re­
mention is the foreign exchange policy of the government prior to the crisis. As 
will be discussed, this had an important bearing on the portfolio shifts of the 
banks in the early 1994 which played an important role in the formation of the 
crises and the contraction of the credit supply. The Turkish Lira (TL) 
appreciated in real terms in 1989 and 1990"^ at 10% and 19% in 1989 and 1990 
respectively. In January 1991-July 1992, the TL depreciated in real terms but 
after July 1992 a new trend of real appreciation started and this continued until 
March 1993 as mentioned earlier.
Source: U ndcrsccroljrijl or Trcusiiry
Figure 9 Open Position of the Banking System ■
*1 use the real exchange rate index (1982=100) calculated by the State Planning Organization.
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The appreciation of TL during 1989-1990 and 1992-1993 encouraged the 
inflow of short term capital into the country. This naturally encouraged the 
banks to accumulate negative positions on net foreign assets (“open position”) 
as obtaining foreign exchange funds and lending them in TL terms after 
conversion provided high margins given the level of TL interest rates and the 
sustained appreciation of the TL. The open positions of the banking system can 
be followed from Figure 9 below. Thus shortly prior to the crisis, the TL was 
considerably overvalued and the banking system ran a high level of open 
position.
In June 1993, a new government was formed. The new Prime Minister 
who served as a Minister in the previous cabinet favored a shift towards lower 
interest rates and a ‘real exchange rate policy’ in the meaning of targeting a real 
depreciation of the currency to compensate for the previous real appreciation 
maintain the competitiveness of Turkish exports. In the second half of 1993, the 
government started to cancel auctions of especially shorter term government 
securities to reduce the interest rates and extend the borrowing maturities. To 
compensate for the reduction in borrowing through securities, the government 
resorted to borrowing from abroad and from the central bank. Central bank 
advances to the government expanded rapidly after September and continued 
until March 1994. Both the latter and increased borrowing from abroad led to 
the growth of the high powered money. Initially, rates on securities declined 
relatively, but by the end of 1993 the market for three month bills disappeared 
and the market for six month bills got smaller"^. As a result, the participation in 
the shorter term securities auctions diminished given the established belief in 
late 1993 that the Treasury would not accept the bids anyway and almost all 
the market collapsed in January 1994.
The Central Bank was able to absorb the increased liquidity until mid- 
January by Open Market Operations (OMO), interventions in the forex market
119trsel and Sak (1995), Ozatay (1995).
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(sales of foreign exchange by the central bank) and borrowing in the interbank 
market. However, after mid-January it became increasingly difficult to sustain 
this task'^' especially because of the Treasury’s increased resort to the Central 
Bank to cover the cash deficit. Only in the first week of January, TL 6 trillion 
was drained by using OMOs and TL 13 trillion borrowing was made from the 
interbank market by the central bank. But that was not adequate given the 
increasing excess liquidity. Central bank extended TL 31 trillion to the 
government in January and TL 39 trillion in February in the form of short term 
advances (Table 34). These figures amounted to net Central Bank advances of 
TL 17 trillion and TL 30 trillion respectively. To give a sense about these 
magnitudes, the ratio of these net advances to the total currency issued 
(currency in circulation + bank vaults) was 28% in January and 47% in 
February 1996 whereas the same ratio was 11% in September 1993 and 13 % in 
October 1993.
'^ “Gültekin, B. Resignation Speech, isletme ve Finans, January-February 1994.
'"'in December, the central bank lending to government (short-term advances) was TL 11 trillion. In the 
first 20 days of January, this figure reached TL 29 trillion.
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Table 34 Money and Credit Indicators
93/8 93/9 93/10 93/11 93/12 94/1 94/2 94/3TL/Dollar C ) 11,746 12,082 12,967 13,724 14,487 17,238 18,297 22,182Reserve Money (RM) (TL trillion) 90.5 91.4 98.6 96.2 101.7 98.6 103.8 107.3RM (^) 114 110 115 105 108 100 95 91Central Bank Advances to Government (TL trillion) 21.2 20.3 24.3 21.7 20.5 30.6 39.0 22.2Net Central Bank Advances to Government (TL trillion) -1.1 6.8 8.1 9.4 11.1 17.4 30.0 5.4Currency Issued (TL trillion) 57.6 59.5 62.5 63.5 62.6 62.0 64.5 74.5Currency Issued (^ ) 117 116 118 113 108 102 96 102Total Deposit Bank Credits (TL trillion) 291.1 312.7 326.1 341.5 363.0 383.0 379.1 399.4Total Deposit Bank Credits (“) 113 117 118 116 120 120 108 105Total Bank Assets (TL Trillion) 749.7 797.2 889.6 867.9 954.9 1022.2 1036.3 1135.7Total Bank Assets (^ ) 108 110 119 109 117 119 109 110Cred. to Private Sector (^ ) 110 114 115 115 118 119 107 103Cred. to Private Firms (*■) 118 123 123 121 126 128 114 112Interbank Int. Rates (^ ) 58 57 58 76 70 91 193 350Interest Rates on bills and bonds (**) 82 81 84 87 89 93 123 128Issues of Gov. Securities (TL Trillion) 34,952 12,980 32,607 7,283 7,957 9,425 3,286 2,632Total Credits/Total Assets (%) 39.0 39.2 36.7 39.4 38.0 37.5 36.6 35.2Sec. Portfolio (TL trillion)____________________________ 71.8 75.9 84.0 83.2 108.3 107.4 107.4 120.3Securities Portfolio/Total Assets (%)__________________ _ 9.4 9.5 9.5 9.6 11.4 10.5 10.4 10.6Bonds Held Against Legal Reserve/Total Assets ("%) 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.39 0.37 0.39 0.40Open Position (USD billion) N/A -4.9 N/A N/A -5.0 N/A N/A -4 3Open Position/Total Assets (%) N/A
.4.
N/A N/A 2.7 N/A N/A 3.5
Source. Issues of Government Securities are obtained from Capital Market Board. Rest of the data is obtained from the Central Bank.
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Table 34 (Continued) Money and Credit Indicators
94/4 94/5 94/6 94/7 94/8 94/9 94/10 94/11 94/12T L /D o lla r  (^) 34 ,155 31 ,794 31 ,226 31 ,017 32 ,918 34 ,005 35 ,787 36 ,287 38 ,3 8 0
R eserv e  M o n ey  (R M ) (T L  tr illio n ) 127.2 143.8 147.7 170.7 179.2 184.1 181.3 178.8 185.7R M  (■) 81 84 85 97 99 97 89 83 79
C en tra l B a n k  A d v a n ce s  to  G o v e rn m e n t (T L  tr illio n ) \ 1 2 M l 38.9 40.5 43.9 50.6 9.0 9 .0 1 3
N et C en tra l B a n k  A d v a n ce s  to G o v e rn m e n t (T L  tr illion ) -0 .6 0.0 -29 .0 3.9 6.0 -5 .7 9.0 9.0 1 3
C u rren cy  Issu ed  (T L  tr illio n ) 76.1 92.0 91.4 101.1 112.5 119.7 122.4 120.0 118.3
C u rren cy  Issu ed  (“) 79 87 85 93 101 102 98 90 82
T o ta l D ep o sit  B a n k  C re d its  (T L  tr illio n ) 43 4 .4 400 .5 421.3 422.4 437 .2 4 63 .2 4 79 .2 512 .2 630 .6
T o ta l D ep o sit  B a n k  C re d its  (“) 86 73 75 75 75 76 73 73 83
T o ta l B a n k  A sse ts  (T L  T r illio n ) 1239.7 1244.7 1327.4 1397.6 1457.0 1538.1 1599.9 1628.3 1773.7
T o ta l B a n k  A sse ts  ( ') 91 84 87 91 93 93 90 86 87
C red . to  P r iv a te  S ec to r  (“) 84 72 74 71 70 70 69 68 77
C red . to  P r iv a te  F irm s (“) 92 78 79 78 77 79 78 16 81
In terb a n k  Int. R a te s  (^) 258 263 54 43 87 69 71 68 92
In terest R ates on  b ills  an d  bonds C) 127 159 162 110 104 97 86 94 100
Issu es o f  G ov . S ecu r itie s  (T L  T r illio n ) 521 2 5 ,002 50 ,664 62,681 66 ,944 52 ,398 48 ,958 6 6 ,090 57,253
T o ta l C re d its /T o ta l A sse ts  (% ) 35.0 32 .2 31.7 30.2 30.0 30.1 30.0 31.5 35.5
S ec. P o rtfo lio  (T L  tr illio n ) 113.4 151.2 195.6 222 .8 216.5 198.2 202 .2 202 .4 2Q12
S ecu r itie s  P o r tfo lio /T o ta l A ssets (% ) 9.1 12.1 14.7 15.9 14.8 12.9 12.6 12.4 11.7
B on d s H eld  A g a in st  L eg a l R eserv e /T o ta l A sse ts  (% ) 0.48 0.49 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.48 0 .46 0.45 0.41
O p en  P osition  (U S D  b illio n ) N /A N /A -1 .2 N /A N /A N /A N /A
O p en  P o sit io n /T o ta l A sse ts  (% )
O  1 r \ r \ “^  / 1 — 1 Arv  n /  A _
N /A N /A
.4.
1.7 N /A N /A N /A N /A
Source: Issues of Government Securities are obtained from Capital Market Board. Rest of the data is obtained from the Central Bank.
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Increased liquidity with decreased absorption of this liquidity due to canceled 
auctions and reduced open market purchases increased the demand for foreign 
exchange by banks. To slow down the run on the forex market, the central bank 
intervened by selling US dollars at the amount USD 1.2 billion in January. In 17-19 
January, the central bank slowed down its effort to absorb the liquidity to support 
coming Treasury’s auction. However, despite this, the participation in the auctions was 
very limited. After January 20, the central bank increased the rates in the interbank 
market by increased borrowing and in the OMOs. In the January 26 auction, the 
participation was again very limited. That same day, the wedge between the central 
bank’s quotation for the US dollar and the spot market rate reached 18% and the 
central bank intervened in the forex market selling USD 200 million. In the night of the 
same day, the central bank announced a 13.6% devaluation of its dollar rate . All this 
started the financial crisis.
As a whole, TL depreciated by 19% in the spot market in January 1994. The 
Treasury increased the interest rates on bills and bonds in February. Although, the 
amount issued and purchased that month was very limited, the pace of depreciation 
slowed down to 6%. Acceleration in the depreciation rate came in March at 21% in 
the absence of intervention by the government. In April a short term stabilization 
package was implemented. Nevertheless TL depreciated by 54% in that month. 
Intervention was inevitable and the interest rates on the bills were raised to 340% 
(compounded annual rate) in May to reestablish the collapsed government securities 
market and a total of 25 trillion TL of bills were issued to prevent further plunge of 
the TL. The same month, TL appreciated by 7%. High rates on the government 
securities were maintained until July, after which the rates more or less stabilized.
122.There have been claims of corruption about the fact that USD 200 million was sold on January 26Th and in the 
night the devaluation was made. The then-Governor of the central bank B. GUltekin rejected the claims in his 
resignation speech stating that the meeting on the 25th of January with the Prime Minister and the Technical 
Council did not reach a conclusion and that the intervention on the 26th of January was made on the assumption 
that no devaluation would be made.
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4.3 Portfolio Shifts in the Banking Sector and the Contraction of Credit
After a period of relatively slow growth in 1992 and 1993, nominal Reserve Money 
(RM) started to grow rapidly between February and September 1994, starting 
especially with April. Total bank credits maintained their 1993 trend in 1994. In fact, 
except for a sudden fall in May 1994 and a sudden jump in December 1994, the trend 
continued well through the first quarter of 1995. Nominal RM stagnated between 
October 1994 and January 1995 after which it regained its trend in January-September 
1994 (Figure 10).
2 4 0 a 10 12 2
S o u r c e ;  T h e  C e n t r a l  B a n k
a a 10 12 2
Figure 10 Nominal Total Credits and Reserve Money (Index)
These distinct movements of deposit bank credits and RM can best be followed using 
the ratio of the total bank credits to RM (TC/RM) which can be called a 'credit 
multiplier'. Credit multiplier fell rapidly between January and September 1994 from 
3.9 to 2.4 (Figure 11). The fall was especially drastic in April and May (from 3.7 to 3.4 
to 2.8). To be precise, there was a 9% nominal increase in credits in April - financed
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mainly by a rise in foreign exchange deposits- in April but the rise in RM was much 
higher (about 19%) which pushed the ratio down. In May, credits fell by 7% 
nominally. Under increasing RM, the ratio fell drastically.
Figure 11 Total Credits/Reserve Money
What were the reasons that led to the drastic fall of the TC/RM ratio? The main actor 
can not be monetary policy as there is no reason for monetary policy to lead to such 
drastic movements of the ratio of credits to high-powered money
Clearly, the portfolio shifts in bank assets that led to the contraction of credit 
was caused by the two factors that was emphasized in the story. The first one was the 
open (or negative net foreign asset) positions of the deposit banks. The second was the 
Treasury’s behavior which first cut the security issues in October 1993 and than 
reintroduced it with sky-high interest rates in May 1994. As a result, there was a 
contraction in real bank assets as well as a shift in asset composition that went against 
credits and in favor of more liquid assets, foreign assets and government securities.
123,To be more precise, such factors may be also influenced by the monetary policy indirectly. However, they 
exert independent effects on the credit.
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All in all, we see a mechanism which triggered a contraction in bank credits as 
explained by the bank lending channel. However, here, we have an example where the 
contraction is caused by a non-monetary trigger.
As mentioned earlier, growing open positions of the deposit banks was a result 
of the real appreciation of the TL after 1989 and 1990 and than revitalized after July
1992. That policy encouraged banks to borrow from abroad and use the proceeds to 
lend domestically not only to private sector but also to the government. After March
1993, TL was depreciated at par with the dollar but that signal was not noticed by the 
banks. As a result, net capital inflows and lending to government by the central bank 
became the two important determinants of the RM prior to 1994.
Although the start of the depreciation of TL at par with the dollar after the first 
quarter of 1993 was not noticed by the banks, the declining ex-post real interest rates 
on government bonds in the last quarter coupled with official statements that interest 
rates would flirther go down and TL would get depreciated at par with the dollar forced 
banks to close their open position in foreign assets' '^*. Claims on banks abroad as a 
percentage of total (aggregated) bank balance sheets jumped from 8.1 % in November 
1993 to 10.5% in December and maintained this level, which is an act of accumulating 
foreign assets in order to reduce the open position. The same period also witnessed a 
rise in claims among the banks. The ratio of claims on domestic banks rose from 3.2% 
in September 1993 to above 7% in October and December, and then went down (Table 
35).
Table 35 Interbank Claims (% of Total Assets) (')
91/12 92/12 93/7 93/8 93/9 93/10 93/11 93/12 94/1 94/2 94/3
Claims on Domestic Banks 1.6 3.0 6.3 1.6 3.2 7.5 1.8 13 3.6 2.1 1.8
Claims on Foreign Banks 8.5 10.0 8.5 7.5 8.0 8.7 8.1 10.5 10.3 10.4 10.9
Source: Central Bank.
124Ertugriil (1995).
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Total open positions of the banks decreased slightly from USD 5 billion in December 
1993 to USD 4.3 billion in March 1994. The aggregate open position was actually 
closed in the second half of 1994. At the end of June, it went down to USD 1.2 billion. 
This caused the contraction of the real credits in the second quarter of 1994.
In the first quarter, the securities portfolio of the banks remained relatively 
stable as this period corresponded to the time when the issue of government securities 
was negligible. With May, simultaneous with the banks’ accelerated effort to close 
their open position, the Treasury started to issue large amounts of securities (from TL 
521 billion in April to TL 25,000 billion in May) with very high interest rates (337 % 
compounded rate on the average in May and 302 % in June) and very short maturity 
(mostly 1 month in May) to curb the run on the foreign exchange market. After June, 
the rates fell but were still around 100% (simple, average).
The rise in the government securities issues, was clearly reflected in the Balance 
Sheets of the banks between May and July. The total securities portfolio of the banks 
which consisted mostly of government securities, increased from TL 113 trillion in 
April to TL 151 trillion in May, TL 195 trillion in June and TL 222 trillion in July after 
which it stabilized. As a ratio to total assets, securities portfolio rose from 9.2% in 
April to 15.9% in July.
Portfolio shift in the banks’ assets which were based on the combined effect of 
the banks’ accelerated effort close their open positions and increased purchases of 
government securities in the second quarter of 1994 thus have been the main factor 
behind the relative contraction of credit during this period during which total bank 
credits contracted by 29% in real terms.
A complication to this argument is the course of interest rates in the overnight 
(interbank) market. The overnight rates have been very high during January-May 1994. 
Could this be taken as evidence that actually monetary policy stance was tight during 
that period? Observation of the interbank rates together with real and nominal basic 
monetary aggregates like currency issued and RM shows that the latter two alone can 
not explain the abrupt rises in overnight rates in that period. Two examples seem to be
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adequate to support this conclusion. In February when the overnight rates reached 
193% from 91% in January, the contraction in RM was only 5% and the contraction in 
the currency issued was about 6%. On the other hand, in June, when both RM and 
currency issued remained intact in real terms, the overnight rates fell to 54% from 263 
% in May.
4.4 The Interaction Between State and Private Banks
The crises caused some interesting interaction between public (state-owned) banks and 
private banks. Government employed the assets of state banks not only as a cushion to 
mitigate the effects of the crisis on private banks but also as resources to finance its 
cash deficit. This caused considerable resource transfer from the public banks to the 
private banks and put the state banks in a difficult situation. In nominal terms, the 
difference between interbank interest expenditures and income increased from negative 
TL 600 trillion in 1993 to negative TL 8,000 trillion in 1994. For the private banks on 
the other hand, the difference jumped from a positive TL 400 trillion to a positive TL 
4,500 trillion.
The general view was that although the state banks incurred big losses they hid 
this by acts of window dressing on the year-end balance sheets and income statements. 
It has been argued by some observers that by December 1993 the equity base of the 
state banks have almost entirely vanished Nevertheless, even the announced 
income statements according to which total profits of state banks dropped by about 
50% in nominal terms (Table 36) reveal the severeness of their financial situation.
JTable 36 Some Indicators on the Performance of Private and'i^ ublic Banks
PRIVATE BANKS PUBLIC BANKS
1993 1994 1993 1994
INTEREST INCOME/EXPENDITURE 1.85 1.66 1.45 1.30
^in t e r b a n k  in t e r e s t  in c o m e  ( ') 956 6,975 620 2,080
in t e r b a n k  in t e r e s t  e x p e n d it u r e  ( ') 568 2,452 1,326 10,087
jrO TAL PROFIT ( ') 15.8 35.2 9.5 5.5
Notes: (') Trillion TL.
Source: Association of Banks and the Central Bank.
125 Ertugrul (1995).
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In the first quarter of 1994, the government used the foreign currency reserves of the 
state banks and the central bank to mitigate the effects of the crises. As seen in Table 
37, in the first quarter of 1994, the open position of state banks increased by about 
USD 400 million whereas the private banks closed their open position by USD 1 
billion. Note that the foreign currency reserves of the central bank declined from USD
6.2 billion in December 1993 to USD 3.3 billion in the end of March 1994. After April 
the reserves started to climb up when the foreign currency rates stabilized in nominal 
terms and started to become over-valued in real terms.
Table 37 Open Positions of the Banking System (USD billion)
Quarter STATE PRIVATE FOREIGN TOTAL
1988/4 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.24
1989/4 0.27 0.38 0.08 0.72
1990/4 -0.99 -0.89 -0.14 -2.02
1991/4 -0.10 -0.84 -0.06 -1.01
1992/4 -0.62 -2.07 -0.20 -2.89
1993/3 -0.66 -3.66 -0.53 -4.86
1993/4 -0.91 -3.69 -0.4 -4.98
1994/1 -1.28 -2.72 -0.3 -4.27
1994/2 -0.29 -0.60 -0.3 -1.16
1994/3 0.00 -0.74 -0.3 -0.99
1994/4 -0.20 -1.55 -0.05 -0.79
Source: Undersecretariat of Treasury.
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5 EARNINGS ВЕНА VIOR OF FIRMS BEFORE AND DURING THE CRISIS
So far, the discussion centered around the macroeconomics of credit and money in 
Turkey and the factors that took the country to the financial crises in 1994. We now 
turn to the financial behavior of firms and the effects of the crisis on the behavior. In 
this section we concentrate on the earnings and in the next on liability structure.
Data and General Characteristics o f the Firms in the Sample
The data belong to industrial firms that are traded at Istanbul Stock Exchange. As of 
June and Dec. 1994 there are 123 such companies. Main characteristics about these 
companies are provided in Table 38 for the six month periods between December 
1989-June 1995 except for June 1990 for which data do not exist.
Table 38 Descriptive Statistics I
No. of Firms Average Asset Size (* ) Average Net Sales C )
June 1995 123 4,120,144 2,766,406
Dec. 1994 123 2,790,698 3,344,844
June 1994 113 2,004,091 1,269,755
Dec. 1993 123 1,246,812 1,562,666
June 1993 104 1,051,615 711,745
Dec.. 1992 122 715,360 896,118
June 1992 85 683,420 443,898
Dec. 1991 119 438,283 530,505
June 1991 41 537,657 289,817
Dec. 1990 96 319,313 364,322
Dec. 1989 57 174,788 175,473
Notes: (') TL Million.
The first thing to note is that the sample consist of relatively large companies in the 
Turkish context. The average asset size in December 1994 corresponds to about USD 
73 million and the average net sales correspond to about USD 113 million (the latter 
calculated average currency rate). The sample includes the largest industrial company 
in the country (TUPRAS, the Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corp., where the
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government still holds a substantial share). Secondly, it should be noted that the sample 
firms, being listed at the ISE, represent relatively more sophisticated ones among the 
population of Turkish industrial firms.
5.1 Contraction in sales and increased share of exports
The slow-down in the economy in 1991 and 1994 showed itself in the form of a drop 
in real sales of the firms in the sample (Table 39 and Figure 12). In the second half of 
1994, real net sales contracted by 18 % compared to the second half of 1993 (Table 39) 
and by 6 % compared to the first of 1993. In the second half of 1994 there was a 
recovery. Net sales in the second half of 1994 increased by 12% compared to the first 
half of 1994 in real terms. However, it fell short by 8% compared to the that of the 
second half of 1993. The simple deseasonalized real sales index displayed in Figure 12 
shows the drastic fall in real sales in 1994 .
Table 39 Real Sales Growth in Sample Firms (%) (Medians)
Period Over the previous 
period
Over the same period 
of the previous year
1-6/95 -8.0 2.4
7-12/94 11.4 -1.2
,1-6/94 -11.3 -5.0
J-12/93 7.1 5.5
1-6/93 -1.5 13.3
7-12/92 15.0 5.3
J;6/92 -8.4 8.5
7-12/91 18.5 N/A
Notes: Deflation is made by WPI. Data related to second halves of the year is 
calculated as the difference between the sales figures reported in the end of 
the year income statements and the June income statements. June data are not 
available for 1989 and 1990 and this calculation could not be done for these two years
126.The index is constructed by subtracting the average period real sales from June and December real sales data 
from Table 39. Deflation is made by the general Wholesale Price Index (WPI).
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Figure 12 Deseasonalized Average Real Sales Index (91/1 = 100) (')
( ')  Deseasonalization was made by subtracting the average real sales of each six-month 
period from the average of all the available periods (91/1 to 95/1)
The main response of the firms in the sample to the slow-down in the economy in 1994 
was increased exports (Table 40). The median share of exports in net sales rose from 
10.3% in the second half of 1993 to 18.3% in the first half of 1994.
Table 40 Exports/Net Sales(Medians)
Period Exports/Net Sales (%)
1-6/95 17.7
^7-12/94 18.5
1-6/94 18.3
7-12/93 10.5
1-6/93 9.9
7-12/92 10.0
1-6/92 11.0
7-12/91 12.1
1-6/91 17.4
1-12/1990 10.7
1-12/1989 11.7
■5.2 Earnings and Profitability
Earnings performance is examined next. At the first glance, it is seen that Earnings 
Before Tax (EBT) rose to 15.3% in June 1994 and to 18.8% in December 1994
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compared to 14.3% in December 1993. Table 41 below shows that the main source of 
this increase was the relative decrease in the Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) and the 
consequent increase in the Gross Margin (GM). Table 41 also shows that the other two 
items with substantial movements were interest expenditure and other income which 
includes interest and dividend income.
Table 41 Condensed Income Statement Items (')
Medians GM Oper.
Expen.
Principle
Operating
Income
other
Income
other
Expenses
Interest
Expense
Oper.
Profit
Extra­
ordinary
Income
Extra­
ordinary
Expenses
EBT
Jun-95 JJ,Z 10,7 21,4 4,5 1,4 3,9 18,6 0,4 0,6 17,8
Dec-94 38,0 11,2 25,2 4,3 0,9 7,8 17,9 0,2 1,6 17,2
Jun-94 40,5 11,5 27,0 5,8 1,2 9,5 16,3 0,2 1,6 15,3
Dec-93 32,4 12,4 20,5 3,8 0,8 5,4 13,3 0,3 0,2 13,3
Jun-93 34,4 13,0 19,2 3,0 1,1 6,4 15,0 0,2 0,1 14,9
Dec-92 30,9 12,6 17,6 2,9 0,6 6,7 9,6 0,2 0,2 9,5
Ju 11-92 30,6 14,2 15,9 2,9 0,6 6,8 8,3 0,2 0,2 8,2
Dec-91 30,1 12,8 15,5 3,0 0,6 6,8 7,7 0,2 0,2 7,2
Jun-91 34,3 16,4 13,4 2,3 0,9 6,8 6,4 0,2 0,2 5,5
Dec-90 31,2 12,7 17,7 2,8 0,5 4,5 11,9 0,2 0,2 11,0
Dec-89 30,6 12,1 16,7 2,0 0,6 7,4 9,1 0,1 0,1 8,6
Averages GM Oper.
Expen.
Principle
Operating
Income
Other
Income
Other
Expenses
Interest
Expense
Oper.
Profit
Extra­
ordinary
Income
Extra­
ordinary
Expenses
EBT
Jun-95 33,4 12,2 21,2 11,0 2,3 6,5 23,5 1,6 1,8 23,2
Dec-94 36,7 12,1 24,6 9,7 1,8 11,6 20,9 1,1 2,6 19,4
Jun-94 39,8 13,1 26,7 13,5 3,3 18,3 18,8 1,8 3,1 17,5
Dec-93 32,3 13,2 19,0 6,6 1,5 7,4 16,9 1,1 1,4 16,5
Jun-93 32,5 14,0 18,6 6,4 1,5 7,7 16,1 1,0 1,5 15,5
Dec-92 31,1 14,1 17,0 4,7 1,3 9,1 11,5 0,9 2,0 10,4
Jun-92 31,4 15,6 15,8 5,5 1,3 10,6 9,6 1,0 2,2 8,1
Dec-91 30,7 14,3 16,4 4,7 1,8 10,1 10,7 1,1 1,4 9,6
Jun-91 32,8 19,3 13,5 7,5 3,0 10,6 8,6 0,7 1,6 7,7
Dec-90 31,4 13,5 18,0 5,0 1,4 7,6 14,3 1,3 2,0 13,7
Dec-89 31,3 13,8 17,5 4,6 1,4 9,3 11,9 1,1 1,4 11,6
Notes: (‘) Ratio to Net Sales
Below we present a second table, Table 42, which was constructed as a six-month by 
six-month income statement from the original financial information that led to Table 
41 above. In Table 41, the December figures represent the entire year which makes it 
difficult to compare the first half of a year with the second half Table 42, on the other
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hand, enables us to have an idea about the situation in the second half of the year more 
exp l i c i t l yTo  save space only medians are reported. It is seen from the movements 
of the GM, Interest Expenditure and Other Income that the main shock came in the 
first half of the year. In all these items, the figures of the second half of 1994 are close 
to those of 1993.
Table 42 Condensed Income Statement
Medians GM Oper.
Expen.
Principle
Oper.
Income
Other
Income
Other
Expen.
Interest
Expen.
Oper.
Profit
Extra­
ordinary
Income
Extra­
ordinary
Expen.
EBT
1-6/95 33.2 10.7 21.4 4.4 1.4 4.0 18.7 0.4 0.6 18.0
7-12/94 34.5 11.0 22.4 3.6 0.6 4.1 18.8 0.2 1.5 18.8
1-6/94 40.5 11.5 27.0 5.8 1.2 9.5 16.3 0.2 1.6 15.3
7-12/93 32.8 13.0 20.6 4.0 0.5 4.6 14.7 0.1 0.1 14.3
1-6/93 34.4 13.0 19.1 3.0 1.0 6.1 14.8 0.2 0.1 14.4
7-12/92 31.3 13.0 15.2 2.9 0.5 5.4 11.2 0.2 0.1 11.6
1-6/92 30.7 14.2 16.0 2.8 0.6 6.6 8.4 0.2 0.2 8.3
7-12/91 32.5 17.3 15.3 2.4 0.2 7.6 7.9 0.3 0.3 7.6
1-6/91 34.3 16.4 13.4 2.3 0.9 6.8 6.4 0.2 0.2 5.5
1-12/90 31.2 12.7 17.7 2.8 0.5 4.5 11.9 0.2 0.2 11.0
1-12/89 30.6 12.1 16.7 2.0 0.6 7.4 9.1 0.1 0.1 8.6
Notes: All figures are percent ratios to Net Sales. Data related to second halves of the year is calculated as the difference between the figures 
reported in the end of the year income statements and the June income statements. June data are not available for 1989 and 1990 and this 
calculation could not be done for these two years.
In the rest of this section, we first attempt to decompose the increase in GM and clean 
out distortionary components that arise due to inflation. Next, we analyze the 
remaining movements in the other items of the Income Statements (I/Ss).
■5.3 Analysis of the COGS and the GM
The ratio of Gross Margin (GM) to Net Sales (NS) was comparatively high in 1994. 
Especially in the first half of 1994, this ratio reached a high 41% in June 1994 from 
34% in the first half 1993. This rise in the GM/NS in 1994 came in spite of the
'■^Note that Table 41 was prepared using the original bi-annual company Income Statements. The figures 
associated to the second half of a year are calculated as the difference between the end of the year figures and the 
mid-year (flow) figures. For example, the ratio of interest expense to net sales in the second half of a year is 
calculated as the ratio of the difference between the end of the year interest expense and the mid-year interest 
expense to the samedifference for net sales. This facilitates the comparison of ratios associated to each half of 
the year. In the next section, this approach will be abondoned.
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exploding increases in the prices of inputs produced by state owned enterprises'^* 
which raised the cost of direct rhaterial inputs (CDMI) considerably (Table 43). The 
ratio of CDMI to net sales rose to 45% in the first half of 1994 from about 37% in both 
halves of 1993.
Table 43 Developments in the Cost of Produced Goods Sold (COPGS) and Cost of
Medians Direct
Materials
Direct
Labor
General
Prod.
Costs.
Net Change in 
Semi-Fin. Goods 
Inventory.
Net Change in 
Fin. Goods 
Inventory.
COPGS COGS
1-6/95 46.8 2.6 13.9 -1.1 -2.9 59.7 67.6
7-12/94 45.8 2.6 12.6 -0.6 -0.6 63.3 68.5
1-6/94 45.4 3.4 11.4 -3.2 -3.7 53.8 58.9
7-12/93 37.5 6.2 13.8 -0.1 -0.4 60.0 66.9
1-6/93 37.2 7.0 14.6 -0.7 -0.5 63.5 66.3
7-12/92 43.6 5.3 12.3 -0.3 -0.4 63.9 69.2
1-6/92 38.1 7.5 15.2 -0.6 -2.0 62.1 69.7
7-12/91 35.9 9.1 12.1 -0.3 0.2 68.3 69.3
1-6/91 37.3 10.3 14.3 -3.0 -2.6 62.3 65.7
1-12/1990 41.1 8.0 13.6 -0.5 -1.3 63.9 68.8
1-12/1989 44.4 9.0 29.1 0.1 0.0 71.5 71.5
Averages Direct
Materials
Direct
Labor
General
Prod.
Costs.
Net Change in 
Semi-Fin. Goods 
Inventory.
Net Change in Fin. 
Goods Inventory
COPGS COGS
1-6/95 44.3 3.2 19.4 -1.7 -5.8 59.5 66.2
7-12/94 45.1 4.0 17.8 -3.1 -2.4 61.8 70.4
1-6/94 43.6 4.9 17.5 -4.3 -7.8 54.6 60.3
7-12/93 36.9 8.2 18.3 -0.3 -0.8 62.1 67.1
1-6/93 37.1 9.6 19.8 -1.6 -1.0 64.0 66.4
7-12/92 40.5 7.7 16.3 -0.3 -0.9 63.8 69.7
J-6/92 39.0 10.3 18.9 -1.5 -2.5 64.4 69.4
7-12/91 37.8 12.2 18.1 -0.4 -1.0 66.7 66.9
1-6/91 39.7 14.1 20.6 -3.3 -5.2 66.2 71.6
1-12/1990 39.1 9.3 17.8 -1.0 -1.4 64.0 71.3
1-12/1989 37.6 8.4 28.1 -0.6 -0.4 73.1 73.3
Notes: % Ratios to Net Sales. Data related to second halves of the year is calculated as the difference between the figures reported in the end 
of the year income statements and the June income statements. June data arc not available for 1989 and 1990 and this calculation could not 
be done for these two years.
'^^The economic stabilization package of April 1994 included a “jump” in the prices of publicly produced goods 
at the order of 55% in the single month of April 1994. This measure aimed firstly at compensating the SEEs for 
their prices previously frozen for the coming local elections in March 1994 and secondly to enable them fix their 
prices once more for a certain subsequent time period to make a fresh start at the fight against inflation. Ail this 
caused the overall WPI inflation in that month to reach 32%.
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The fall in the eost of goods sold -in spite of the rise in CDMI - in the first half of 
1994, was due to (1) redueed labor cost due to the erosion of nominal wage rates under 
accelerating inflation (2) declining general production costs and (3) increased stocks 
of finished and semi-finished goods. In addition to these real factors, inflation has a 
distortionary effect on the COGS statements. For example, inflation leads to an 
overestimation of the end-of-year inventories compared to the beginning-of-year 
inventory which leads to an underestimation of the COGS, calculated as the difference 
between the end-of-year and beginning-of-year inventories plus purchases during the 
year will be underestimated. Thus, the accounting information revealed in the Income 
Statements (I/S) overestimates the real GMs in inflationary environment which needs 
to be corrected.
5.4 Correcting the COGS Statements for Distortionarv Effects of Inflation
To correct for the distortionary effects of accelerated inflation of the GM we employ 
two different approaches. In the first one, which is a version of Tybout’s (1988) 
approach, (beginning and end of period) finished and semi-finished goods inventory 
levels were corrected using WPI inflation rates. The details are explained in the 
appendix. This (and the next) correction were made on the original COGS Statements 
which are prepared in June and December. Thus the figures for June represent half- 
year results and those for December represent the entire year. For comparison, the 
uncorrected figures COGS and Cost of Produced Goods Sold (COPGS)'^^ which come 
directly from the companies financial tables are also reported below.
129,See the appendix for the definition of COPGS.
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Table 44 Uncorrected COGS Statements
Medians Direct
Materials
Direct
Labor
General
Prod.
Costs.
Net Change in 
Semi-Fin. Goods 
Inventory (‘ )
Net Change in 
Fin. Goods 
Inventory (1)
COPGS COGS
June 95 46.8 2.6 13.9 -1.1 -2.9 59.7 67.7
Dec. 94 40.3 3.1 14.4 -0.9 -1.2 57.3 62.9
June 94 45.4 3.4 11.4 -3.2 -3.7 53.8 59.5
Dec. 93 38.0 5.8 14.9 -0.5 -0.8 60.8 68.3
June 93 36.0 7.1 14.4 -0.8 -0.5 63.6 66.5
Dec. 92 41.8 6.6 15.7 -0.3 -1.2 63.4 69.1
June 92 38.1 7.6 15.3 -0.6 -2.1 61.9 70.2
Dec. 91 40.9 8.0 14.5 -0.8 -1.0 65.1 69.9
June 91 37.3 10.3 14.3 -3.0 -2.6 62.3 69.6
Dec. 90 41.1 8.0 13.6 -0.5 -1.3 63.9 68.8
Dec 89 44.4 9.0 29.1 0.1 0.0 71.5 71.5
Averages Direct
Materials
Direct
Labor
General
Prod.
Costs.
Net Change in 
Semi-Fin. Goods 
Inventory ( ')
Net Change 
in Fin. Goods 
Inventory (‘ )
COPGS COGS
June 95 44.3 3.2 19.4 -1.7 -5.8 59.5 66.5
Dec. 94 41.5 4.3 16.8 -2.3 -2.5 58.2 64.6
June 94 43.6 4.9 17.5 -4.3 -7.8 54.6 60.7
Dec. 93 38.5 7.7 17.2 -0.8 -1.2 61.4 68.4
June 93 37.0 9.7 19.7 -1.6 -0.9 64.0 67.7
Dec. 92 40.6 8.1 18.5 -0.5 -2.4 64.3 70.1
June 92 38.6 10.3 19.2 -1.7 -2.6 64.1 70.9
Dec. 91 39.0 10.4 19.0 -1.4 -2.4 64.3 69.3
June 91 39.7 14.1 20.6 -3.3 -5.2 66.2 71.6
_pec. 90 39.1 9.3 17.8 -1.0 -1.4 64.0 71.3
Dec 89 37.6 8.4 28.1 -0.6 -0.4 73.1 73.3
Notes: (‘) Beginning Inventory less ending inventory.
Discrepencies arise from uneven data availability among different table items. 
Source; ISE.
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Table 45 COGS Statements with Corrected Inventory Levels
Medians Direct
Materials
Direct
Labor
General
Prod.
Costs.
Net Change in 
Semi-Fin. Goods 
Inventory (’ )
Net Change 
in Fin. Goods 
Inventory ( ')
COPGS COGS
June 95 46.8 2.6 13.9 0.1 -0.8 67.8 72.6
Dec. 94 40.3 3.1 14.4 0.1 0.3 63.2 65.9
June 94 45.4 3.4 11.4 -0.1 -0.4 62.3 66.7
Dec. 93 38.0 5.8 14.9 0.0 0.1 66.5 69.4
June 93 36.0 7.1 14.4 -0.3 0.1 67.8 70.9
Dec. 92 41.8 6.6 15.7 0.1 -0.1 70.3 71.8
June 92 38.1 7.6 15.3 -0.2 -1.7 69.5 75.9
Dec. 91 40.9 8.0 14.5 -0.1 0.0 69.7 72.5
June 91 37.3 10.3 15.7 -1.2 -2.0 68.4 71.2
Dec. 90 37.3 8.0 15.3 0.0 -0.2 67.0 69.9
Dec 89 41.1 9.0 14.5 0.5 0.8 74.4 74.4
Averages Direct
Materials
Direct
Labor
General
Prod.
Costs.
Net Change in 
Semi-Fin. Goods 
Inventory )
Net Change 
in Fin. Goods 
Inventory (*)
COPGS COGS
June 95 44.3 3.2 19.4 0.7 -2.5 67.1 70.5
Dec. 94 41.5 4.3 16.8 -0.2 1.0 65.2 68.4
June 94 43.6 4.9 17.5 -0.3 -2.1 62.5 64.9
Dec. 93 38.5 7.7 17.2 0.1 0.5 65.4 69.7
June 93 37.0 9.7 19.7 -0.6 0.9 69.9 71.8
Dec. 92 40.6 8.1 18.5 0.6 -0.2 68.7 72.6
June 92 38.6 10.3 19.2 -0.2 -0.8 69.4 73..7
Dec. 91 39.0 10.4 19.0 -0.3 -0.4 68.3 71.4
June 91 39.7 14.1 20.6 -1.7 -3.5 70.6 75.1
Dec. 90 39.1 9.3 17.8 0.0 -0.3 66.0 73.2
Dec 89 37.6 8.4 28.1 0.3 1.5 75.9 76.2
Notes: ( ) Beginning Inventory less ending inventory.
Discrcpencies between the components of COGS and its sum in the Tables arise from uneven data availability among different 
table items. Details are presented in the appendix.
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When the finished and semi-finished goods inventories are corrected to account for the 
distortions arising from inflation fates and variations of inflation rates among years, it 
is seen that the relatively large negative changes in these inventories in June 1994 
(respectively -4.3% and -7.8% in the uncorrected -averages-table) decline substantially, 
especially for semi-finished goods inventory. Finished goods inventory seems to have 
increased even after the adjustment made for inflation which is consistent with the 
slow-down in the economy.
Overall, when the corrected COPGS/NS and COGS/NS figures are compared 
with uncorrected figures, the degree of distortion in the uncorrected tables can be seen. 
In the uncorrected tables, the 8.8% decline in median COGS/NS in June 1994 which 
leads to an equal amount of rise in the GM/NS, reduces to 2.7% after correction. 
Similarly, on a yearly basis, the decline of 5.4% between December 1993 and 
December 1994 decreases to 2.7 % after correction.
The second approach handles the accounting COGS as a whole and corrects it 
directly using several assumptions about the inventoiy policy of the companies and the 
movement of prices. The major ones of these assumptions are that (1) the inventory 
policy is (S,s) type (2) the actual unit prices and the actual unit costs (not the 
accounting costs) are constant (and thus equal to the actual annual COGS) over the 
year (3) a moving average cost is used as the inventory evaluation m e t h o d T h e  
problem then reduces to finding a conversion factor which will directly convert the 
accounting COGS to the actual annual COGS. The details of the derivation of the 
conversion factor is again left to the appendix and the results are reported in Table 46. 
Note that only the annual COGS figures are reported.
'^ *^ The companies in the sample which constitute relatively large manufacturing companies use average costing as 
the inventory evaluation method. They do not necessarily use moving average costing method. However, to the 
extent that they prepare short term income statements and reach the annual statement as an aggregation of these 
statements, the result of simple average costing method will converge to the moving average costing method.
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Table 46 Correction of COPGS and COGS with the Second Approach
Medians COPGS/riJS COGS/NS
Dec 94 60.2 65.3
Dec. 93 62.6 69.9
Dec 92 65.3 70.3
Dec. 91 66.8 71.3
Dec 90 65.0 70.6
Averages COPGS/NS COGS/NS
Dec 94 61.4 67.3
Dec. 93 63.4 69.9
Dec 92 65.8 71.6
Dec. 91 65.6 70.5
Dec 90 65.2 72.6
Notes: Correction is made using 6 periods per year. Details are presented in the appendix.
The results of the second correction approach on the COGS/NS are quite close to those 
of the first approach not only with the trend but even on the levels'^'. Both correction 
methods reduce the fall in COGS/NS in 1994 to less than 3% (averages).
Overall, the results of the two approaches point out to the fact that, in 1994, 
inflation led the accounting statements to seriously underestimate the actual COGS and 
thus overestimate of the actual GM.
5.5 Analysis of the Other Items in the Income Statements
The stabilization package adopted in April 1994 included an immediate hike in the 
interest rates on Treasury Bills and Government Bonds to slow-down the run on 
foreign exchange which traditionally is regarded as the safest financial asset during 
crises. The measures were successful in reaching their goal, namely absorbing the 
excess liquidity that invaded the economy due to the previous decisions of the 
government. However, increased rates on government paper immediately pushed up 
the general interest rate level as expected. The effect of this, is clearly seen in the 
income statements of the firms. On the one hand, median Other Income item , which 
mainly included the interest and dividend income from financial investments, increased
131Note that the latter is not true for COPGS.
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from 3.0 in the first half of 1993 to 5.8% in the first half of 1994. On the other, 
interest expenditures rose from 6.4% to 9.5%. Table 42 shows that the Other Income 
and Interest Expenses returned to their normal seasonal levels in the second half of 
1994 but overall, for 1994, both items were high compared to 1993 due to the increases 
in the first half of the year.
5.6 Recapitulation
Before wrapping up all the findings and conclude this section, it has to be noted that 
missing data leads to discrepancies in sums . The findings on earnings can be 
summarized as follows. Firstly, the raw financial data shows a rise in not only the EBT 
but also the GM. However, the gross margin has to be corrected for the distortionary 
effects of inflation. When this is done it is seen that it still shows a rise as seen in Table 
47. This rise is due to the net effect of a fall in labor and general production expenses 
and an increase in materials payments. Secondly, the increasing interest rates, on the 
one hand increased the interest expenditures and on the other increased the interest 
income substantially.
The net effect is still a rise in the EBT in 1994 but much less than indicated by 
the nominal financial figures in the company reports.
Viewing the earnings behavior from 1991 to 1994 it is seen that earnings 
increased consistently after 1991 even disregarding the particular circumstance in 
1994. An important factor behind this trend seems to be a consistent fall in the 
operating costs relative to net sales, which fell from 16.4% in the first half of 1991 to 
10.7% in the first half of 1995.
A final important finding, based on Table 47 which displays the median income 
statement figures for six month periods is that the main negative effect of the crisis was 
felt in the first half of 1994 as indicated by the rise in interest expenditures.
'^'The average ratio of cash+securities (most of which is government paper) to total assets increased from 9,2% 
in December 1993 to 10.1% in June 1994 and 12.1% in December 1994.
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Table 47 Corrected COGS and Earnings Before Tax Figures (%)
Medians COGSl/NS GMl/NS EB Tl COGS2/NS GM2/NS EBT2 UNCORRECTED 
GM EBT
Jun-95 72,6 27.4 12.0 33.2 17.8
Dec-94 65,9 34.1 13.3 65,3 34.7 13.9 38.0 17.2
Jun-94 66,7 33.3 12.5 40.5 15.3
Dec-93 69,4 30.6 11.5 69,9 30.1 11.0 32.4 13.3
Jun-93 70,9 29.1 9.6 34.4 14.9
Dec-92 71,8 28.2 6.8 70,3 29.7 8.3 30.9 9.5
Jun-92 75,9 24.1 1.9 30.6 8.2
Dec-91 72,5 27.5 4.6 71,3 28.7 6.6 30.1 7.2
Jun-91 71,2 28.8 0.0 34.3 5.5
Dec-90 69,9 30.1 9.9 70,6 29.6 9.4 31.2 11.0
Dec-89 74,4 25.6 3.6 30.6 8.6
COGSl, GMl; COGS and GM corrected with the first method. 
COGS2, GM2: COGS and GM corrected with the second method.
Averages COGSl/NS GMl EBT 1 COGS2/NS GM2 EBT2 UNCORRECTED 
GM EBT
Jiiii-95 70.5 29.5 19.3 33.4 23.2
Dec-94 68.4 31.6 14.3 67.3 32.7 15.4 36.7 19.4
Jun-94 64.9 35.1 12.8 39.8 17.5
Dec-93 69.7 30.3 14.5 69.9 30.1 14.3 32.3 16.5
Jun-93 71.8 28.2 11.2 32.5 15.5
Dec-92 72.6 27.4 6.7 71.6 28.4 7.7 31.1 10.4
Jun-92 73.7 26.3 3.0 31.4 8.1 .
Dec-91 71.4 28.6 7.5 70.5 29.5 8.4 30.7 9.6
Jun-91 75.1 24.9 -0.2 32.8 7.7
Dec-90 73.2 26.8 9.1 72.6 27.4 9.7 31.4 13.7
Dec-89 76.2 23.8 4.1 31.3 11.6
COGSl: COGS corrected with 
COGS2; COGS corrected with
the first method 
the second method
6 1994 CRISIS AND THE LIABILITY STRUCTURE
We now turn to the effects of the financial crises on the liability structures of the sample 
firms. Table 48 shows that, the debt constituted more than half of the total liabilities. In 
Junes, the ratio goes above 55% of the total. More than 80% of the total debt is in short 
term nature. It is seen that the rise in total debt in mid-years stems from the rise in short
'” por a lot of firms, the sub-totals exist but their components do not. Thus when averages or medians of these 
components are taken over firms, the discrepancies arise.
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term debt; the ratio of short term debt to total liabilities (STD/TA) exhibits clear
seasonal variations and it increases by up to 7% in the June financial statements.
Table 48 Descriptive Statistics II: Liability Structure and Interest Expense 
(% Ratios to Total Assets Except for Interest Burden)
MEDIANS
All (2)
Jun-95
l)ec-94
Jun-94
Dec-93
Jun-93
Dec-92
Jun-92
Dec-91
Jiin-91
Dec-90
Dec-89
TOTAL
DEBT
50.3
50.6
46.6
57.7
52.6
56.4
52.4
56.8
53.7
57.7
.52.3
50.3
SHORT 
TERM DEBT
36.6
41.6
35.5
43.3
38.5
43.3
37.3
43.5
39.1
45.5
35.4
34.3
LONG 
TERM DEBT
9.5
6.7
7.4
8.6
9.6
10.3
9.9
11.7
10.0
11.0
9.8
13.5
Notes: (') Interest Expense/Net Sales. (") Only Decembers.
BANK
CREDIT
11.5
8.9
8.3
9.8
13.0
13.7
14.3
17.4
12.5
12.0
6.4
15.2
TRADE
CREDIT
9.7
9.4
9.2
11.6
10.2
9.9
10.8
8.6
10.0
7.8
9.0
8.2
INTEREST 
BURDEN ( ')
5.7
3.9
7.8
9.5
5.4
6.4
6.7
6.8
6.8
6.8
4.5
7.4
AVERAGES TOTAL
DEBT
SHORT 
TERM DEBT
LONG
TERM DEBT
BANK
CREDIT
TRADE
CREDIT
INTEREST 
BURDEN ( ')
All (2) 51.8 40.1 11.8 15.9 12.0 8.8
Jun-95 51.9 43.0 9.0 14.1 12.3 6.5
Dec-94 48.3 38.9 9.4 14.2 11.8 11.6
Jun-94 58.6 46.2 12.5 16.7 14.0 18.3
Dec-93 51.6 39.8 11.8 16.2 13.0 7.4
Jun-93 56.3 44.0 12.3 16.3 12.6 7.7
Dec-92 53.4 41.5 11.9 16.8 12.9 9.1
Jun-92 57.8 44.2 13.6 20.3 10.8 10.6
Dcc-91 53.6 41.9 11.8 18.1 11.9 10.1
Jun-91 57.8 44.8 13.0 18.5 9.4 10.6
Dec-90 51.8 39.1 12.7 12.7 10.8 7.6
Dec-89 52.9 38.3 14.6 14.6 10.6 9.3
Notes: ( )  Interest
The debt item includes the following sub-items: (i) Financial Debt (bank loans 
and securities), (ii) Trade Credits Received, (Hi) Other Debt (debt to shareholders, debt 
to participations, taxes and duties to be paid, other debt to the state) (iv) advances 
received for orders not delivered (v) deferred taxes and severance pay. Among these, 
bank loans and trade credits constitute about 60% of the total short term debt and about 
40% of the long term debt on the average. Thus from our point of view, the items
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under consideration are bank credits and trade credits' '^*. Bank credits constitute 14- 
20% of the total liabilities and thus about 30-40% of the total debt. Trade credit 
received seems to be comparable to bank credits in importance as a financial resource. 
Except for 1994 and 1995, the median ratio of trade credit to total liabilities (TC/TA) 
displays a counter movement to that of total debt and short term debt. The interest 
burden displays a declining trend after June 1992. This trend ended abruptly with the 
1994 crises when the interest rates exploded.
6.1 Categorization of Firms
To analyze the differential impact of the crises on firm with different attributes, the 
sample was classified using three different qualitative variables. In the literature a 
number of criteria have been used to distinguish firms that are likely to have lower 
agency costs or to be less financially constrained. For example, as mentioned earlier, 
Fazzari et. al (1988) use retention rates, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994) use size and 
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) use relation to industrial groups. In this study 
we use size and three qualitative variables; relation to banks, relations to 
conglomerates and foreign equity participation. The descriptive statistics on the 
categories are given in Table 49. We now turn to explain these categories in more 
detail.
''^Other Debt item has also some financial characteristics as it includes debt to shareholders and to 
participations. The size of the Long term portion of this item is negligible with zero median value for all periods 
under consideration. On the other hand the short term portion whose main component is unpaid taxes and duties, 
is large. In this item there is a pronounced seasonality in that the June figures are on the average half of the 
December figures. During the crisis, median ratio of short term other debt to total assets was 10.6% in June 1994 
and 3.9% in December against 7.4% and 3.3% in June and December 1993 respectively. The average figures 
shows a smaller change: 11.6% and 4.9% in June and December 1994 against 10.3% and 4.7% in 1993 
respectively. Thus this item shows an increase during the crisis period.
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Table 49 Descriptive Statistics on Firm Categories (TL billion)
SIZE CONGLOMERATE BANKS FOREIGN STAKE
SMALL MED. LARGE GROUP NON­
GROUP
BANK NON
-BANK
FOREIGN NON-
FOREÏGN
No. of Firms 34 42 47 40 83 35 88 15 108
Asset Size
Average 619 1,329 5,669 1,467 3.428 3,128 2,634 3,572 2,682
Median 450 1,132 2,578 1,234 1,248 2,442 1,058 2,329 1,133
Net Sales
Average 583 1,471 7,017 1,702 4,136 3,871 3,136 4,171 3,228
Median 516 1,453 3,360 1,458 1,484 2,167 1,371 2,995 1,402
Notes: Figures belong to December 1994.
Source: ISE and author’s calculations
Category 1: Size
As mentioned earlier, the average firm in the sample represents relatively large firms 
when the entire population of industrial firms in Turkey is considered. Nevertheless, 
the sample is divided into three categories according to size. The division was made 
according to total net sales as of December 1993. Inter-category shifts is not allowed 
between periods. However, this does not create a major restriction since firm rankings 
according to size does not change much. For example, the rank correlation between 
1993 (December) and 1994 (December) was l.O'^ .^
The category net sales thresholds were taken as: Large: larger than TL 1 
trillion; Medium: TL 400 TL billion to TL 1 trillion; Small: smaller than TL 400 
billion (all, 1993 December prices). The number of firms, asset sizes and net sales for 
size categories are given in Table 49.
Category 2: Relation to Conglomerates
The second qualitative variable is firms’ relationships to conglomerates. A firm is 
considered a ‘Group Firm’ (GF) if a holding company or one its non-bank 
subsidiaries hold more than 20% of its shares. The firms belonging to conglomerates 
with banks are not included in this group. Instead they are included as “bank firms” 
(Category 3). Again, intergroup shifts is not allowed but that also is consistent with the
135'Another rsnkin^ Wcis iiiso ni3de according to totcil assets. The rsnk correlation between this ordeiin^ cind net 
sales ordering was about 0.9 for December 1993 and December 1994. The results are thus convincing that taking 
total assets or net sales as the size criterion basically give the same firm-category mappings.
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sample data. As of December 1994, 40 of the 123 firms in the sample are GF and the 
rest (83) are non-group firm (NGF). Controlling for bank relations GFs, are presumed 
to have better access to the financial markets than NGFs, mainly because belonging to 
a group make the firm implicitly more secure vis-à-vis potential lenders.
Category 3: Relation with Banks
In Turkey, the banks are allowed to hold shares of companies. A firm in this study is 
considered related to a bank (BF) if either (i) a bank holds more than 15% of the 
shares of the firm or (ii) if the firm belongs to a group which holds cross-ownership 
relations with a bank. As in the GFs. BFs are presumed to have a higher access to 
financial markets compared to Non-Bank Firms (NBFs).
As seen in Table 49, 35 out of 123 firms in the sample are related to banks.
Category 4: Foreign - Non-Foreign Firms
A final categorization was made according to the foreign stake in the firm. A firm is 
considered ‘foreign’ if the foreign stakeholders own more than 10% of the total 
outstanding shares. As of December 1994 there are 15 such firms. We presume that 
foreign firms are less financially constrained.
6.2 The Differential Characteristics of Categories
From Tables 49 - 52 the following observations about the liability structure of firms 
can be extracted. We first compare the general trends for different categories of firms 
and then examine the details of changes the shifts in trends in different periods. Note 
that to account for skewedness in distributions, Tables 49 - 52 provide both averages 
and medians. To facilitate comparison across firm types, sample mean and medians are 
reported in the first row.
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Total and Short/Long Term Debt
(i) Smaller firms, non-group firms and non-bank firms have higher debt to asset ratios. 
For the foreign/non-foreign split the results are mixed.
(ii) Ratio of both short and long term debt to total assets gets larger as size gets 
smaller but the reliance on short-term debt gets much more pronounced with size 
(Table 49). The mean and median values for long term debt are, in most periods similar 
for small and large firms. However, for short term debt, the differences are much 
higher, reaching 6% at times in favor of smaller firms. In other words, in smaller firms, 
short term debt constitutes a higher proportion of the total. Hence the difference in the 
ratio of total debt between large and small firms is mainly accounted by differences in 
short term debt.
(in) The conclusion in (ii) is stronger for G/NG and B/NB firms. In fact, for Bank 
firms, averages of long-term debt to total assets are higher than NG and NB firms 
respectively.
Bank Credits
(iv) The ratio of bank credits to total assets is also higher in smaller firms relative to 
larger firms. Similarly, non-group and non-bank firms also have higher bank credit 
ratios than group and bank firms respectively. For Non-foreign firms, the medians 
show higher reliance on bank credits compared to foreign firms but that conclusion 
weakens when the averages are considered. For the pre-crises period these conclusions 
are correct for both debt as a ratio to total assets and as a ratio to total debt.
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Trade Credit
(v) Large and NG firms rely, in general, more on trade credit than the small and non­
group firms respectively. This fact is valid concerning both the ratio of trade credits to 
total assets and the ratio of trade credits to total debt. For bank and non-bank firms the 
data do not provide a perceptible distinction. For foreign and non-foreign firms when 
averages are considered, foreign firms seem to rely more on trade credits than non- 
foreign firms but the evidence weakens slightly when medians are considered.
Interest Burden
(vi) Smaller, NG, NB and NF firms carry a higher burden of interest compared to 
larger, group, bank and foreign firms respectively, suggesting that agency costs for the 
former categories of firms are lower than the latter group as expected
6.3 Behavior before and during the Crises
The behavior of the liability structure and interest burden provides interesting evidence 
on the distinct responses of the firm categories and the market’s treatment of them.
In general, it is seen that total debt increased in June 1994, the peak of the crisis 
as discussed in the previous section, although part of the increase can be attributed to 
the seasonality. Increase in total debt which is due to reduced income from sales, 
consequent increase in financing needs and finally debt restructuring is not unexpected
1 ' i n
during economic crises . However, the investigation of the movement of two 
important sub categories in of total debt, namely bank credits and trade credits 
received, shows how this increase in financing needs were met and how the degree of 
access to financial markets is determined during “bad times”.
136,
137.
Of course part of the difference in interest burden is due to higher debt. 
The debt deflation view stresses also the effect of increased interest rates.
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Figures 13-15 display the course of median values of interest burden, bank 
credits/total assets and trade credlt/total assets for different bank categories during the 
periods df December 1993 to June 1995. Firstly, the top panels demonstrate how the 
agency costs differ during the crises for different categories of firms. For all categories, 
the interest burden rises but with differing degrees. Namely, the increase in interest 
burden in smaller, non-group and non-bank firms are much higher than larger, non­
group and non-bank firms respectively. Thus the a priori categorization made among 
the firms with respect to possible closeness of ties to the banks are justified.
Having seen that smaller, non-group and non-bank firms are treated as higher 
agency cost firms by the financial market, we can next look at the share of bank credits 
in total assets to see if different categories of firms had distinctive access to bank credit 
during the crises. Indeed, this is the case. As seen in the middle panel of figure 14, 
large firms received an increased share of bank credits during the crises whereas the 
same share decreased considerably for smaller firms. The same is true for group and 
non-group firms. As seen in the middle panel of figure 15, bank credits increased for 
group firms during both June 1994 and December 1994 whereas they fell in both 
periods for non-group firms.
The behavior of bank credits in bank vs. non-bank split is different than the 
other two splits but nevertheless supports the same conclusion. For bank firms, credits 
fell slightly in June 1994 but than increased, reaching their level of December 1993 in 
December 1994. For non-bank firms, credits fell in both periods, coming close to half 
their level of December 1993 in December 1994. The fall in June 1994 is especially 
striking.
The evidence until this point show that (1) financing needs increased during the 
crises (2) however, the banks treated the firms that are informationally closer to them 
favorably. A third item, trade credits received, sheds a final light on the issue. As seen 
in the bottom panels of figures 13-15, for smaller, non-group and non-bank firms, 
which had the relative share of bank credits in total assets decline during the June 
1994, resorted to increased borrowing from other firms. As seen in Figure 14 the jump
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in trade credits is especially pronounced for small firms for which a comparably drastic 
fall occurred in bank credits.
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Table 49 Small (S), Medium (M) and Large Firms (L)
Average BAf^KCRE DIT TOTAL DEBT SHORT TERM DEBT LONG TERM DEBT INTEREST BURDEN TRADE CREDIT
s M L S M L s M L S M L S M L S M L
All (1) 18.3 16.1 14.0 56.5 49.7 50.7 43.8 38.9 38.6 12.7 10.7 12.0 9.9 8.8 8.1 11.0 11.8 12.8
Jun-95 14.9 15.1 12.6 54.6 49.4 52.2 44.5 41.7 43.0 10.1 7.7 9.3 8,9 5,7 4,7% 12.0 11.2 13.4
Dec-94 12.3 16.3 13.7 50.5 45.4 49.3 41.4 36.9 38.9 9.2 8.5 10.5 10,0 11,0 9,6% 11.7 10.8 12.7
Jun-94 15.8 18.2 16.1 61.9 53.8 60.2 49.7 42.4 46.8 12.2 11.5 13.4 15,4 14,4 12.9%' 14.6 11.3 15.6
Dec-93 18.3 17.5 13.3 56.4 49.9 49.7 43.5 38.1 38.6 12.8 11.9 11.0 7,5 7,0 7,0% 12.8 12.2 13.8
Jun-93 17.8 16.3 15.3 62.6 53.1 54.4 49.3 41.2 42.5 13.3 11.9 11.9 8,1 6,2 7,6% 13.2 10.6 13.7
Dec-92 18.9 18.1 14.2 60.0 51.7 50.3 46.1 40.9 38.8 13.9 10.8 11.5 10,1 8,6 7,7% 12.5 12.5 13.7
Jun-92 25.1 20.6 17.4 63.9 55.1 56.2 48.0 42.4 43.2 15.8 12.7 13.0 13,2 9,4 8,7% 8.5 9.6 12.8
Dec-91 24.8 15.7 15.5 60.2 52.0 50.4 47.0 41.3 38.6 13.2 10.6 11.8 12,4 9,7 7,7% 10.2 12.9 12.2
Jun-91 20.9 15.2 19.0 59.8 59.0 55.0 45.9 46.4 42.4 13.9 12.5 12.6 13,5 6.9 9, 1% 9.4 9.1 9.6
Dec-90 17.1 10.9 11.7 56.1 49.8 51.0 41.4 38.6 38.2 14.7 11.2 12.8 9,8 7,5 5,7% 8.8 10.5 12.0
Dec-89
* Three extremi
18.5
e values abov(
17.0
i 65% were e>
16.7
cchided
53.9 48.8 55.5 40.4 36.6 38.7 13.5 12.2 16.9 10,0 9,2 8,3% 6.7 10.7 12.2
Medians BAP4K CRE DIT TOTAL DEBT SHORT TERM DEBT LONG TERM DEBT INTEREST BURDEN TRADE CREDIT
S M L s M L s M L s M L s M L s M L
All(I) 13.4 11.4 10.8 55.0 47.7 50.1 40.1 34.7 36.5 9.2 9.5 9.7 7.1 6.1 5.3 7.8 10.0 10.4
Jun-95 8.9 8.2 10.1 53.1 49.1 50.3 39.2 40.7 42.6 7.4 5.8 7.1 4.9 2.9 3.5 8.9 7.9 12.1
Dec-94 6.9 8.4 11.3 45.8 42.4 48.5 36.8 34.7 35.4 7.4 7.2 7.7 7.8 7.4 7.1 8.3 8.5 11.9
Jun-94 6.9 9.3 11.7 61.7 51.7 59.1 49.7 39.0 46.4 8.2 8.7 9.7 13.5 5.5 8.1 12.7 8.8 12.2
Dec-93 13.0 8.9 10.7 54.7 51.6 47.8 41.3 39.7 37.4 9.6 7.7 8.9 6.1 4.5 4.9 6.6 9.7 10.3
Jun-93 14.8 12.7 13.4 62.2 51.8 55.4 46.3 41.8 40.4 11.4 9.7 10.7 7.0 4.0 5.8 9.7 9.7 10.0
Dec-92 18.7 14.7 12.4 57.5 50.0 50.0 40.2 34.7 37.3 12.4 9.1 10.8 9.0 6.3 4.9 12.4 9.9 10.7
Jun-92 20.6 17.2 14.6 61.9 56.1 57.6 43.5 41.3 43.6 13.0 11.2 11.7 11.9 5.0 5.3 5.8 8.4 10.0
Dec-91 21.5 8.4 11.9 61.0 50.8 51.1 43.3 35.6 36.1 9.5 10.0 9.9 6.8 7.3 5.4 9.1 11.1 9.4
Jun-91 19.4 9.8 8.7 57.5 58.9 54.7 43.8 46.1 45.5 10.7 11.1 11.0 7.5 5.9 5.2 5.7 8.6 9.0
Dec-90 5.3 . 7.0 4.7 56.9 47.9 52.3 35.6 34.9 35.4 10.4 9.5 9.4 5.3 4.9 3.8 4.7 9.0 10.5
Dec-89 14.6
11
16.1 14.4 50.3 46.2 58.5 40.1 31.2 34.6 15.4 10.8 15.1 4.7 6.8 7.0 4.5 9.1 9.2
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Table 50 Bank and Non-bank Firms
Averages BANIC CREDIT TOTAL DEBT SHORT TERM DEBT LONG TERM DEBT TRADE CREDIT INTEREST BURDEN
BANK NON­
BANK
BANK NON-BANK BANK NON-BANK BANK NON-BANK BANK NON-BANK BANK NON-BANK
All(l) 14.1 16.6 49.8 52.8 36.0 41.9 13.8 10.9 11.9 12.0 8.3 9.1
Jun-95 10.9 15.4 50.9 52.3 42.6 43.1 8.3 9.2 12.3 12.2 6.4 6.2Dec-94 11.4 15.3 47.5 48.6 38.3 39.1 9.3 9.5 11.4 11.9 9.2 11.9Jun-94 12.9 18.3 55.6 59.9 43.2 47.5 12.4 12.5 12.8 14.5 14.3 19.0Dec-93 11.9 17.9 48.4 52.9 35.7 41.5 12.7 11.5 13.6 12.7 6.0 7.6Jun-93 13.6 17.5 53.1 57.7 40.0 45.8 13.0 12.0 12.4 12.7 6.3 7.8Dec-92 13.9 18.1 49.2 55.2 37.0 43.4 12.3 11.8 12.6 13.1 7.8 9.1Jun-92 14.8 22.9 52.2 60.5 37.3 47.5 14.9 13.0 11.0 10.7 8.6 10.8Dec-91 15.6 19.2 51.3 54.7 37.7 43.6 13.6 11.0 12.7 11.6 9.8 9.6Jun-91 22.8 17.3 52.4 59.3 32.3 . 48.3 20.0 11.1 3.6 11.0 15.7 8.4
Dec-90 14.7 11.8 50.6 52.4 33.2 41.9 17.4 10.5 9.3 11.4 8.1 6.8
Dec-89 18.9 16.0 52.7 53.0 32.6 42.1 20.1 10.8 11.3 10.1 9.0 8.9
Medians BAN!C CREDIT TOT.\ L  DEBT SHORT TERM DEBT LONG TERM DEBT TRADE CREDIT INTEREST BURDEN
BANK NON­
BANK
BANK NON-BANK BANK NON-BANK BANK NON­
BANK
BANK NON-BANK BANK NON-BANK
AIl(l) 11.7 11.4 49.3 51.9 33.9 38.3 10.8 9.0 10.2 9.4 6.0 5.6Jun-95 8.2 9.2 51.2 50.4 41.6 41.7 6.3 9.2 9.7 9.2 3.3 3.7Dec-94 9.6 7.6 47.8 46.2 35.5 35.5 10.5 7.3 9.6 9.2 5.5 8.0Jun-94 7.4 10.3 54.9 58.6 42.8 43.6 10.1 8.5 10.1 11.7 7.5 11.2Dec-93 9.8 14.5 46.5 53.8 35.8 40.5 10.8 9.0 11.6 9.4 5.7 4.5Jun-93 13.6 13.7 56.8 56.0 41.6 44.3 11.1 10.0 8.7 9.9 7.0 4.8Dec-92 13.3 16.4 48.9 53.9 34.7 39.6 10.9 9.5 11.1 10.6 6.3 6.3Jun-92 14.3 19.7 53.8 57.6 34.9 44.8 13.6 11.2 8.4 9.3 5.6 6.5Dec-91 10.3 13.0 54.7 53.7 34.4 40.4 9.1 10.0 11.2 9.4 5.6 6.6Jun-91 23.9 9.8 54.7 58.3 36.1 46.7 28.2 10.9 3.0 9.3 10.1 5.3Dec-90 10.4 5.0 49.6 52.4 31.6 ' 36.1 12.0 8.8 6.6 9.1 4.7 4.2Dec-89
Notes: fh O n I'
15.2
/  Decembei
14.7
-S
50.1 53.5 29.5 42.9 17.7 9.5 8.9 7.5 8.0 6.5
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Table 51 Group and Non-Group Firms
Averages BANK<::r e d it TOTAL DEBT SHORT TERM DEBT LONG TERM DEBT TRADE CREDIT INTEREST BURDEN
GROUP NON­
GROUP
GROUP NON­
GROUP
GROUP NON-
GROUP
GROUP NON­
GROUP
GROUP NON­
GROUP
GROUP NON­
GROUPAll(l) 16.3 15.6 50.0 52.7 39.1 40.6 11.0 12.1 10.4 12.7 8.2 9.2
Jun-95 14.9 13.7 51.6 52.1 43.2 42.8 8.4 9.2 11.8 12.5 5.1 6.8
Dec-94 14.5 14.0 44.8 50.0 35.4 40.6 9.3 9.5 10.6 12.4 9.0 12.1
Jun-94 17.8 16.2 58.2 58.8 43.8 47.3 14.5 11.5 12.9 14.5 14.4 19.1
Dec-93 14.2 17.0 47.5 53.5 36.3 41.4 11.2 12.1 10.8 14.0 5.8 7.8
Jun-93 15.5 16.7 56.5 56.2 43.9 44.1 12.7 12.1 11.5 13.2 6.0 7.9
Dec-92 17.0 16.8 51.6 54.3 37.8 43.3 13.8 11.0 11.5 13.6 8.4 8.8
Jun-92 24.5 17.8 63.5 54.5 50.3 40.6 13.2 13.8 10.9 10.8 10.8 9.6
Dec-91 20.9 16.8 53.3 53.8 42.2 41.7 11.0 12.1 9.1 13.2 10.0 9.5
Jun-91 17.2 19.6 65.5 51.8 53.4 38.0 12.1 13.8 12.7 6.8 9.4 10.5
Dec-90 13.4 12.4 52.2 51.6 41.6 37.8 10.6 13.8 9.0 11.6 7.1 7.3
Dec-89 18.6 16.4 53.1 52.8 44.6 35.1 8.4 17.7 12.3 9.8 9.3 8.8
Medians BANK CREDIT TOTAI.DEBT SHORT TERM DEBT LONG TERM DEBT TRADE CREDIT INTEREST BURDEN
GROUP NON­
GROUP
GROUP NON­
GROUP
GROUP NON­
GROUP
GROUP NON­
GROUP
GROUP NON­
GROUP
GROUP NON­
GROUPAll(l) 10.6 12.0 48.9 52.3 34.4 37.5 8.8 9.7 8.8 10.2 5.2 6.0
Jun-95 8.5 9.2 50.6 50.7 43.1 38.8 4.7 6.9 12.1 8.5 4.7
Dec-94 10.4 8.0 43.6 47.8 34.3 35.9 5.6 7.6 8.0 9.7 5.1 7.9Jun-94 8.4 11.3 53.0 58.4 43.0 43.6 10.6 8.5 8.6 12.6 6.6 13.4
Dec-93 7.0 13.7 45.5 53.5 32.9 39.7 8.9 9.6 8.9 10.8 4.0 5.7
Jun-93 10.3 14.0 54.0 57.2 42.1 43.6 9.8 10.7 10.0 9.6 3.6 6.8
Dec-92 16.5 13.9 46.3 54.3 31.6 40.2 9.9 9.9 9.8 12.1 6.5 6.2
Jun-92 21.7 16.1 59.7 55.5 44.8 39.8 10.1 12.7 9.3 8.6 5.4 6.9
Dec-91 14.8 12.5 49.6 54.0 35.3 40.4 10.0 9.6 8.2 10.7 5.3 6.7
Jun-91 9.3 12.7 61.2 54.7 51.7 40.1 11.5 11.0 11.0 3.8 4.9 8.3
Dec-90 8.7 6.2 50.7 53.2 34.3 35.6 9.1 10.4 8.9 9.0 4.6 4.2
Dec-89 15.3 15.0 51.6 50.1 49.0 32.3 7.0 15.5 11.3 7.6 7.0 в ^
' Decembers.
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Table 52 Foreign and Non-foreign Firms
Medians BANK CREDIT TOTAI.DEBT SHIORT TERM DEBT LONG TERM DEBT TRADE CREDIT INTFRF.ST m iRnENFOREIGN NON-
FOREIGN
FOREIGN NON-
FOREIGN
FOREIGN NON-
FOREIGN
FOREIGN NON-
FOREIGN
FOREIGN NON-
FOREIGN
FOREIGN NON-
FORFinNAll(l) 8.2 11.9 52.6 50.2 37.6 36.2 9.9 9.5 11.2 9.4 4.5
 WIVIiilVjrll 
6.0Jun-95 5.7 9.7 50.6 50.6 38.4 41.8 5.7 9.0 12.8 9.0 4.5 3.6Dec-94 5.6 9.2 44.1 46.8 34.3 35.7 8.0 9.1 9.7 9.1 7.4 7.6Jun-94 9.1 9.8 58.1 57.8 50.1 43.2 9.6 11.7 10.1 11.7 7.4 10.3Dec-93 12.9 13.1 53.5 51.2 43.9 37.5 9.6 10.2 10.2 10.2 2.7 5.3Jun-93 16.5 13.5 59.7 56.2 47.0 43.3 10.7 9.8 12.2 9.8 5.2 5.8Dec-92 12.8 16.5 51.5 54.3 36.4 40.7 11.1 11.6 10.4 11.6 6.0 8.8Jun-92 10.3 17.5 59.7 56.6 41.1 43.5 12.5 8.6 15.1 8.6 3.2 6.5Dec-91 10.3 17.2 52.6 53.8 35.1 41.9 9.6 9.4 10.4 9.4 5.4 6.8Jun-91 29.6 11.0 55.3 57.9 29.5 . 45.5 17.1 8.2 6.8 8.2 15.4 6.4Dec-90 3.4 7.0 48.8 52.3 38.4 34.4 8.6 8.7 13.2 8.8 n nJ.J 4.6Dec-89 12.2 15.2 54.9 50.3 31.5 34.5 19.0 8.2 7.8  ^ 8.2 6.7 6.7
Averages BANKC: r e d it TOTALDEBT SHIORT TERM DEBT LONG TERM DEBT TRADE CREDIT INTERE.ST RIlRnFNFOREIGN NON-
FOREIGN
FOREIGN NON-
FOREIGN
FOREIGN NON-
FOREIGN
FOREIGN NON-
FOREIGN
FOREIGN NON-
FOREIGN
FOREIGN NON-
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IN T E R E S T  B U R D EN
BANK CREDITS
Figure 13 Bank and Non-bank Firms
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Figure 14 Small and Large Firms
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Figure 15 Group and Non-group Firms
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In the previous seetion, we attempted at describing the effects of the crisis on 
the financial behavior of firms using a descriptive approach. We employed the 
average and median values. Naturally, such an approach can not tell a clear 
story controlling for the effects of different factors. In this section, we will try 
to eliminate this flaw by employing an econometric approach.
We will investigate the liability structures of the firms employing an ad- 
hoc estimation procedure. The ratios of short (STBCTA) and long term bank 
credits (LTBCTA) to total liabilities are taken as the dependent variable. As 
discussed earlier, bank credits constitute the largest source of short term 
external funds in Turkey. The other major source is trade credits. For medium 
and long term, bank credit is again the main source of external finance. The 
bond market is minor both for long term and short term. Thus, for both long and 
short term external funds bank credit is the major source of debt.
In the applied literature two main approaches have been employed to 
determine the sensitivity of firms to cash flow. One departs from the investment 
demand function enriched by the cash flow variable to see if its coefficient is 
significant. Much of the studies referred to in the second section of this chapter 
belong to this tradition . A second approach is to tackle the problem from the 
angle of capital s t r u c t u r e I f  firm financing behavior is based on a pecking 
order whereby the priority order is internally generated funds, external debt and 
new equity issues, one expects a significant coefficient on the cash flow 
variable in capital structure estimations'"'®. In this section we adopt the second 
approach mainly because the investment (book) data were too noisy for the 
sample firms.
7 L IA B IL IT Y  STR U C TU R E  ESTIM ATIO N S
'^ ®In addition to the references in the second section, see also Ramirez (1995). 
'^ ’For a recent d iscussion  on capital structure, see Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
‘‘“’See A tiyas and Ersel (1994 ) for an exam ple.
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Annual and semi-annual financial data from 1992 to 1995 were used 
with a total of 777 observations. To avoid biases arising from seasonalities and 
accounting principles, a dummy taking the value of one in Junes was used as a 
regressor. The structure and the ‘response to crises of 1994’ were investigated 
in separate regressions to avoid running regressions with too many variables at 
once. Nevertheless, this was also done to see if it makes changes in the results 
but not reported as the main conclusions remained intact.
Fixed effects model was used in estimations. This allows us to drop any 
restrictional assumptions on the error term. Moreover, fixed effects model does 
not require any assumption on the independence of the error term and the 
regressors as discussed in Chapter III.
If there are agency costs of external finance then everything else constant 
firms would prefer using retained earnings to finance their operations. Hence 
retained earnings (internal funds) should have a negative effect on bank credit. 
On the other hand collateralizable assets of the firm should have a positive 
effect. Average profitability would point out to higher probability of repayment 
and is therefore expected to take a positive sign. Size is expected to take a 
positive sign as it is presumed that size would facilitate access to credit.
In the estimations of short term bank credit the following explanatory 
variables were used;
Pre-tax profit as a percentage o f total net sales (PROFIT) as a proxy for 
retained earnings or the internal source of funds for the period; Accounts 
receivable as a percentage o f total asses (ARTA) as a proxy for short term 
collateralizable assets of the firm; Real Totals Assets (RTOTAS was used to 
capture the effect of size.
To determine the effects of the capital market imperfections, the 
following dummies were used with quantitative variables interactively,
BANK: takes the value of 1 for ‘bank firms’.
CONG: takes the value of 1 for ‘group firms’
FORE: takes the value of 1 for ‘foreign firms’.
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LARGE: takes the value of 1 for large size firms and 0 for medium- and small­
sized firms.
Period dummies:
JUN: takes the value of 1 for June data. JUN95, DEC94, JUN94, DEC93, 
JUN93: take the value of 1 in the respective period. Dummies for December 
1992 and June 1992 were not included in order to avoid exact multicolliniarity 
among the period dummies.
In the estimations of long term bank credit in the total liabilities, the same 
explanatory variables were used except that ARTA was substituted by the Ratio 
o f Total Net Fixed Assets to Total Assets (NFATA) as a proxy for long term 
collateralization capacity of the firm.
In Table 53, the “structure” estimations are presented. For both short- 
and long-term bank credits profit has a negative coefficient indicating that 
internal and external funds are not perfect substitutes. In other words, internal 
funds are the primary source of finance. This gives support to the asymmetric 
information literature which suggests that a premium is imposed on the external 
finances due to the asymmetry of information between the lender and borrower, 
making internal funds the main primary financial resource for the firm.
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Table 53 Estimation Equations for Short and Long-term Bank Credit: 
Structure
Equation
Term
i l l
Short
Term
Short Term
i ^
Long Term
i l l
Long Term
Dependent Variable STBCTA STBCTA LTBCTA LTBCTA
PROFIT -0.325
(-7.00)
-0.239
(-5.14)
-0.0835
(-3.32)
-0.059
(-2.34)
ARTA 0.106
(2.58)
0.143
(2.48)
NFATA - 0.00001
(-0.00)
-0.0072
(-1-27)
RTOTAS 0.03
(3.89)
0.014
(1.48)
0.018
(4.31)
0.10
(1-95)
BANK*PROFIT 0.170
(2.46)
-0.03
( - 1-02)
BANK*ARTA -0.063
(-0.87)
BANK*NFATA 0.005
(0.74)
BANK*RTOTAS - 0.0012
(-0-71)
-0.015
(-1-62)
CONG‘ PROFIT 0.155
(2.38)
0.005
(0-15)
CONG*ARTA -0.052
(-0.76)
CONG*NFATA -0.0044
(-0.38)
CONG*RTOTAS 0.0067
( 1.81)
-0.019
(-0.96)
LARGE*PROFIT 0.0226
(0.39)
-0.058
( - 1-86)
LARGE*ARTA -0.084
(-1-26)
LARGE*NFATA 0.0073
( 1.30)
LARGE*RTOTAS - 0.011
(-1.15)
-0.088
(-1.65)
R^ 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.72
No. of Observations 777 111 111 111
Notes: t values arc in parenthesis, 
are not reported.
”  significance at 5% and ’ at 10% level. Coefficient s of time dummies
In equation (1), ARTA has a positive and significant sign in the short term bank 
credit equation as would be expected. Higher collateralization capacity leads to 
higher external finance. However, surprisingly, NFATA is not significant in the 
long term equation (3). Size (RTOTAS) is positive and significant in both short 
term and long term equations (1) and (3).
The most important finding in equation (1) is the positive and significant 
coefficients for BANK*PROFIT and CONG*PROFIT interactive variables in
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the short term estimations. Thus the coefficients of PROFIT is smaller in 
absolute value for bank and group firms compared to non-bank and non-group 
firms'"*'. This indicates that the agency problems are less severe for bank and 
group firms supporting the assertions of the asymmetric information literature. 
Surprisingly, these variables are insignificant in the long-term equation.
Equations (3) indicates that size is an important factor in access to long­
term credit. In equation 13), the coefficient of RTOTAS is positive and 
significant and that of BANK*RTOTAS is negative and significant. This 
indicates that size is a less important factor for bank-firms in obtaining long­
term bank credits possibly due to the informational advantages emphasized 
earlier. In equation (4) the coefficient of LARGE*PROFIT is surprisingly 
negative and significant at 10% level.
Table 54 Estimation Equations for Short and
Equation (1) (2)
Term Short Term Long Term
Dependent
Variable
STBCTA LTBCTA
PROFIT -0.25
(-7.38)
-0.072"
(-3.92)
JPROFIT 0.086"
(2.09)
-0.045"
(-2.04)
ARTA 0.08"
(2.58)
JARTA 0.046
(0.78)
NFATA 0.0003
(0.46)
JNFATA -0.0003
(-0.13)
RTOTAS 0.029"
(4.21)
0.16*’
(4.24)
JRTOTAS 0.63’
(1.69)
0.37
(1.00)
R^ 0.74 0.72
No. of
Observations
777 777
Notes; t values are in parenthesis. ** significance at 5% 
level. Coefficient s of time dummies are not reported.
and * at 10%
I 4 I These results are robust to changing the estimation method to random effects or OLS.
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We now turn to examine the impact of the crisis. In general we expect the crises 
to magnify the agency problems and more so for smaller, non-bank and non­
group firms. To capture the effect of the 1994 crisis, we interact the JUN94 
dummy with each explanatory variable “'‘I  The results are presented in Table 54.
In line with earlier estimations, PROFIT has a negative and significant 
coefficient for both short- and long-term credit. JPROFIT is significant but 
positive. The financial crisis thus seem to have exerted its effect mainly through 
the JPROFIT variable. But unexpectedly, the sign is positive. On the other 
hand, the coefficient of JPROFIT is negative and significant for long-term 
credit. This possibly points out to a restructuring move from short- to long-term 
credit and needs to be investigated in more detail. As it is implausible to have 
the sensitivity to internal funds decrease during the crises, another explanation 
for the positive and significant coefficient of JPROFIT in short-term equation 
may be increased rigidities concerning external finance. Lower sensitivity 
(lower absolute value of the sum of the coefficients of PROFIT and JPROFIT) 
means a given amount of reduction in internal funds would lead to a lower 
amount of increase in short-term borrowing from banks. Conversely, a given 
amount of increase in internal Hinds would lead to a lower reduction in bank 
borrowing. Size (RTOTAS) is significant in both equations. On the other hand, 
JRTOTAS is positive in both short and long term but significant in only the 
short term equations.
We continue in this section to single out the difference in the behavior of 
different categories of firms during crises.
In Tables 55 - 56 we report the results of regression ran for different 
categories of firms: bank, non-bank, group, non-group and non-bank/non-group 
firms.
■''^ Thus, for example, JPROFIT is the product of JUN94 and PROFIT.
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Table 55 Short-term Bank Credit
Equation (I) ______(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Category BANK NON-BANK GROUP NON-GROUP LARGE SMALL
PROFIT -0.206" -0.263" -0.19” -0.28" -0.29" -0.233"
(-4.43) (-5.98) (-3.41) (-6.56) (-6.49) (-4.77)
JPROFIT 0.027 0.010’ 0.09 0.073 0.133" 0.059
(0.47) (1.89) (1.60) (1.24) (2.43) (1.00)
ARTA 0.037 0.083" 0.060 0.075” 0.039 O.Ol"
(0.81) (2.15) (1.11) (1.93) (0.99) (2.18)
JARTA 0.031 0.056 0.028 0.052 0.068 0.035
(0.37) (0.75) (0.29) (0.70) (1.13) (0.34)
RTOTAS 0.022" 0.032" 0.10" 0.027" 0.028 ’ 0.085
(1.89) (3.75) (2.55) (3.69) (5.05) (1.52)
JRTOTAS 0.010 0.61 0.0013 0.50 0.70" 0.044
(1.25) (1.39) (0.45) (1.24) (2.18) (1.02)
R^ 0.70 0.74 0.80 0.71 0.77 0.73
No. of
Observations
229 548 254 523 310 467
Notes; t values are in parenthesis. ** significance at 5% and * at 10% level. Coefficients of time dummies are not reported.
Table 56 Long-term Bank Credit
Equation (7) (8) J2L jm . iLLL jm .
Category BANK
-0.103”
(-4.25)
NON-BANK 
—
GROUP NON-GROUP LARGE SMALL
PROFIT -0.062
(-2.65)
-0.0089
(-0.20)
- 0.10
(-5.73)
- 0.102
(-3.77)
-0.051
(-2.00)
JPROFIT 0.158
(0.50)
-0.066
(-2.34)
-0.145
(-3.26)
0.028
(1-18)
-0.32
(-0.98)
-0.057
(-1.91)
NFATA 0.008
(1.69)
0.0002
(0.27)
-0.0014
(-0.20)
0.0003
(0.59)
0.0002
(0.43)
-0.0024
(0.41)
JNFATA -0.023
(-0.23)
-0.0013
(-0.42)
0.0042
(0.58)
-0.0028
(-1.37)
- 0.0011
(-0.53)
0.20
(2.06)
RTOTAS -0.25
(-0.04)
0.019
(4.25)
0.025
(0.80)
0.017 (5.39) 0.018
(5.39)
0.90
(0.31)
JRTOTAS 0.28
(0.64)
0.51
(0.97)
-0.72
(-0.25)
0.95
(2.85)
0.43
(1.18)
0.032
(1.57)
R^ 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.78 0.80 0.67
No. of
Observations
229 548 254 523 310 467
Notes: t values are in parenthesis. ”  significance at 5% and ’ at 10% level. Coefficients of time dummies are not reported.
A number of interesting results emerge in Tables 55 and 56 which permit us to 
compare both the responses of different categories of firms to crises at a given 
debt maturity and the response to the crisis of a given firm category in short-and 
long-term bank borrowing.
Comparing bank and non-bank firms in short-term borrowing (equations 
(1) and (2)), it is seen that the coefficient of JPROFIT is insignificant in bank 
firms but positive and significant in non-bank firms. On the other hand, in long 
term equations (7) and (8) respectively, the coefficient of JPROFIT becomes
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insignificant for bank firms and negative and significant for non-bank firms. In 
other words, during the crisis the sensitivity to internal funds remains 
unchanged for bank firms whereas for non-bank firms it gets weakened for 
short-term and strengthened for long-term credits. Our interpretation of these 
observations is increased rollovers in the shorter term for non-bank firms and in 
the longer term for bank-firms. Banks seem to force the non-bank firms to 
restructure debt in the form of short term credits. Size is important for both 
bank and non-bank firms for short term borrowing. For long term bon’owing, it 
is significant for non-bank firms but not bank firms.
For group firms, the coefficient of JPROFIT insignificant like the bank 
firms. But unlike the bank firms, in the long term equation the coefficient is 
significant. Surprisingly, for long-term, the coefficient of PROFIT in 
insignificant. At the face value, this indicates that at normal times, the group 
firms are not constrained for long term credits but during the crises the 
sensitivity to cash flow increased, i.e., the constraints started to bind.
For non-group firms, ARTA is significant in the short term equation like 
the non-bank firms. Also the coefficient of size is significant. For long term 
credit, size is again significant but during the crises its importance even grew, 
as displayed by the positive and significant coefficient on RTOTAS.
For large firms, the coefficient of JPROFIT is positive and significant in 
the short run and insignificant in the long run. For small and medium sized 
firms, the coefficient is insignificant in the short run but negative and 
significant in the long run. Surprisingly, for large firms, size appears to be 
significant in both terms and size became even more important during the crises 
in the short run.
7.1 Recapitulation
The estimations point out to the imperfections in the market for bank credit; the 
negative and significant coefficients on PROFIT variable shows that internal 
and external funds are not perfect substitutes for firms. Moreover, this
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sensitivity is not equal among firms. It is more severe for firms that are 
informationally farther to banks than those closer to banks.
The results also indicate that size is an important factor in the access to 
bank credit. During the crises for some, but not all, of the firm categories its 
importance became even more pronounced. Generally, size seems to be 
important for firms in access to credit even after controlling for ties to banks.
Finally, the results indicate that there has been a push towards 
restructuring. But the terms of restructuring also differed among different firm 
categories. Firms closer to banks seemed to have obtained better terms and 
restructured to longer maturity.
8 RESTRUCTURING
Table 57 below shows that the past due loans of the banking system increased 
sharply after February 1994. Given the rapid increase in past due loans, it can 
be argued that the more creditworthy/ customers who went in trouble could 
have convinced the banks of restructuring.
Table 57 Past Due Loans ( )
93/12 94/1 94/2 94/3 94/4 94/5 94/6 94/7 94/8 94/9
Gross 11,424 11,882 12,813 13,591 16,761 17,933 20,280 21,508 23,385 22,871
Net (') 4,119 4,406 5,224 5,758 8,608 10,237 12,351 13,531 14,857 13,520
Gross/ Total 
Assets (%)
0.43 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.69 0.82 0.93 0.97 1.0 0.88
Gross/Total 
Credits (%)
1.13 1.15 1.37 1.42 1.97 2.55 2.93 3.21 3.33 2.92
Notes: (') Trillion TL. (') Gross less specific reserve for loans.
The other side of the coin is the firms. Increasing debt burden and simultaneous 
pressures from demand side forced firms to restructure their liabilities. In this 
section, the restructuring behavior of firms is investigated. OLS and PROBIT 
regressions were used for this purpose. The conclusions are generally similar
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but more powerful in OLS than PROBIT. The PROBIT results are therefore not 
reported here.
The strategy is to run regressions on the change in the ratio o f total bank 
credits to total liabilities for total, short and long term bank credits. Data belong 
to June 1994. The dependent variable is taken as the difference between the 
ratio of bank credits (for total, long term and short term) to total liabilities in 
June 1994 over June 1993''’^  (DBCTL, DLTBCTL, DSTBCTL respectively). 
The independent variables are natural logarithm of total assets (LNTOTAS) to 
capture the effect of size; the ratio of profits to net sales (PROFIT) to capture 
the effects of cashflow; the ratio of interest expense to net sales (INTBUR) to 
capture the effect of agency costs of borrowing and financial distress, the 
BANK, FORE and CONG dummies defined as before to capture the effects of 
firms’ relations to these categories; and finally, the ratio of total bank credits to 
total liabilities in June 1993. The results are presented in Table 58.
Considering the results together first, it is seen that PROFIT has a 
negative sign and size has a positive coefficient in all three regressions. The 
sign of BCTA93, the starting bank credit level (ratio to total liabilities) is 
significant in all regressions but the sign is different. INTBUR has significant 
and positive coefficients in the total and short term regressions. Finally, the 
coefficients of BANK and FORE dummies are insignificant in all regressions 
whereas coefficient of CONG dummy is positive and significant in total and 
long term regressions.
We take the restructuring mainly as a shift of bank loans from short to 
long term maturity. On the other hand, rescheduling may also be in the form of 
a simple short term roll-over of the part or all of the existing debt. The better the 
relations between the firm and the bank (thus the less the information problem 
between the borrower and the lender, taking the prospects for the firm constant
ran estimated regressions with the change of the same ratios between June 1994 and December 
1993. The conclusions were basically unchanged but those of the former were stronger. It is preferable 
to report June 1994-June 1993 results also because using June data avoids possible biases arising from 
seasonal trends in balance sheets.
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of course) the better should be the conditions of the restructuring facing the 
firm. Viewing the estimation results from this angle, size appears as a major 
factor in restructuring. The coefficient of size is significant for long term bank 
credit regression but insignificant for short term. Larger firms restructured 
easier than the smaller ones. The coefficient of PROFIT is negative in all 
regressions but insignificant in the short term bank credits similar to the case of 
LNTOTAS indicating that the higher the internally generated funds the less the 
restructuring.
Table 58 Restructuring
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
DBCTL DLTBCTL DSTBCTL
c -0.181 -0.148 -0.034
(-1.60) (-1.94) (-0.36)
LNTOTAS 0.015** 0.011* 0.003
( 1.77) (2.05) (0.48)
PROFIT -0.093* -0.056 -0.037
(-2 .18) (-1.97) (-1.06)
INTBUR 0.095* -0.041 0.135*
(2.07) (-1.35) (3.59)
BANK -0.009 (-0.014) 0.004
(-0.37) (-0.84) (0.22)
FORE -0.002 0.002 -0.003
(-0.06) (0.10) (-0.11)
CONG 0.042* 0.029 0.013
( 1.82) (1.86) (0.68)
BCTA93 -0.19* 0.10 -0.295*
(-2.38) (1.91) (-4.46)
R^ 0.19 0.19 0.21
Standard Error 0.096 0..064 0.079
Notes: t values arc in parenthesis. * indicates significance at 5% level. ** indicates significance at 10% level. 
No. o f  O bserva tion s: 104.
The initial level of bank credit is also significant for both long term and short 
term but the sign is negative for short term and positive for long term; in other 
words the higher the initial level of total credits the lower the proportional 
increase in short term credits and the higher the proportional increase in the 
long term credits. To the extent that the initial level of bank credit can be
'‘'‘'For the PROBIT analysis which is not reported here, when this difference is higher than 1%, it is 
taken as evidence of rescheduling and for those firms the value of the dependent variable is taken as 1.
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considered as a proxy for the closeness of ties between the firm and the banks, it 
can be concluded that firms with closer ties to banks restructured easier than the 
other firms. This may also be the reason of insignificant coefficient of BANK 
dummy; controlling for the effect of BCTR93, coefficient of BANK becomes 
insignificant.
The same result may, however , lend itself to a different interpretation as 
well. It may be that banks rescheduled the credits to firms with higher levels of 
credit simply to recover their loans.
The sign of INTBUR which is positive and significant for short term and 
negative and insignificant for long term sheds some light on this latter issue. 
Firms with higher agency costs (high interest burden) were not able to 
restructure their debts to long term (negative coefficient with a p-value of 18%). 
On the other hand, the same category of firms witnessed their short term bank 
debt increase during the crises. These two bits of information may be 
interpreted as, the lower the agency cost (information problem) the better were 
the rescheduling conditions that the firm faced. Finally, the significant and 
positive sign for CONG dummy in the long term regression supports this 
interpretation. Belonging to a conglomerate increases the negotiation power of 
the firm.
9 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we obtained several results. Firstly, based on VAR estimations 
including variables on money, credit, output and bank balance sheet variables, 
we showed that movements of output is closely associated with that of credit. 
Though this is not a totally rigorous proof on the existence and importance of 
the credit channel in Turkey it provides at least tentative evidence on the issue.
Secondly, we looked at the issue of credit contraction in Turkey. We 
argued and presented evidence that the contraction of credit during the 1994
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financial crisis was mainly due to non-monetaiy factors; money played a role in 
the formation of crisis but it did not lead to the contraction of credit per se. 
Instead, the credit contraction was due to the accumulation of a number 
conditions that led the banks to form a net negative position in foreign currency 
assets prior to the crisis and the fiscal policy of the government at the end of 
1993 and the beginning of 1994. As a result, contraction of credit started before 
tight money started.
Thirdly, we considered the sales and earnings behavior of firms. It was 
seen that the crisis brought about a serious contraction in sales and pushed to 
firms to increase their exports. However, a glance at the earnings showed a 
surprising increase in earnings. This increase in earnings was not totally due to 
increased holdings of government securities as many observers argued after the 
crisis, even the gross margins increased. We employed two approaches to 
correct for the distortionary effect of inflation on the income statements. After 
the correction we showed that the increase in earnings was there but much 
smaller than what is reported in the financial statements. This increase was seen 
to be the net effect of reduced real labor costs (due to increased inflation in the 
presence of fixed nominal wages during the crisis year), reduced general 
operation expenses, increased interest expenditures and increased interest 
income.
Fourthly, we looked at mean and median values of liability structure 
items. We detected systematic differences in the liability structure of different 
categories of firms. We found that firms that are presumably closer to banks 
informationally or legally, rely less on total debt as well as bank credit. We 
interpreted this as these firms having a stronger equity base. The evidence on 
interest burden also supports the idea that these firms obtain better deals from 
the banks in general. The behavior of the firms during the crisis also lend 
support to the same hypothesis. The firms that are closer to banks abruptly 
increase their reliance on bank credits relatively. Interest burden increases for 
all type of firms but much more pronouncedly for firms that are farther to
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banks. Finally for the latter firms, reliance on trade credit rise considerably 
during the peak of the crisis showing that their financial needs increased and 
they had to resort increasingly to non-bank resources.
Fifthly, we estimated bank indebtedness equations. The results showed 
that for all firms, the coefficient of profits are negative and significant but the 
size is larger for firms informationally farther to banks. For the crisis behavior, 
we estimated equations on both pooled and separate firm categories. It was seen 
that different categories of firms behaved differently during the crisis which is 
also confirmed by macroeconomic data on credits. There has been a push for 
restructuring but firms closer to banks received better treatment from banks, 
basically in the form of restructuring to longer term. In these regressions we 
also saw that size is an important factor in obtaining credits even after 
controlling for ties to banks.
Finally we looked at the issue of restructuring in more detail. We saw 
that firms with higher internal funds avoided restructuring as would be 
expected. Secondly, size appeared as an important factor. Thirdly, higher 
agency costs (distance from banks) led to higher restructuring but mainly in the 
form of short-term roll-overs and not to long-term debt. Finally, initial closeness 
of ties to banks, proxied by initial gearing ratio increased restructuring from 
short to long term.
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APPENDIX 1 TO CHAPTER 4; VAR ESTIMATION RESULTS
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DATA SOURCES
'he data are monthly. Four VAR configurations were used. The first VAR configuration 
^hich is related to Impulse Response Functions in Figures 3-6 include real bank balance sheet 
ariables. The second VAR configuration employs nominal real bank balance sheet variables, 
he third VAR is run on differenced variables of the first VAR. Finally the fourth 
onfiguration includes bank credits to private enterprises instead of total bank credits. All 
onfigurations include the log monthly Industrial Production Index for output and the log of 
Wholesale Production Index. The variable abbreviations are defined below.
il; Interbank Interest Rate (Source; The Central Bank)
'^IPI: Log of Monthly Production Index (Source; State Institute of Statistics)
■^ RTC; Log of Real Total Bank Credits (Source; The Central Bank)
'^TC; Log of Nominal Total Bank Credits (Source; The Central Bank)
NiRTDEP; Log of Real Total Bank Deposits (Source; The Central Bank)
NTDEP; Log of Nominal Total Bank Deposits (Source; The Central Bank)
''IRSEC; Log of Real Total Bank Securities Portfolios (Source; The Central Bank)
NSEC; Log of Nominal Total Bank Securities Portfolios (Source; The Central Bank)
NWPI; Log of Wholesale Price Index (Source; State Institute of Statistics)
/NCPE; Log of Total Bank Credits to Private Enterprises (Source; The Central Bank)
) denotes first difference (Third VAR configuration)
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I. FIRST CONFIGURATION (FR LNRTC LNIPI LNRTDEP LNRSEC LNWPI)
Sample(adjusted); 1986:11 1995: 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
FR
FR(-l)
FR(-2)
FR(-3)
FR(-4)
FR(-5)
FR(-6)
LNRTC(-l)
LNRTC(-2)
LNRTC(-3)
LNRTC(-4)
LNRTC(-5)
LNRTC(-6)
0.978734
(0.12408)
-0.214781
(0.16220)
-0.350586
(0.17328)
0.120786
(0.18402)
-0.291885
(0.16706)
-0.048596
(0.12259)
-1.292725
(0.99070)
-0.105240
(1.02555)
-0.790709
(0.97325)
2.417549
(1.12365)
-1.378787
(1.15081)
1.715635
(1.03338)
03
LNRTC
0.020045
(0.02155)
-0.082290
(0.02817)
0.003326
(0.03009)
0.040998
(0.03196)
0.020248
(0.02901)
-0.057985
(0.02129)
0.315843
(0.17206)
0.087224
(0.17811)
0.761289
(0.16903)
-0.303544
(0.19515)
-0.149180
(0.19986)
0.105534
(0.17947)
LNIPI
-0.029607
(0.03200)
0.000355
(0.04183)
-0.041005
(0.04468)
0.060509
(0.04745)
0.057858
(0.04308)
0.017982
(0.03161)
0.063227
(0.25547)
-0.139016
(0.26445)
0.535135
(0.25097)
-0.362307
(0.28975)
0.156998
(0.29675)
-0.016456
(0.26647)
LNRTDEP
0.050805
(0.02616)
-0.036275
(0.03420)
-0.003175
(0.03654)
0.039190
(0.03880)
0.038034
(0.03523)
-0.051957
(0.02585)
-0.223169
(0.20890)
0.059268
(0.21624)
0.444141
(0.20522)
-0.014836
(0.23693)
-0.284447
(0.24266)
0.025260
(0.21790)
LNRSEC
-0.033694
(0.03231)
0.003500
(0.04223)
0.081707
(0.04512)
-0.049486
(0.04792)
-0.011434
(0.04350)
-0.075397
(0.03192)
-0.475479
(0.25797)
0.329700
(0.26704)
0.106786
(0.25342)
-0.153728
(0.29258)
-0.362585
(0.29965)
0.493201
(0.26908)
LNWPI
0.004690
(0.01090)
0.069903
(0.01425)
-0.019478
(0.01523)
-0.022380
(0.01617)
0.011084
(0.01468)
0.027722
(0.01077)
0.033030
(0.08705)
0.069504
(0.09011)
-0.125978
(0.08552)
0.059720
(0.09873)
-0.149218
(0.10112)
0.083804
(0.09080)
LNIPI(-l) -0.332232 0.211336 0.230847 0.167341 0.132352 -0.043949
(0.48927) (0.08497) (0.12617) (0.10317) (0.12740) (0.04299)
LNIPI(-2) -0.212816 0.249562 0.211716 0.279870 0.216804 -0.017043
(0.50196) (0.08718) (0.12944) (0.10584) (0.13070) (0.04410)
LNlPl(-3) 0.597525 -0.009338 -0.175316 -0.175815 -0.099496 0.012107
(0.52701) (0.09153) (0.13590) (0.11113) (0.13723) (0.04631)
LNIPl(-4) 0.639657 -0.123372 -0.275971 -0.320271 -0.129666 0.026006
(0.50797) (0.08822) (0.13099) (0.10711) (0.13227) (0.04463)
LNIPI(-5) 0.033481 -0.130687 0.024236 -0.044882 0.213321 0.017912
(0.52131) (0.09054) (0.13443) (0.10992) (0.13574) (0.04581)
LNlPI(-6) -0.157330 0.071832 0.094078 0.048897 -0.108117 -0.016016
(0.46954) (0.08155) (0.12108) (0.09901) (0.12226) (0.04126)
LNRTDEP(-l) 0.641892 -0.128156 -0.347866 0.248398 0.196385 0.009289
(0.81404) (0.14138) (0.20991) (0.17165) (0.21196) (0.07153)
LNRTDEP(-2) -0.219994 0.213762 0.032164 0.498365 -0.032306 -0.046203
(0.84192) (0.14622) (0.21710) (0.17752) (0.21922) (0.07398)
LNRTDEP(-3) 0.555856 -0.005961 0.215842 0.325300 0.061055 0.002568
(0.84798) (0.14727) (0.21867) (0.17880) (0.22080) (0.07451)
LNRTDEP(-4) -0.720497 0.042815 -0.171273 -0.056698 -0.113947 0.096704
(0.83456) (0.14494) (0.21521) (0.17597) (0.21731) (0.07333)
LNRTDEP(-5) 1.778863 -0.054546 -0.052119 -0.156032 0.177481 0.096241
(0.84364) (0.14652) (0.21755) (0.17789) (0.21967) (0.07413)
LNRTDEP(-6) -2.147285 0.121482 0.065256 -0.015428 -0.169577 -0.103739
(0.79505) (0.13808) (0.20502) (0.16764) (0.20702) (0.06986)
LNRSEC(-l) -0.683714 0.032801 0.205810 0.196850 0.871376 -0.024867
(0.46756) (0.08120) (0.12057) (0.09859) (0.12175) (0.04108)
LNRSEC(-2) 1.089749 -0.210571 0.014793 -0.234845 -0.233581 0.157227
(0.61880) (0.10747) (0.15957) (0.13048) (0.16113) (0.05437)
LNRSEC(-3) 0.123225 0.042812 -0.083476 -0.155800 0.101640 -0.037751
(0.64483) (0.11199) (0.16628) (0.13597) (0.16791) (0.05666)
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LNRSEC(-5)
LNRSEC(-6)
LNWPI(-l)
LNWPI(-2)
LNWPI(-3)
LNWPl(-4)
LNWPI(-5)
LNWPI(-6)
C
LNRSEC(-4) -1.717165
(0.64275)
1.049031
(0.63684)
-0.573128
(0.48963)
-4.877106
(1.67018)
7.510857
(2.54128)
-1.351960
(2.64149)
-3.855931
(2.72154)
5.395035
(2.46189)
-2.662568
(1.80425)
-2.446994
(4.93987)
0.167448
(0.11163)
-0.039918
(0.11060)
-0.058071
(0.08504)
-0.925809
(0.29006)
0.189804
(0.44135)
1.029854
(0.45875)
-0.132647
(0.47265)
-0.429667
(0.42756)
0.259672
(0.31335)
-0.992926
(0.85792)
0.088030
(0.16574)
0.090191
(0.16422)
0.038175
(0.12626)
-0.160873
(0.43068)
-1.085497
(0.65531)
1.069995
(0.68115)
-1.076954
(0.70179)
0.872879
(0.63484)
0.426677
(0.46525)
2.863249
(1.27383)
0.247672
(0.13553)
-0.107671
(0.13428)
0.027375
(0.10324)
-0.885170
(0.35217)
0.418776
(0.53585)
0.748184
(0.55698)
0.312690
(0.57386)
-0.560157
(0.51911)
-0.007345
(0.38044)
1.087575
(1.04161)
-0.003903
(0.16736)
-0.299467
(0.16582)
0.186635
(0.12749)
-0.618484
(0.43489)
0.827605
(0.66172)
-0.047717
(0.68781)
0.419178
(0.70865)
-0.803192
(0.64104)
0.263261
(0.46980)
0.020600
(1.28628)
-0.129990
(0.05648)
0.125935
(0.05596)
0.005225
(0.04302)
1.105499
(0.14675)
-0.114199
(0.22329)
-0.133778
(0.23210)
-0.035166
(0.23913)
-0.112270
(0.21632)
0.269192
(0.15853)
-0.352707
(0.43405)
R-squared 0.855553 0.961296 0.886629 0.949888 0.954380 0.999842
Adj. R-sq. 0.774302 0.939525 0.822850 0.921701 0.928710 0.999753
Sum sq. resids 2.953121 0.089070 0.196360 0.131299 0.200225 0.022799
S.E. equation 0.214808 0.037306 0.055392 0.045294 0.055933 0.018874
Log likelihood 35.06658 211.8759 171.9534 192.2801 170.9710 280.6928
Akaike AIC -2.799585 -6.300758 -5.510215 -5.912724 -5,490760 -7.663470
Schwarz SC -1.841570 -5.342744 -4.552200 -4.954709 -4.532746 -6.705455
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SECOND CONFIGURATION (FR LNTC LNIPI LNTDEP LNSEC LNWPI)
Sample(adjusted): 1986:11 1995 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
FR
FR(-l)
FR(-2)
FR(-3)
FR(-4)
FR(-5)
FR(-6)
LNTC(-l)
LNTC(-2)
LNTC(-3)
LNTC(-4)
LNTC(-5)
LNTC(-6)
LNlPl(-l)
LNlPl(-2)
LNIPl(-3)
LNIPI(-4)
LNlPl(-5)
LNlPl(-6)
LNTDEP(-l)
LNTDEP(-2)
LNTDEP(-3)
LNTDEP(-4)
LNTDEP(-5)
LNTDEP(-6)
LNSEC(-l)
LNSEC(-2)
LNSEC(-3)
0.978737
(0.12408)
-0.214782
(0.16220)
-0.350586
(0.17328)
0.120789
(0.18402)
-0.291884
(0.16706)
-0.048595
(0.12259)
-1.292734
(0.99070)
-0.105226
(1.02554)
-0.790694
(0.97325)
2.417584
(1.12364)
-1.378833
(1.15081)
1.715622
(1.03338)
-0.332232
(0.48927)
-0.212808
(0.50196)
0.597532
(0.52701)
0.639652
(0.50797)
0.033471
(0.52131)
-0.157334
(0.46954)
0.641879
(0.81403)
-0.219987
(0.84191)
0.555843
(0.84798)
-0.720493
(0.83456)
1.778865
(0.84364)
-2.147270
(0.79505)
-0.683712
(0.46756)
1.089751
(0.61880)
0.123235
(0.64483)
:03
LNTC
0.024736
(0.01775)
-0.012387
(0.02321)
-0.016151
(0.02479)
0.018618
(0.02633)
0.031332
(0.02390)
-0.030263
(0.01754)
0.348874
(0.14174)
0.156727
(0.14673)
0.635308
(0.13925)
-0.243824
(0.16076)
-0.298398
(0.16465)
0.189340
(0.14785)
0.167389
(0.07000)
0.232519
(0.07182)
0.002768
(0.07540)
-0.097367
(0.07268)
-0.112776
(0.07458)
0.055818
(0.06718)
-0.118869
(0.11647)
0.167560
(0.12045)
-0.003388
(0.12132)
0.139517
(0.11940)
0.041696
(0.12070)
0.017741
(0.11375)
0.007934
(0.06689)
-0.053343
(0.08853)
0.005058
(0.09226)
LNIPI
-0.029607
(0.03200)
0.000356
(0.04183)
-0.041006
(0.04468)
0.060509
(0.04745)
0.057858
(0.04308)
0.017982
(0.03161)
0.063226
(0.25547)
-0.139019
(0.26445)
0.535132
(0.25097)
-0.362305
(0.28975)
0.157001
(0.29675)
-0.016454
(0.26647)
0.230846
(0.12617)
0.211717
(0.12944)
-0.175316
(0.13590)
-0.275972
(0.13099)
0.024237
(0.13443)
0.094080
(0.12108)
-0.347864
(0.20991)
0.032163
(0.21710)
0.215847
(0.21867)
-0.171273
(0.21521)
-0.052126
(0.21755)
0.065258
(0.20502)
0.205808
(0.12057)
0.014796
(0.15957)
-0.083480
(0.16628)
LNTDEP
0.055495
(0.02476)
0.033629
(0.03236)
-0.022653
(0.03457)
O.OI68IO
(0.03672)
0.049119
(0.03333)
-0.024235
(0.02446)
-0.190135
(0.19767)
0.128762
(0.20463)
0.318169
(0.19419)
0.044883
(0.22420)
-0.433659
(0.22962)
0.109059
(0.20619)
0.123391
(0.09762)
0.262827
(0.10016)
-0.163706
(0.10515)
-0.294264
(0.10136)
-0.026970
(0.10402)
0.032880
(0.09369)
0.257682
(0.16242)
0.452170
(0.16799)
0.327866
(0.16920)
0.040010
(0.16652)
-0.059795
(0.16833)
-0.119167
(0.15864)
0.171984
(0.09329)
-0.077619
(0.12347)
-0.193552
(0.12866)
LNSEC
-0.029004
(0.03499)
0.073404
(0.04574)
0.062229
(0.04887)
-0.071865
(0.05190)
-0.000349
(0.04712)
-0.047675
(0.03457)
-0.442452
(0.27940)
0.399197
(0.28923)
-0.019182
(0.27448)
-0.094005
(0.31690)
-0.511796
(0.32456)
0.576994
(0.29144)
0.088402
(0.13799)
0.199762
(0.14157)
-0.087387
(0.14863)
-0.103658
(0.14326)
0.231232
(0.14702)
-0.124135
(0.13242)
0.205672
(0.22958)
-0.078504
(0.23744)
0.063619
(0.23915)
-0.017242
(0.23537)
0.273718
(0.23793)
-0.273310
(0.22423)
0.846508
(0.13187)
-0.076352
(0.17452)
0.063887
(0.18186)
I8I
LNSEC(-5)
LNSEC(-6)
LNWPI(-l)
LNWPI(-2)
LNWPI(-3)
LNWPl(-4)
LNWPI(-5)
LNWPI(-6)
LNSEC(-4) -1.717182
(0.64275)
1.049047
(0.63684)
-0.573134
(0.48963)
-3.542563
(1.45906)
6.746336
(2.33096)
-1.240350
(2.51217)
-3.835791
(2.41300)
3.945924
(2.21611)
-1.657789
(1.41001)
0.037458
(0.09196)
0.086016
(0.09111)
-0.052845
(0.07005)
-0.058253
(0.20875)
-0.195332
(0.33349)
0.259097
(0.35942)
-0.100966
(0.34523)
-0.371253
(0.31706)
0.374629
(0.20173)
0.088031
(0.16574)
0.090192
(0.16422)
0.038174
(0.12626)
-0.082038
(0.37624)
-0.993449
(0.60108)
0.402505
(0.64780)
-0.631404
(0.62223)
0.677804
(0.57146)
0.339704
(0.36359)
0.117681
(0.12825)
0.018265
(0.12707)
0.032601
(0.09770)
-0.019200
(0.29112)
-0.198742
(0.46509)
0.161927
(0.50125)
0.074958
(0.48146)
-0.197240
(0.44218)
0.239351
(0.28134)
-0.133894
(0.18127)
-0.173530
(0.17961)
0.191859
(0.13809)
-0.122715
(0.41149)
0.469056
(0.65739)
-0.289812
(0.70850)
0.629153
(0.68053)
-0.503848
(0.62501)
0.036907
(0.39766)
c -2.446982 -1.345639 2.863239 0.734871 -0.332113
(4.93988) (0.70676) (1.27383) (0.98565) (1.39318)
R-squared 0.855553 0.999630 0.886629 0.999348 0.998789
Adj. R-squared 0.774302 0.999420 0.822857 0.998982 0.998107
Sum sq. resids 2.953121 0.060449 0.196368 0.117569 0.234890
S.E. equation 0.214808 0.030733 0.055392 0.042861 0.060582
Log likelihood 35.06660 231.4517 171.9534 197.8578 162.9074
Akaike AIC -2.799585 -6.688399 -5.510214 -6.023173 -5.331085
Schwarz SC -1.841570 -5.730384 -4.552199 -5.065159 -4.373071
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THIRD CONFIGURATION (FR LNRCPE LNIPI LNRTDEP LNRSEC LNWPI)
Sample(adjusted): 1986:11 1995 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
FR
FR(-l)
FR(-2)
FR(-3)
FR(-4)
FR(-5)
FR(-6)
LNRCPE(-l)
LNRCPE(-2)
LNRCPE(-3)
LNRCPE(-4)
LNRCPE(-5)
LNRCPE(-6)
LNlPI(-l)
LNIPI(-2)
LNlPI(-3)
LNlPl(-4)
LNIPl(-5)
LNIPI(-6)
LNRTDEP(-l)
LNRTDEP(-2)
LNRTDEP(-3)
LNRTDEP(-4)
LNRTDEP(-5)
LNRTDEP(-6)
LNRSEC(-l)
LNRSEC(-2)
LNRSEC(-3)
1.072389
(0.12370)
-0.193280
(0.16903)
-0.265114
(0.19041)
0.159475
(0.20184)
-0.275568
(0.17815)
-0.012062
(0.13114)
-0.343281
(0.77992)
0.727887
(0.86831)
-0.167073
(0.86038)
0.208384
(0.86715)
-0.785209
(0.86376)
0.906937
(0.77353)
0.191942
(0.52886)
-0.536208
(0.51023)
0.457972
(0.49110)
0.453630
(0.49695)
-0.162019
(0.50350)
-0.277134
(0.48225)
0.095464
(0.80635)
-0.678257
(0.92987)
0.593793
(0.92803)
-0.254121
(0.93427)
1.872102
(0.92296)
-2.044779
(0.86274)
-0.482626
(0.52889)
1.201290
(0.68922)
0.077185
(0.71856)
:03
LNRCPE
-0.022946
(0.02250)
-0.042708
(0.03074)
-0.015962
(0.03463)
0.000187
(0.03671)
0.028090
(0.03240)
-0.068005
(0.02385)
0.341398
(0.14186)
0.275328
(0.15793)
0.138693
(0.15649)
-0.125468
(0.15772)
0.119106
(0.15711)
0.213277
(0.14070)
0.023633
(0.09619)
0.143514
(0.09280)
-0.007389
(0.08933)
-0.027958
(0.09039)
-0.144285
(0.09158)
-0.000327
(0.08772)
-0.403506
(0.14666)
-0.024870
(0.16913)
0.229495
(0.16880)
0.201535
(0.16993)
-0.111218
(0.16788)
0.099100
(0.15692)
0.176515
(0.09620)
-0.272619
(0.12536)
0.179083
(0.13070)
LNIPI LNRTDEP LNRSEC LNWPI
-0.042539 0.020585 -0.039431 0.003936
(0.03007) (0.02332) (0.03037) (0.00970)
0.004022 -0.025217 0.031226 0.072986
(0.04109) (0.03187) (0.04150) (0.01325)
-0.054010 -0.024223 0.092639 -0.014271
(0.04628) (0.03590) (0.04675) (0.01493)
0.040628 -0.009061 -0.063831 -0.018847
(0.04906) (0.03806) (0.04956) (0.01583)
0.055343 0.037577 0.002096 0.009063
(0.04331) (0.03359) (0.04374) (0.01397)
0.023555 -0.060781 -0.068903 0.026036
(0.03188) (0.02473) (0.03220) (0.01028)
-0.098168 -0.325845 -0.203670 0.018652
(0.18959) (0.14706) (0.19149) (0.06116)
-0.067286 0.199475 0.176487 0.043009
(0.21107) (0.16372) (0.21319) (0.06809)
0.191219 0.137149 0.361411 -0.051866
(0.20914) (0.16223) (0.21125) (0.06746)
0.120289 -0.164426 -0.352352 0.038036
(0.21079) (0.16351) (0.21291) (0.06799)
0.058967 -0.007372 -0.239098 -0.171837
(0.20997) (0.16287) (0.21208) (0.06773)
0.041728 0.323646 0.230873 0.065575
(0.18803) (0.14585) (0.18992) (0.06065)
0.139955 0.108302 0.174712 -0.008344
(0.12856) (0.09972) (0.12985) (0.04147)
0.197948 0.134796 0.138227 -0.013459
(0.12403) (0.09621) (0.12528) (0.04001)
-0.130446 -0.200732 -0.040893 0.024767
(0.11938) (0.09260) (0.12058) (0.03851)
-0.264623 -0.260081 -0.165743 0.042432
(0.12080) (0.09370) (0.12202) (0.03897)
-0.021054 -0.047768 0.144833 0.032762
(0.12239) (0.09494) (0.12362) (0.03948)
0.092650 -0.028613 -0.129951 -0.025054
(0.11723) (0.09093) (0.11841) (0.03781)
-0.394677 0.226929 -0.047056 0.042751
(0.19601) (0.15204) (0.19798) (0.06323)
-0.062516 0.328450 0.116261 -0.039905
(0.22604) (0.17533) (0.22831) (0.07291)
0.378163 0.408566 0.000540 0.002316
(0.22559) (0.17499) (0.22786) (0.07277)
-0.256720 0.046710 -0.003242 0.065479
(0.22711) (0.17616) (0.22939) (0.07326)
0.051784 -0.139451 0.140214 0.118938
(0.22436) (0.17403) (0.22661) (0.07237)
0.029890 -0.172236 -0.204579 -0.104808
(0.20972) (0.16267) (0.21183) (0.06765)
0.242836 0.283603 0.922049 -0.050767
(0.12857) (0.09973) (0.12986) (0.04147)
0.029773 -0.257978 -0.226019 0.179719
(0.16754) (0.12996) (0.16922) (0.05404)
-0.078646 -0.184966 0.109092 -0.064334
(0.17467) (0.13549) (0.17643) (0.05634)
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LNRSEC(-5)
LNRSEC(-6)
LNWPJ(-l)
LNWPI(-2)
LNWPI(-3)
LNWPI(-4)
LNWPI(-5)
LNWPI(-6)
C
LNRSEC(-4)
R-squared 
Adj. R-squared 
Sum sq. resids 
S.E. equation 
Log likelihood 
Akaike AIC 
Schwarz SC
-1.494556
(0.70439)
0.694261
(0.70505)
-0.354802
(0.54765)
-5.154725
(1.74198)
8.964538
(2.64905)
-0.367853
(2.83230)
-6.803694
(2.77601)
7.666823
(2.44329)
-4.204668
(1.88918)
0.310265
(5.04772)
0.831701
0.737032
3.440771
0.231866
27.34852
-2.646752
-1.688737
0.096390
(0.12812)
-0.163847
(0.12824)
0.012185
(0.09961)
-0.873769
(0.31684)
-0.030415
(0.48183)
0.554831
(0.51516)
0.535051
(0.50492)
-0.685944
(0,44441)
0.536568
(0.34362)
0.183435
(0.91812)
0.970356 
0.953681 
0.1 13832 
0.042174 
199.4892 
-6.055478 
-5.097464
0.024130
(0.17123)
0.130031
(0.17139)
0.068672
(0.13313)
-0.115875
(0.42345)
-1.206924
(0.64394)
0.630349
(0.68849)
-0.488318
(0.67480)
0.672909
(0.59393)
0.548095
(0.45923)
3.182798
(1.22702)
0.882618
0.816590
0.203315
0.056363
170.1976
-5.475445
-4.517431
0.287484
(0.13282)
-0.192430
(0.13294)
0.101203
(0.10326)
-0.646849
(0.32846)
0.255284
(0.49949)
0.454197
(0.53404)
0.219853
(0.52343)
-0.497785
(0.46070)
0.268916
(0.35622)
2.042135
(0.95177)
0.953312
0.927049
0.122330
0.043720
195.8533
-5.983480
-5.025465
-0.060304
(0.17295)
-0.278129
(0.17311)
0.169252
(0.13446)
-0.505696
(0.42771)
0.707518
(0.65042)
0.236035
(0.69541)
0.381747
(0.68159)
-0.668709
(0.59990)
-0.097565
(0.46385)
0.820414
(1.23936)
0.952740
0.926156
0.207426
0.056930
169.1867
-5.455428
-4.497414
-0.094430
(0.05523)
0.081811
(0.05528)
0.015388
(0.04294)
1.085338
(0.13659)
-0.192358
(0.20772)
0.094653
(0.22208)
-0.142168
(0.21767)
-0.077710
(0.19158)
0.209103
(0.14813)
-0.630106
(0.39580)
0.999853
0.999771
0.021155
0.018181
284.4727
-7.738320
-6.780306
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APPENDIX 2 TO CHAPTER 4: CORRECTION OF COGS
TABLES
1. FIRST APPROACH: CORRECTION THROUGH INVENTORIES
The first approach is a version of the suggestions made in Tybout (1988) to 
correct income statements in inflationary environments. This approach is based 
on the correction of the beginning and ending inventory levels. In the Turkish 
accounting standards (“The Uniform Accounting Norms”) for industrial 
companies, the Income Statements (I/S) include a single line for Cost of Goods 
Sold (COGS). The details of COGS are given in a separate table called Table of 
Cost of Goods Sold. In this financial table the information is given under the 
following format:
Manufacturing Activity (1)
Direct Raw Materials Expenditures (2) 
Direct Wage Expenditures (3)
General Production Expenditures 
Semi-Finished Goods Usage 
Beginning Inventory 
Ending Inventory 
Cost of Goods Manufactured
Change in the Finished Goods Inventory 
Beginning Inventory (7a)
Ending Inventory
Cost of Produced Goods Sold (COPGS)
Commercial Activity
Beginning Commodity Inventory 
Purchases
Ending Commodity Inventory 
Cost of Commodities Sold 
Cost of Services Provided 
Cost of Goods (and Services)
Sold (COGS)
(4)
(5) = (5a)-(5b)
(5a)
(5b)
(6) =  (1 )+ (2 )+ (3 )+ (4 )+ (5 )
(7) = (7a)+(7b)
(7b)
(8) = (6)+(7)
(9a)
(9b)
(9c)
(10) = (8)+(9a)+(9b)-(9c)
(11)
(12) = (10)+(11)
To correct for the distortion arising from inflation items (5), (7) and (9) need to 
be corrected. COPGS reports the costs incurred to manufacture the goods to
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sold and is thus an important item. The correction of this item is therefore our 
crucial task here. Reported data on commodity inventories are very limited and 
their quantities are not important relative to the inventories of finished and 
semi-finished goods. Item 9 thus have not been corrected. Thus corrected 
COGS was simply calculated as the sum of the corrected COPGS plus 
(uncorrected) items (9), (10) and (11).
The correction was made simply by converting the inventory figures at 
the mid- year prices using Wholesale Price Index (WPI). On the assumption that 
the net sales and annual purchases during the year, were, on the average, made 
at the mid-year prices. The corrected COGS and the NS become expressed at 
the same price level.
The conversion of nominal inventory figures into mid-year prices was 
made by the following conversion factors;
Annual Figures
Conversion Factor
Beginning Inventory P 9X^  P ¡2 9X-1
Ending Inventory P 9x/ PI2 9X
Here, Pçx denotes the average WPI in year 9X. P12/9X-1 and P12/9X-1 denote year 
end WPI of the consecutive years, 9X and 9X-1.
6-Month Figures
Audited financial tables of firms traded at the ISE, which are the basis of the 
data used in the study are reported twice a year. The June inventory levels have 
been corrected using the following conversion factor.
Conversion Factor
Beginning Inventory P1-6 9x/ P ¡2 9X-J
Ending Inventory P¡-6 9x/ P6 9X
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Here, Pi.6/9x denotes the average WPI during the first half of the year 9X. 
Pi2/9x-i is the December WPI of the year 9X-1 and P6/9x is the June WPI for 
the year 9X.
2. SECOND APPROACH: DIRECT CORRECTION OF THE COPGS
The second approach is based on a simplistic model of inventory policy. The 
main assumptions are (1) the inventory policy is (S,s) type (2) the actual unit 
prices and the actual unit costs (not the accounting costs) are constant (and thus 
equal to the actual annual COGS) over the year (3) a moving average cost is 
used as the inventory evaluation method. Using these assumptions this model 
constructs a conversion factor series which corrects the COPGS. The rest of the 
items between COPGS and COGS reported in the Table of Cost of Goods Sold 
(see the format of the Table of Cost of Goods Sold in the Turkish accounting 
system at the beginning of this appendix) are than added directly to COPGS.
Construction of the conversion factor is made with some further 
simplifying assumptions. Let S represent the real amount of inventories (here, 
the total inventories of materials to be used in production, semi-finished goods 
and the finished goods, thus excluding commodities) and assume for simplicity 
that S=2s. Further, assume that speed of the production cycle is uniform over 
the year and it takes 2 months for inventories to go down to s from S.
Let Cl represent the unit replacement cost of inputs and P, represent the 
unit price. By assumption (2) above, C,/P, is constant. Furthermore:
GM=C,/P, = Z C t/IP ,
where GM is the actual (true) gross margin of the company over the year and 
the summations are consequently made over the year. But the true gross margin 
is not observable. Our task is to find a measure of the true gross margin, GM, by 
filtering out the distortionary effects of inflation in the accounting gross margin, 
Ghf.
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By assumption (3), GMf, is calculated using moving average cost 
method. Given S=2s, the accounting unit cost, C , at any time during the year is 
the simple arithmetic average of the current and previous actual unit costs:
C " /  = ( Q - ^C,.,)/2
where A-l<t<A and A represents the inventory cycle number within the year 
(each cycle is assumed to take two months). The accounting Cost of Goods 
Sold, COGS°, is then given by
COGSr = 'Z(C , + G - i ) s / 2
I
= s( Z q ) + s(Co.C6) /2
where, Q  represents the unit cost applicable to the last period of the previous 
year. For six periods per year, actual COGS which we want to reach is
6
COGS=s( Z g )
1
Then, by using the following conversion factor on the accounting COGS, 
COG^, which is observed, one can obtain an estimate of the actual COGS (note 
that the minimum real inventory level, s, disappears):
6 r  5
COGS/COG^ = (Z g ) / (Z c ,)  + {Co + C6)/ 2
1 L I
As the WPI is announced monthly, unit cost corresponding to a period, is taken 
as the arithmetic averages of the two monthly figures. Though this model has 
some grossly simplifying assumptions, there is no harm in using its result as one 
possible measure of the distortionary effects of inflation on the income 
statements.
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